INTRODUCING THE EU VI: EVER-WIDER UNION:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BRUSSELS 000019

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: INTRODUCING THE EU VI: EVER-WIDER UNION:
THE ACCESSION PROCESS AND THE EU HOPEFULS

REF: (A) 05 BRUSSELS 3957; (B) 05 BRUSSELS 3994;
(C) 05 BRUSSELS 4373; (D) 05 BRUSSELS 4406
(E) 05 BRUSSELS 4443

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
--------------


1. Enlargement is one of the EU's "most successful
policies" and "a powerful foreign policy tool" for
extending a zone of peace and democracy across the
European continent. The conditions for joining and
the various stages of the accession process, as
outlined below, allow for little flexibility to
depart from EU standards, rules and practices. The
EU has thus been growing from the founding "Six" to
the current EU-25. Following the unprecedented
accession of ten countries on May 1, 2004, the
process is bound to continue: Bulgaria and Romania
aim to join at the beginning of 2007; Croatia and
Turkey started accession negotiations in October
2005; and Macedonia was granted candidate status at
the end of 2005. An even wider Union extending to
the whole region of Western Balkans is already in
the cards. However, enlargement "fatigue" among EU
governments and public opinion could complicate the
accession of new members and the issue of the EU's
final borders remains an open question.


2. This message - the sixth in a series updating
USEU cables of 2003 - is meant to help officers in
positions requiring a good knowledge and
understanding of the EU machinery. Other cables in
this series discuss the history of the European
Union; the chief political institutions of the EU
(Commission, Council and Parliament); the Presidency
and the European Council; the courts, the banks and
other bodies; the EU pillar structure and decision-
making procedures; and EU-US cooperation under the
Transatlantic dialogue. End Summary and
Introduction.

AN EVER-GROWING EU
--------------


3. Enlargement is often presented by the EU itself
as one of its "most successful policies" and "a
powerful foreign policy tool," extending a zone of
peace and democracy across Europe. Following the
expansion from 15 to 25 members on May 1, 2004, the
process will continue with further enlargement
eastward: Bulgaria and Romania signed their
accession Treaty in April 2005 with the aim of
joining at the beginning of 2007. Turkey and
Croatia formally opened accession talks in October
2005 and the countries of the Western Balkans all
share a European perspective.


4. The original six-member group of 1951 (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands)
has already undergone five successive enlargements
(not including the 1991 unification of Germany) to:

-- Denmark, Ireland and the UK (1973);
-- Greece (1981);
-- Portugal and Spain (1986);
-- Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995); and
-- Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia (2004).

ACCESSION CRITERIA
--------------


5. Per the EU Treaty, any European state may apply
to become a member of the Union. The Treaty fails
to provide any definition of what is meant by a
"European state," leaving open the issue of the EU's
final borders. (Note: Morocco's application for EU
membership was rejected in the early 1980s after the
Council determined it was not a "European state."
End Note.) Nor does the Treaty lay down detailed
political and economic conditions for membership.
The first clearly-defined rules for membership were
established at a June 1993 meeting of the European
Council in Copenhagen and are referred to as the
"Copenhagen criteria":

- Political. Achievement of stable institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for minorities;

- Economic. Existence of a functioning market
economy and capacity to cope with the competitive
pressure and market forces within the EU;

- Administrative. Ability to take on the
obligations of membership.


6. The 1995 Madrid European Council established a
further requirement that a candidate country must
have created the conditions for its integration
through the adjustment of its administrative
structures. This means that, while it is important
that the EU body of law (the "acquis") is transposed
into national legislation, it is even more important
that the legislation is implemented effectively
through appropriate administrative and judicial
structures.

HOW TO JOIN THE EU
--------------


7. The basic aim of accession negotiations is,
indeed, to ensure that the candidate country is able
to adopt and implement the "acquis" by the time of
accession. New members must abide by the whole
"acquis," including the case law of the European
Court of Justice. In some cases, where specific
difficulties make it impossible for the candidate to
apply the "acquis" fully from accession date, the EU
can accept transition measures. Derogations take
the form of transition periods that the EU grants to
a newcomer to bring its legislation and practices in
line with the "acquis."


8. In essence, however, the membership criteria are
non-negotiable, a key feature for a correct
understanding of the enlargement process. Any
derogation is strictly limited in scope and
duration. Unlike some of the former EU-15, the ten
member states that joined in 2004 had no recourse to
simply "opt out" of any EU policies, and are
committed to eventually join EMU and Schengen. The
EU itself can also seek temporary derogations to the
application of EU policies to the candidates, such
as the free movement of labor into the EU. Workers
from the new Central and Eastern European countries
did not get immediate access to all EU labor markets
after accession.


