CENTRAL ASIA: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ADD SUBSTANCE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001128

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZK EAID ENRG EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CENTRAL ASIA: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ADD SUBSTANCE TO
RELATIONS WITH THE EU

REF: A. BRUSSELS 383

B. BRUSSELS 731

Classified By: POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are both trying to
add "more substance" to their respective relationships with
the EU by broaching the idea of extending the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to their countries. Kyrgyzstan
plans to propose a draft Action Plan, similar to those the EU
negotiates under ENP. Uzbek diplomats portrayed the
imposition of EU sanctions as having little or no impact on
Uzbek policy; however, the GOU is trying to show that it is
listening to the concerns of the EU. The EU Council
Secretariat does not expect any significant improvement in

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EU/Uzbek relations before 2007 because President Karimov
"desperately" needs the solid support of Russian and Chinese
friendship through the 2007 election cycle. In the
Secretariat's view, once Karimov is "reelected" next year, he

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may begin to reach out to the west for rapprochement and
distance himself from Russia and China. Apals said that
Germany is trying to work out a mechanism with Uzbekistan for
an "international independent investigation" into Andijon
possibly under UN auspices; since no one has defined the
terms of such an inquiry means, there could a number of
various solutions that could accommodate the Uzbeks. End
Summary.

EU/Central Asia: An Overview
--------------


2. (C) Poloff met with Brussels-based Central Asian diplomats
recently to discuss the present status of their respective
countries' relations with the EU and to discuss how they see
relations with the EU trending over the course of the next
few years. (Comment: Officials from the Embassy of
Turkmenistan in Brussels declined poloff's request for a
meeting. End comment.) Because Central Asian nations are not
part of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),
cooperation with the region does not have the same status as
with the South Caucasus, which were added to the ENP in 2004.
To wit, Central Asian nations have varying levels of
engagement with the EU at this stage depending on their
strategic significance: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the
most engaged; Tajikistan moderately engaged; and Uzbekistan
is struggling to maintain a positive image after the
imposition of EU sanctions following Andijon. Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan are both trying to add "more substance" to their
respective relationships with the EU by broaching the idea of
extending the ENP to their countries. Tajikistan receives
significant assistance from the European Commission but is
increasingly trying to persuade European companies to invest
in the country. Uzbekistan has an uphill climb to repair
its relationship with the EU; its officials maintain that
they are not completely isolated from the EU and are open to
dialogue. Turkmenistan does not appear to desire deeper
engagement with the EU and is satisfied confining the
relationship to an energy dialogue.

Uzbekistan
--------------


3. (C) Nodir Ganiyev and Ulugbek Agzamov, political/security
officers at the Uzbekistan Mission to
the EU, said that Uzbekistan wants to have a better dialogue
with the EU but the circumstances for re-opening cooperation
are difficult. Bilateral mechanisms for official dialogue
between the EU and Uzbekistan were suspended in October and
the scheduled meeting of the Cooperation Council in February
was postponed indefinitely, pending Uzbekistan's acceptance
of in international inquiry on Andijon. Recognizing that the
relationship is strained, Ganiyev maintained that Uzbekistan
is not completely 'frozen-out' of discussions with EU
officials. He said that Ambassador Vladimir Norov has
regular conversations with EU Special Representative (EUSR)
for Central Asia Jan Kubis and that the Ambassador still has
meetings with Commission and Council officials. The
Ambassador, and the GOU, are trying to show that they are
listening to the concerns of the EU.


4. (C) Poloff asked what the practical effect of EU sanctions
has been on Uzbek thinking. They portrayed sanctions as
having little or no impact on Uzbek policy and actions.
Agzamov said that Uzbekistan does not buy military
equipment/arms from Europe anyway so the sanctions have had
no effect on Uzbek arms procurement; he also said that Uzbek
officials in Tashkent do not travel to Europe frequently
either so the travel restrictions have not had a dramatic
effect. Despite Agzamov's assertions that sanctions have not
altered Uzbek policy, Ganiyev nevertheless said that the GOU
would still work to try to have them lifted at the end of the
year when they come up for review by the EU. They said the
EU should take into account that the Ministers of Interior
and Defense are in new positions which shows that they are
undertaking their own necessary steps to redress what
happened.


