Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS2463
2006-07-14 12:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

PM: BELGIUM CAN DO MORE ON AFGHANISTAN, WANTS HELP

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM MCAP MOPS KNNP AF CG IR BE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #2463/01 1951248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141248Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2569
INFO RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0429
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0207
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0082
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 7538
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0137
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 002463 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MCAP MOPS KNNP AF CG IR BE
SUBJECT: PM: BELGIUM CAN DO MORE ON AFGHANISTAN, WANTS HELP
ON CONGO, STAYS TOUGH ON IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Korologos; Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 002463

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MCAP MOPS KNNP AF CG IR BE
SUBJECT: PM: BELGIUM CAN DO MORE ON AFGHANISTAN, WANTS HELP
ON CONGO, STAYS TOUGH ON IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Korologos; Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Verhofstadt told Ambassador Korologos July
20 that he was trying to secure coalition approval to
"double" the Belgian troop contribution to Afghanistan,
adding some 200 troops around Kabul. In principle, he
accepted the need for NATO common funding, but that NATO's
budgeting needed to be strengthened. Verhofstadt called for
more U.S. support for Congo post-transition, and has sent a
letter on this to President Bush. He also called for a donor
coordination body to replace the expiring CIAT in Kinshasa.
Ambassador pressed the PM to talk tough in his July 11
meeting with Iranian nuclear negotiator Larijani (which we
later heard he did). Verhofstadt said he was unconcerned
about coming local elections but was looking forward to his
campaign for reelection in spring 2007. END SUMMARY.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------


2. (C) In a July 20 meeting at the PM's office, the
Ambassador urged PM Verhofstadt to fulfill his pledge to
President Bush to do more on Afghanistan. Verhofstadt
admitted Belgium's only increase so far this year is 8
soldiers to PRT's. Now, however, the government is
discussing deploying some 200 soldiers to join the
Franco-Turkish maneuver battalion in Kabul. This would
nearly double our troop strength in Afghanistan. MoD Flahaut
has agreed, but it is now blocked not by Flahaut's French
Socialists but by the Flemish Socialists. Belgium is also
looking at collaborating with the Swedes on their PRT,
including sending civilian personnel from Development
Cooperation and at more development aid. Any increases would
probably only happen in November (Note: after elections).

NATO
---


3. (C) Verhofstadt said soon-to

be-transferred-from-Washington Ambassador Van Daele will work
effectively in NATO and will be given more authority to solve
problems. The PM accepted in principle the virtues of common
funding, agreeing when Ambassador noted the efficiencies of
common purchase of reusable equipment. PM said Belgium found
NATO budgeting sloppy, and that he had asked NATO SYG De Hoop
Scheffer to more carefully delineate common funding
guidelines, so the process can be predictable and
transparent. He has gained agreement from Defense Minister
Flahaut, if budgeting can improve. Belgium cannot resort to
a supplemental, unlike the U.S. due to its need for a
balanced budget. In fact, it will run a modest surplus based
on more robust economic growth.


4. (C) The PM spoke proudly of Belgium's military
modernization. He said the newly-acquired armored trucks
would be in the military parade the following week, but by
July 2007 they will parade the whole panoply of new equipment
for the army including armored vehicles purchased from
US-affiliated MOWAG, armored jeeps, and NH-90 helicopters.
This practical transformation underscores Belgium's
commitment to the new NATO and its missions.

SWIFT
--------------


5. (C) PM said he would try to keep control of the matter by
referring it to the College (like an interministerial
Deputies Committee) on Intelligence and Security, which is
headed by his personal Security Adviser Brice De Ruyver
(note: an academic and part-time adviser). He would strive
to keep the case out of the hands of the Federal Prosecutor,
who would not be subject to &political guidance8. He hoped
conclusion of College would be that no laws were broken. In
any event, he expressed the belief that the issue would be
politically manageable and that much of the furor has already
died down.

CONGO
--------------


6. (C) PM said he thought Congolese elections would go off as
scheduled and turn out reasonably well. He was concerned,
however, about growing nationalist sentiment, a movement he
called "Congolites." These were not any members of the
current coalition, but rather independents who are against
the parties' dependence on foreign sponsors.


7. (C) Verhofstadt believed that it was important to preserve
international coordination post-election among the donors and
a framework through which donor views could be communicated
to the Congolese government. He thought an "evolved CIAT"
was needed on the economy, to give advice and urge the
Congolese to do the right thing with the aid we give them.
So much assistance is now wasted in duplication or
corruption. Kabila has accepted such an advisory body,
without the formal power of the current CIAT. One
alternative is to create a "peace-building" commission, the
second alternative is an EU aid coordination body convened
under the Coutnou agreement. Political coordination among
key friends of Congo, including the U.S. and Belgium was also
important, so they could effectively engage post-transition
with the Congolese, particularly as the U.N. role would
diminish after transition. Verhofstadt ventured that this
could be more informal than the current CIAT or his proposed
donor structure.


8. (C) Verhofstadt mentioned he had sent a letter to
President Bush calling for the mobilization of additional
resources to help the new government after elections. He had
also sent this letter to 29 other heads of government,
including the EU, Switzerland, Norway and Japan. (Text of
letter has been forwarded to Department.)

DOMESTIC POLITICS
--------------


9. (C) PM said he was more focused on preparing the 2007
budget than on October 8 local elections, and looked forward
to national elections which he would not schedule to be held
until June or late May of next year. He said he would be
judged on the performance of his government and the economy,
which because of its modest (0.3%) budget surplus would be
among the fastest-growing in Western Europe at 3% per year.
(Note: We are analyzing his economic predictions, which seem
optimistic. End note.) Belgium's obligatory vote increases
unpredictability, he joked. He hoped for good weather on
election day, because the voters vote against the government
if the weather is bad. He acknowledged that after two full
terms, like politicians in other countries, he would have a
tough election fight ahead.

IRAN
--------------


10. (C) Verhofstadt said he would see Iranian nuclear
negotiator Larijani July 11, at Iranian request. His sole
purpose was to underscore Solana's message on the P5 plus 1
offer. He said he was embarrassed by recent press reports
that the Belgian lead of the IAEA investigative team in Iran
had been moved to a desk job, due to his conviction that Iran
was pursuing the bomb. In direct contact, however, the
inspector was not as critical of El Baradei as one might
think from the press. The Ambassador pressed the PM to hew
to the customary tough Belgian line on Iran and not offer any
daylight from the international community's generous offer.


11. (C) (Note: A Verhofstadt staffer got back to Embassy July
13 to report the meeting with Larijani largely reflected the
Iranians disappointing session earlier in the day with
Solana. Verhofstadt, whose points had been coordinated with
Solana's staff between the meetings, told Larijani that Iran
must immediately accept the P5 1 package, cease enrichment
and return to implementing the Aditional Protocol. The
Iranian said he had two points. First, that Iran accepts the
international community's offer, "as a basis to negotiate."
The second point was that Iran wanted to negotiate the terms
of package, but needed more time to review the offer. It
would not suspend enrichment and was prevented by going back
to the Additional Protocol by its own Pariament. Larijani
said he would be back to neotiate more with Solana, perhaps
in two weeks (the Belgians had not heard this from the EU).
The PM's staffer said his impression was that Iran was just
"playing for time." End note.)


12. (C) COMMENT: Verhofstadt seemed buoyant as he looked
toward some important moves before summer recess next week,
including possible enhancement in Afghanistan. He was more
confident than one might predict given his party's weak
standing in the polls, perhaps cheered by the flaring dispute
between his likely opponent and the key Francophone coalition
partner. End Comment.
ROBL
.