9. The legal basis for the process of enlarging the
Union can be found in the EU Treaty but its various
stages have been determined in a piecemeal fashion:

- An application for membership is addressed to the
EU Council (the Presidency). After passing it to
the Commission, the Council/European Council
unanimously pronounces on a Commission's opinion
(the "avis"). The Council is not required to
follow the Commission's opinion. In the case of
Greece, the Council ignored an unfavorable
Commission "avis."

- As illustrated by the cases of Turkey, Croatia and
Macedonia, the decision to grant an applicant
country the status of EU "candidate" does not
necessarily imply the immediate opening of
negotiations between the EU and the candidate on
accession terms. Candidate status is a political
recognition of a closer relationship with the EU,
but does no automatically mean that the aspirant
may hope to join in a near future. To do so, the
country needs to reach a sufficient degree of
general compliance with the membership criteria.
Moreover, the opening of accession talks requires
the definition of a negotiating framework for
their conduct. This would cover practical
arrangements for negotiating sessions, frequency
of meetings, chairmanship, etc., but could also
address sensitive political issues.

- The accession procedure per se starts with a
screening process, i.e. a careful and very
detailed analysis by the Commission of the
legislation of the candidate country to identify
differences with the EU "acquis" that will need to
be corrected by the candidate. This is undertaken
within the framework of the contractual links
between the EU and the candidate country.

- Negotiations on accession terms take the form of a
bilateral inter-governmental conference between
the EU member states and the candidate country
with the Commission acting as EU negotiating
agent. The negotiations take place either at
senior official or ministerial-level conferences
that address one or several of the policy chapters
forming the EU body of law. Talks focus on the
terms under which candidates will adopt, implement
and enforce the "acquis." The bilateral
negotiations cover all policy chapters of EU
competence (over 80,000 pages of the "acquis,"
broken down into "chapters" -- there will be 35
chapters in the negotiations with Turkey and
Croatia).

- For each chapter, the Commission makes proposals
to the Council for a "common position" of the EU.
The EU Council Working Group on Enlargement then
reviews draft common positions and refers
recommendations to the Council (in practice, the
EU PermReps, meeting in COREPER). All decisions
on such EU common positions must be reached by
unanimity). Only then does the EU formally
present its common positions on the chapter in
question to the candidate country.

- The negotiating position of the candidate country
is specified in a chapter-specific document
adopted by the government that explains the state
of the country's legislation in that field, the
extent to which the "acquis" has been transposed
into domestic law or the time limit within which
legislation is to be adopted. Where for
political, budgetary, economic or social reasons a
given provision of the "acquis" cannot become part
of domestic legislation before the scheduled
accession date, the candidate country may ask for
a transition period, specifying its duration and
the manner of full transposition. The two sides
then come to agreement on each chapter.

- The final accession terms are the subject of an
agreement between the EU countries and the
applicant. The Treaty of Accession includes an
"Accession Protocol" detailing the conditions and
arrangements for accession as well as an
"Accession Act" covering adjustments to the EU
institutions to make room for the new member(s),
e.g. voting rights in the Council, number of
members in the European Parliament, etc. For
those countries that joined in 2004, a single
"Accession Treaty" covered the terms of accession
for all ten to the EU. The same applies to the
accession terms agreed with Bulgaria and Romania.


10. When signed, the Accession Treaty remains
subject to a ratification procedure by the EU
countries and each candidate country, in accordance
with their respective constitutional requirements.
It also requires the assent of the European
Parliament, which acts by an absolute majority of
its members. The completion of such ratification
procedures usually takes at least 12-18 months from
the end of negotiations and signing of the treaty.
EU member states generally do not have a tradition
of organizing a referendum on the accession of new
countries. However, France, which had made an
exception (for the UK) in 1972, reformed its
Constitution in 2005 so that its ratification of
future EU accession treaties will require the
organization of a referendum (Note: this will not
cover the accessions of Bulgaria, Romania and
Croatia). Although most candidates had no
constitutional obligation to organize one, all the
countries that joined in 2004 (with the exception of
Cyprus) held a referendum on their accession terms.

NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED
--------------


11. Given the evolving character of the EU body of
law, accession negotiations are by no means a static
process. The domestic legislation of the candidate
country must be further screened to check its
conformity with the evolving/amended EU "acquis."
In 2000, the EU negotiating positions for ongoing
talks with the candidates were themselves subject of
a "screening" to check their conformity with the new
"acquis" and the EU Council amended its own
negotiating positions accordingly.