5. (C) Ganiyev forcefully conveyed that the Andijon events
were inspired by Islamic extremists and that these people
were not peacefully protesting, as was the common portrayal
in the EU. He claimed that after Andijon, when the EU was
calling for an international investigation, the EU never
invited Ambassador Norov to explain the GOU's side of the
story and that this was insulting. They proceeded to show
poloff a GOU-produced documentary video (in English) which
they said showed the true nature of the events at Andijon.
They said they invited EU representatives to observe the
"open and fair" Andijon
trials but that the officials refused. They said the number
one issue for the GOU is maintaining stability and combating
extremist elements from Afghanistan.


6. (C) Moving on to energy, Ganiyev said that Gazprom
investments in Uzbekistan would hopefully create the
opportunity for the GOU to be involved in energy transport
discussions with the EU "on a mutually beneficial basis."
The GOU is in favor of projects that connect Caucasus energy
with Europe and they hope to be involved in such projects.
However, they stressed they do not want the dialogue on
energy to become "politicized."


Kazakhstan
--------------


7. (C) Arman Abikenov, Counselor at the Kazakhastan Mission
to the EU, cited a number of recent and forthcoming
high-level meetings between EU and Kazakh officials as
evidence that the EU/Kazakh relationship is strong and
getting stronger: EU Special Representative (EUSR) for
Central Asia Jan Kubis will travel to Astana twice in April;
EU Commissioners Piebalgs and Ferrero-Waldner have received
invitations to travel to Astana and have indicated that they
will go, although dates have not been set. He stated that
relations with the European Parliament are particularly
strong and a number of "pro-Kazakh" Parliamentary Deputies
have come to Astana to deepen relations.


8. (C) He said the core political issues for Kazakhstan with
the EU are: a) Application for OSCE
Chairman-in-Office; b) Attaining Market Economy Status from
the EU; c) WTO accession. He stressed that the EU is, and
will continue to be, a foreign policy priority for the Kazakh
government; he noted that President Nazarbayev listed
relations with the EU fourth in his list of foreign policy
priorities in his recent state of the union speech. Abikenov
said the GOK realizes that cooperation with the EU in trade
and economics is of highest importance but that WTO accession
would take precedence.


9. (C) Abikenov said that Kazakhstan is interested in
starting a dialogue on possibly extending the EU's European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to Kazakhstan; he said that
Kazakhstan will start to press this at a higher level. This
falls into the context of what kind of relationship the EU
wants to have with Kazakhstan after 2008 when the current
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) expires.

Kyrgyzstan
--------------


10. (C) Aibek Tilebaliev, Minister Counselor at the Embassy
of the Kyrgyzstan, said that his government wants to add
"more substance" to the EU/Kyrgyz relationship. As a result,
the EU has been receptive to Kyrgyz proposals for an Action
Plan; Bishkek is preparing a draft for proposal at a meeting
of the Cooperation Council in April but Tilebaliev lamented
that it has been a very slow process - "it is hard to get
people in Bishkek to focus on this." He said that the EU has
conveyed clearly in meetings of the
Cooperation Council that it wants constitutional reforms to
continue.

11. (C) In a discussion on Kyrgyzstan's domestic political
situation, Tilebaliev lamented that, unfortunately, the
Kyrgyz people are still waiting for jobs and improvements one
year after the "Tulip Revolution." He speculated that new
elections could occur after the constitutional referendum
which is due to take place later this year. He said that
politicians in Bishkek are divided over what kind of future
government (presidential or parliamentary) they want.
Frankly speaking, he said, people are still trying to figure
what exactly these new systems would mean; referendums, he
commented, "are usually in favor of the government."
Tilebaliev predicted that the new Parliamentary speaker would
bring needed stabilization to the Kyrgyz political scene;
this would enable the Kyrgyz parliament to accomplish more.
Sidestepping the question of the status of the relationship
between PM Kulov and President Bakiyev, Tilebaliev said that
they enjoy a "working relationship" but did not elaborate.


12. (C) Discussing regional cooperation, Tilebaliev said that
Presidents Bakiyev and Karimov met recently in St. Petersburg
and that the relationship has improved after the tension
following Andijon. The
Presidents have agreed to re-open some of the border
crossings that were shut after Andijon and even agreed to
open up some new ones. While highlighting this positive
development, Tilebaliev
said that difficulties still remain such as mine-placement
along the border. The GOK wants to have better border
demarcation and security with Tajikistan; the present border
is a problem because Tajik squatters are entering southern
Kyrgyzstan and taking over land illegally. The government is
discussing with Tajikistan how to address this issue.
Tilebaliev said that relations with China and Russia are
good. Russia is increasing its troop/military hardware
presence in Kyrgyzstan, and there is no friction between
Bishkek and Beijing over treatment of Uighurs, which he
acknowledged had been a problem in the past.

