GEORGIAN EXPECTATIONS FOR ITS ACTION PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001133

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG ETRD GG EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN EXPECTATIONS FOR ITS ACTION PLAN

REF: A. BRUSSELS 450

B. BRUSSELS 919

Classified By: POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: According to Georgian Mission to the EU,
Georgia wants several deliverables out of negotiations with
the EU on its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan.
First, Georgia wants its Action Plan to be a three-year
document rather than a five-year document; the EU is
currently advocating five-years. Second, Georgia wants the
option of aligning with EU declarations, as Ukraine now does.
Third, Georgia wants to have the perspective outlined for a
free trade agreement (FTA) in its ENP Action Plan. Fourth,
Georgia wants to negotiate a visa facilitation regime -
similar to the one that Russia already has and that Ukraine
and Moldova also seek. Fifth, Georgia wants to create an
additional sub-committee on transport and energy but the EU
is reluctant. Finally, Georgia also wants explicit reference
in the Action Plan to its European aspirations. Discussing
conflict resolution, the Georgian Mission said "we cannot
overestimate the EU's role in South Ossetia" but that Georgia
wants the EU to be even more engaged in the region. End
Summary.

Status of Georgia's EU Action Plan
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting on March 17 with poloff, Georgian Mission
to the EU Senior Counselor Vakhtang Makharoblishvili said
that his government was satisfied with the recent round of
negotiations on its ENP Action Plan which took place on March
8; the next round will take place in May. The Commission
extended its ENP to the South Caucasus in 2004 to help bring
political and economic reforms, with short and medium-term
priorities, to countries within the ENP; however, Georgia has
yet to formally adopt its Action Plan. Despite Georgia's
desire for closer relations with the EU, Makharoblishvili
said the GOG was "not under any illusions" about what it
could achieve for its Action Plan and was approaching
negotiations with a patient, long-term mindset.


3. (C) However, Makharoblishvili said a source of frustration
for Georgia was the contradiction between the EU's stated
declaration on South Caucasus ENP and the reality. He said
that the Commission declares that each Action Plan would have
a tailored, country-specific approach; the Commission is
negotiating generalized Action Plans for the South Caucasus
that does not seemingly differentiate between Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan -- this "should not be a
cut-and-paste exercise" where one merely transfers the same
boilerplate language to each country's Action Plan, he
lamented. Georgia has different goals than Armenia and
Azerbaijan and this should be reflected in the Action Plan,
he said. (Comment: In a separate meeting with poloff on March
23, EU Council Russia policy advisor Carl Hallergard said
that, of the three South Caucasus countries negotiating ENP
Action Plans, Georgia is making the least progress and the
Georgians have been "terrible" in negotiations as they "do
not know what they what they want -- they are all over the
place. The Azeris and Armenians have been much more
committed." End Comment.)

Deliverables for Action Plan
--------------


4. (C) Makharoblishvili stressed that there are several
specifics that the GOG would like to see included in the
final draft of its Action Plan. In negotiations with
Georgia, the EU has advocated that the Action Plan should be
a five-year document which would be up for re-negotiation in
2011; Georgia is trying to negotiate a three-year document
which could be re-negotiated in 2009. Second, Georgia wants
to have the option of aligning itself with EU declarations.
Third, Georgia wants to have the parameters of a FTA outlined
in the document. Makharoblishvili stated that this is his
foremost priority in Action Plan negotiations as Georgia
wants to diversify its trading partners away from Russia.
The EU counter-argument to finalizing an FTA is that the
Georgian trade balance with the EU would worsen and that an
FTA will have negative consequences for the Georgian economy.
Conceding this point would be a short-term problem for
Georgia, Makharoblishvili said GOG economists believe that a
trade imbalance could be overcome in the medium and
long-terms if an FTA were negotiated. In any case,
Makharoblishvili said that an FTA would be less of an
economic issue and more of a political issue for Georgia.


5. (C) Makharoblishvili said that Georgia wants a visa
facilitation regime in the Action Plan, similar to the one
that Russia has with the EU. (Comment: As reported in
reftels, Moldova and Ukraine also want visa facilitation
regimes to be worked out with the EU. End Comment.)
Makharoblishvili said that the EU is reluctant to establish
visa facilitation with Georgia; when he asked EU officials
why they have such a regime established with Russia and why
they are reluctant to do one with Georgia, they replied:
"Russia has bargaining power." Makharoblishvili stated that
Georgia is interested in creating an additional sub-committee
on transport and energy but EU hesitancy is precluding
progress on this proposal.


6. (C) Makharoblishvili expressed pointed frustration at the
fact that the rounds of negotiations over the ENP Action Plan
with South Caucasus have been postponed several times. He
said that Cyprus managed to block the second round of
negotiations with Azerbaijan; Cyprus also worked to postpone
the first and second rounds of negotiations on the Action
Plan with Georgia. Arguing again for a differentiated
approach to the South Caucasus countries, Makharoblishvili
said that the EU seems to be disregarding Georgia as a "Black
Sea country;" he emphasized that because Georgia is a "Black
Sea country," its European aspirations should be taken more
seriously. However, he said, the EU is only considering
language in the Action Plan that "takes note of Georgia's
European aspirations" and the GOG wants a more explicit
reference in the document. The EU counter-argument is that
if it is "obvious" that Georgia has this trajectory;
Makharoblishvili retorted: "Well, if it is so obvious, why
can't we put it in the document?"

Conflict Resolution
--------------


7. (C) In a discussion on the EU's role in South Caucasus
conflict resolution, Makharoblishvili said that the GOG wants
the EU to increase its role in the region but said that "we
should not overestimate the role of the EU on South Ossetia
resolution." He realizes that the EU is consumed with a host
of other problems dealing with conflict resolution right now
and that it is up to Georgia to "do the homework" to solve
its problems. Despite EU claims that the mandate of new EU
Special Representative (EUSR) Peter Semneby has been
strengthened, Makharoblishvili said that this is not really
the case; if one compares the language announcing the
appointment of the first EUSR Talvitie to the language
announcing this recent appointment of Semneby, nothing
substantive has really changed. However, he said that the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions in South
Caucasus have been a "success story." (Comment: EU Council
official with responsibility for South Caucasus William Boe
told poloff on March 10 that the language announcing the
limited strengthened mandate of new EUSR Semneby was indeed
only intended as a "political signal" -- it did not mean that
the EU was going to dramatically increase its involvement or
presence in the region, Boe said. End comment.)


8. (C) Makharoblishvili stated that the involvement of the EU
in Georgia sends a political signal to Moscow that "people
care about Georgia." He said that if Moscow sees that the EU
is on the sidelines, then Russia will get more aggressive in
the region. Russia has to see that the US and EU are working
together to stay engaged in the resolution process.
GRAY
.