12. The accession negotiations are governed by
other principles. One of them is that each
negotiation with a candidate proceeds on the basis
of "its own merits." Another is that as long as the
negotiations continue and until everything is
agreed, nothing is agreed. In the language of the
negotiators, agreement on accession terms for a
specific chapter allows that chapter to be
"provisionally closed," implying that either side -
the EU or the candidate - may come back with
questions on the chapter concerned and ask for
further clarifications or a reopening of talks on
the issue.

13. The list of "provisionally concluded" chapters
is an easy, but superficial, way to assess the state
of play in the accession negotiations. Throughout
the negotiations and up to formal accession, the
Commission monitors the actual progress made by a
candidate in its preparations for membership.
Comprehensive assessments of a candidate's
preparations are provided by the Commission's annual
reports that provide a detailed analysis of the
fulfillment of accession criteria. This monitoring
is an integral part of the accession process, as
progress in the negotiations must be able to rely on
progress on the ground.


14. The pace of each negotiation therefore
basically depends on the degree of preparation by
each applicant country and the complexity of the
issues to be resolved. For this reason, any precise
forecasting of the duration of accession
negotiations is a matter for speculation or stated
political intention, not of certainty.

BIGGEST ENLARGEMENT EVER
--------------


15. Following the unprecedented accession of ten
members whose level of welfare was well below the EU
average, the Union had to cope with wide regional
disparities, differences in wage rates and
purchasing power. The accession terms for the "Ten"
provide for gradual access to the EU's system of
direct payments and common market organizations
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),EU
funding under regional and structural policy
instruments (essential means of wealth
redistribution),as well as funds to improve nuclear
safety, public administration and border protection.


16. The EU financial framework for 2007-2013 will
allow for such transfers and the accession terms
ensure new members will be net beneficiaries in the
years following accession, i.e. they will receive
more out of the EU budget than they will contribute.
The countries that joined in 2004 are not expected
to adopt the euro before 2007 at the earliest. In
addition to adopting the EU's legislation to ensure
that its national central bank is considered
independent, a newcomer will also have to
demonstrate that its key economic indicators
converge with those of the monetary union members.


17. All through the negotiating process with Cyprus
(Nicosia),the EU refused to directly link accession
of the island to a settlement of the intra-community
dispute. In the absence of a Cyprus settlement, the
application of the "acquis" to the Northern part of
the island has been suspended until the Council
decides otherwise by unanimous decision.

ACCEDING COUNTRIES
--------------


18. Bulgaria and Romania, whose accession had been
envisaged as part of the wave of enlargement to the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe but who were
lagging behind, signed their Accession Treaty in
April 2005. As we draft this message (beginning of
2006),ratification is still in progress. The EU
continues to urge Bulgaria and Romania to address
their persisting deficiencies, particularly in the
fight against corruption and judicial reform, and to
fulfill their commitments to enable accession on the
target date of January 1, 2007. The Accession
Treaty features a series of safeguard provisions,
including a postponement clause allowing the EU to
decide, on the basis of a Commission recommendation,
that accession be postponed by one year. Such a
recommendation would be based on a determination
that the state of preparations for adoption and
implementation of the "acquis" is such that there is
a serious risk of Bulgaria/Romania being manifestly
unprepared to meet the requirements of membership by
January 2007.


19. A Commission assessment of the situation of
both countries in May 2006 is expected to be
crucial. There is a stated determination on the
part of the Commission to conduct a thorough
scrutiny of the implementation of the "acquis" and
to invoke the safeguard provisions in case of any
persisting difficulty. While commitments will be
honored and the final decision by EU governments
will be political, the EU appears increasingly
determined not to compromise on its principle of
"conditionality." The tendency was reinforced with
the negative votes on the draft Constitutional
Treaty in France and the Netherlands, which fueled
calls to slow down the enlargement process.

CANDIDATE COUNTRIES
--------------


20. On October 3, 2005, the EU agreed to open
accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey, thus
ending months of debate and hesitation on whether
both countries had fulfilled their respective
requirements. Croatia had received candidate status
in June 2004 but the EU made the opening of talks
subject to Croatia "cooperating fully" with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Turkey, which first applied to
join in 1959 and has been in association with the
(then) European Economic Community since 1963,
obtained candidate status in December 1999. It took
several more years marked by both continued EU calls
for further Turkish reforms and protracted
differences over the Cyprus issue before accession
talks were formally opened. Even so, the EU's
negotiating framework specifies that the
negotiations with Turkey are "an open-ended process,
the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed." (Note:
there has been no case in EU history where accession
negotiations, once started, have not led to an offer
of full membership).