Tajikistan
--------------


13. (C) Behzod Mingboev, political officer at the Tajikistan
Embassy in Brussels, said that Tajik/EU relations are good
but noted that cooperation is mostly confined to assistance
through the Commission; it is important, he said, for the GOT
to improve its image in the EU. EU programs are helping with
border troop training facilities to support counter-narcotics
efforts. Mingboev emphasized that what the GOT
really wants is more investment and it is trying to persuade
EU-based companies to invest in key sectors, such as
hydroelectric power. However, Mingboev said that Tajikistan
is interested in capital from anywhere -- whether it is
Russia, China, India, or the EU -- the Tajik economy needs
investment. (Comment: Per ref B, the Commission stated that
Tajikistan is the biggest recipient of assistance in the CIS
and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
End comment.)

The View from the EU Council
--------------


14. (C) In a separate meeting with poloff on March 22, Gints
Apals, EU Council official with responsibility for Central
Asia, said that while the geographical limits to the ENP have
never been defined, there are few enthusiasts among Member
States for extending ENP to countries in Central Asia, such
as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (Comment: In an interesting
aside on Kazakhstan, Apals said he heard
from "Japanese sources" that Russian special services were
behind the recent high-level opposition killing in Kazakhstan
as a way to destabilize Nazarbayev. End Comment.) First,
Apals said, the ENP has not proven that it is an effective
mechanism yet; the ENP needs to make more advancements for
Member States to even consider such a proposal. Second, a
country like Kazakhstan could conceivably claim a "European
identity" because part of its territory lies in Europe but
Kyrgyzstan cannot make such a
claim; for Kazakhstan, "it would take a long time" for any
movement on an Action Plan and Kyrgyzstan would be even more
complicated, Apals said. Perhaps these issues will be raised
at the Cooperation Council meeting in Astana on April 5,
Apals said, and Member States will merely be obliged to "take
note" of Kyrgyzstan's and Kazakhstan's initiatives on Action
Plans.


15. (C) Discussing Uzbekistan, Apals said that one should not
expect any significant improvement in EU/Uzbek relations
before 2007 because President Karimov "desperately" needs the
solid support of Russian and Chinese friendship through the
2007 election cycle. Once Karimov is "reelected" next year,
Apals believes, Karimov may begin to reach out to the west
and EU for rapprochement and distance himself a little from
Russia and China. Uzbekistan Ambassador to the EU Vladimir
Norov is pressing hard for renewed dialogue with the EU,
Apals said, and he has heard rumors that Norov is one of the
officials that Karimov has given permission to reach out to
western interlocutors. However, EUSR Kubis recently tried to
make a visit to Tashkent but was told by officials there not
to come, Apals said - not exactly a rebuke but not a sign of
warming relations either; EUSR Kubis enjoys good personal
relations with President Karimov, Apals said, so this request
had to have been made by Karimov himself. Apals said that
Germany is trying to work out a mechanism with Uzbekistan for
an "international independent investigation" into Andijon
possibly under UN auspices; since no one has clearly defined
what "international independent investigation" means, Apals
said, Germany thinks there could be a number of various
solutions that could accommodate the Uzbeks.


16. (C) On Tajikistan, Apals said that although the country
is the largest recipient of EU aid in the CIS, he believes
that better EU relations is not a first-tier priority for
Tajikistan. President Rahmonov merely sees the EU as a
political counterweight to his neighbors Russia, China, and
Iran; the EU is seen as having more of an "honest broker"
role amongst these powerful actors. Tajikistan is likely to
continue to be the largest recipient of EU aid, Apals said,
because "Kazakhstan does not need it, Turkmenistan is not
asking for it, there is no traction for more aid among EU
Member States for Kyrgyzstan, and political conditions do not
make more aid possible for Uzbekistan."


17. (C) On Turkmenistan, Apals said that "60% of the
EU/Turkmen relationship is devoted to energy dialogue."
During EUSR Kubis' recent trip to Ashgabat, Apals got the
impression that there is heavy pressure on President Niyazov
from Moscow on the energy front. However, Niyazov did
express interest in two options for bringing Turkmen gas to
Europe, Apals said: 1) A pipeline through Kazakhstan
controlled by an international consortium; 2) a Trans-Caspian
Pipeline controlled by an international consortium.
Gray
.