21. As happened with the process of enlargement to
the "Ten," the holding of substantive accession
talks does not require the closure of a
comprehensive screening process. Screening with
Turkey and Croatia is expected to last until the
fall of 2006 but will not, in theory, prevent the
opening of talks on initial chapters to proceed in
parallel. Unlike earlier enlargements, this
screening will, from the outset, also tackle most
complex issues such as agriculture or public
procurement.


22. As of early 2006, Turkey and Croatia are having
meetings with Commission experts to review the
extent to which they have already adopted and
implemented the "acquis." As soon as bilateral
screening on specific chapters has been completed
with either of both countries, the Commission will
report to the Council. In the reports, the
Commission may make a recommendation to open talks
on the individual chapters concerned. In this case,
the Commission may set conditions that, in its view,
should be met by the candidate country before actual
negotiations begin. The Commission already made it
clear it might also recommend benchmark conditions
for the provisional closure of each of the 35
chapters. While accession talks with Croatia may
take a couple of years, EU leaders have said
Turkey's accession could not be envisaged before the
implementation of the EU financial framework
starting in 2014.


23. EU leaders at the end of 2005 granted Macedonia
the status of a candidate country, based on a
Commission recommendation. No date was set for the
actual start of accession negotiations. Setting a
date will depend on the country's ability to meet
its obligations under the Stabilization and
Association Agreement (see below) and to comply
sufficiently with the membership criteria. The
Commission will continue to assess the progress made
by Macedonia and report to the member states. But
the decision on candidacy status was a political
signal to the whole region of the Western Balkans,
reinforcing these countries' European perspective.
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
--------------


24. A much wider EU is, indeed, already in the
cards. At the November 2000 Zagreb Summit, leaders
from the EU and the Western Balkans countries
confirmed their commitment to the Stabilization and
Association Process (SAP),a strategy explicitly
linked to the prospect of EU accession and adjusted
to the level of development of each of the countries
concerned. In return for receiving the accession
prospect and assistance to achieve it, the five
countries (the now EU candidates Croatia and
Macedonia, as well as Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Albania) undertook to meet the
political and economic requirements set for all
aspirants. The SAP proved a success in laying
foundations for faster reforms. At their June 2003
Summit in Thessaloniki, EU leaders reaffirmed their
commitment to the integration of the Western Balkans
countries and the SAP was enriched to bring these
countries closer to the EU through new instruments
such as the European Partnerships, inspired by the
Accession Partnerships that had been designed for
the countries bound to join in 2004.


25. Depending on the outcome of the UN-sponsored
final status talks, Kosovo's further progress toward
the EU is also part of the Union's strategy vis--
vis Western Balkans. European integration is said
to be "essential to reinforce the security and
stability of the region" and to achieve a
sustainable settlement on the status of Kosovo. The
EU is also reviewing the situation on Montenegro,
stressing that the revision of the Constitutions of
the two republics needs to proceed smoothly and in
line with European standards.


26. As for the candidate countries, the Annual
Report on the Stabilization and Association Process
(released in the fall) is a key instrument to assess
the readiness of the Western Balkans countries to
move closer to the EU. It summarizes progress made
during the reference period by the individual
countries, monitors the development of regional
cooperation and assesses the impact of the
Stabilization and Association instruments.

PRE-ACCESSION STRATEGY AND ACCESSION PARTNERSHIPS
-------------- --------------


27. In order to assist a candidate country to carry
out reforms to fulfill the accession criteria and
prepare itself for managing and absorbing EU funds
after accession, the EU provides financial and
technical assistance as part of a pre-accession
strategy. The strategy defines for each candidate
the short-and medium-term priorities to be met. Pre-
accession financial support is devoted to meeting
these priorities. Specific EU programs serve this
purpose. For the Central and Eastern European
countries that joined in 2004, pre-accession
financial assistance included instruments such as
PHARE (which supported mainly institution building),
ISPA (development of environment and transport
infrastructure) and SAPARD (agricultural and rural
development support). For Cyprus, Malta and Turkey,
the EU developed other pre-accession instruments.


28. Pre-accession assistance to Turkey is provided
under the EU's new single instrument for financial
cooperation. Projects funded under the program will
be accession-driven, i.e. targeted as assisting
Turkey in complying with the priorities set out in
an Accession Partnership. Turkey will carry out
these projects with prior approval and/or ex-post
evaluation by the Commission, an approach similar to
that for all candidates. Like other candidates,
Turkey can also obtain loans from the European
Investment Bank (EIB).


29. For the countries of the Western Balkans, the
Commission proposed a roadmap, setting out the
stages and conditions attached to each stage of
their "European perspective." Establishing a
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
covering both trade/economic and political dialogue
aspects of relations with the EU is a fundamental
step in this process. Albania was deemed to have
made sufficient overall progress to establish
implementation capacity, paving the way for
negotiations on such an agreement. These
negotiations are presently (January 2006) ongoing.
Serbia-Montenegro was also deemed prepared to hold
SAA negotiations and Bosnia-Herzegovina formally
opened negotiations in November 2005. A country's
track record in implementing its SAA obligations
(including the application of its trade-related
provisions in the form of an Interim Agreement) is a
key element for the EU to consider any membership
application. Based on a Commission opinion, the EU
may grant a country the status of candidate.
Croatia and Macedonia, which signed a SAA in 2001,
have been most successful in using this path on the
way to membership.

30. A first set of European Partnerships was
approved in 2004: by identifying short and medium-
term priorities which the countries need to address,
they will help the Western Balkans countries reform
and prepare for future membership. New Partnership
Agreements proposed by the Commission in the fall
2005 spelled out the scale of the challenges. Each
of the six prospective members is required to make
changes toward standards and patterns that are
commonplace in the member states. For Turkey, the
tasks range from reducing the influence of the
military to eliminating torture, and from putting a
stop to so-called honor killings to settling border
disputes. Even Croatia -- the closest state to EU
membership -- is still in the unfinished process of
assuring refugee return and resolving border issues
arising from the break-up of former Yugoslavia. As
for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro,
and Macedonia, the emphasis in the New Partnerships
ranges from apprehending war criminals to
establishing acceptable electoral systems, and from
asserting democratic control of the military to
fighting organized crime and corruption.

POTENTIAL MEMBERS OR NOT?
--------------


31. A number of other countries cannot be ruled out
as potential EU members. Norway applied twice, in
1967 and 1992, but both times a national referendum
rejected membership after negotiations were
completed. Switzerland applied in 1992 but a
referendum the same year on joining the European
Economic Area (EEA) failed, forcing Bern to shelve
its application. Even Iceland occasionally
considered applying.


32. The EU also stated its readiness to enhance
relations with close neighbors, including Ukraine,
Moldova, Belarus (subject to changes in the latter
country's political situation),Armenia, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, as well as with its Southern
Mediterranean partners. The so-called European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is depicted as "a key
vehicle for promoting our European values, and
sharing the fruits of the EU's enlargement to the
benefit of our citizens and our neighbors." It is
designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing
lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and
to offer these neighbors a chance to participate in
various EU activities, through greater political,
security, economic and cultural cooperation. Though
the ENP offers a privileged relationship, the EU has
refrained from making any membership commitment vis-
-vis any of these countries (and rejected Morocco
in the 1980's). An indication of this dichotomy is
the fact that ENP is part of the portfolio of
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, who is responsible for
the EU's External relations, whereas Enlargement
Commissioner Rehn handles relations with the Western
Balkans.

COMMENT
--------------


33. The pull of the EU has proved to be a powerful
leverage for transforming former Communist countries
in Europe. The EU countries themselves can only
benefit from having neighbors that are democratic
and have prosperous market economies. While
recognizing their responsibilities in this respect,
many EU leaders are concerned that the pace of
enlargement increasingly needs to take account of
the EU's "absorption capacity." The ongoing
expansion is casting doubts on the EU's ability to
function as a coherent whole. These questions
became only more complex with French and Dutch
blockades of a draft Constitutional Treaty that was
meant to streamline the EU decision-making process.
Should current uncertainties about the EU's
constitutional arrangements persist, a "core" group
of countries (or several groups, depending on the
policy area) may be willing to take steps toward
further integration that other members, old and new,
will either be unwilling or simply not in a position
to take.


34. While stating its willingness to honor
commitments, the EU and its leaders appear
increasingly determined to ensure that aspirant
countries can only proceed from one stage of the
accession process to the next once they have
strictly met the conditions for that stage. The
enlargement package submitted by the Commission in
the fall 2005 reflects the need to maintain this
delicate balance for which Enlargement Commissioner
Rehn is a forceful and persuasive advocate. At the
same time, the EU definitely needs to communicate
better the objectives and challenges of accession
processes, particularly to its own citizens.


35. The basic issues of "deepening" and "enlarging"
will come back to the fore during the Austrian
Presidency in the first half of 2006. Although
neighbors like Ukraine remain anxious to receive
positive signals about their European vocation, the
"enlargement fatigue" and financial constraints
could induce some EU governments to resist any
further commitments or the rapid accession of new
members. The issue of its final borders, which has
always been a "taboo," will increasingly dominate
internal EU deliberations.

SAMMIS