Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRATISLAVA929
2006-11-29 09:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

PESSIMISM ON KOSOVO

Tags:  PREL KO LO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0929/01 3330910
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290910Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0492
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0053
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0615
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0023
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2010
TAGS: PREL KO LO
SUBJECT: PESSIMISM ON KOSOVO


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman for reason
1.4 b and d.

(C) Summary: PolDir Miroslav Lajcak summoned "Quint"
representatives to the MFA to share concerns that the Contact
Group may be losing control of the Kosovo process and his
fear that Russia will veto a UNSC resolution on final status.
Slovakia fully supports Ahtisaari's work, but Lajcak is
concerned that Ahtisaari will not have an audience to which
to present his plan in Belgrade after the elections. Lajcak
suggested that the international community may need to think
about alterations. Lajcak was obviously spooked by his
conversation with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade; time
will tell if the Russian's threats were real policy or
merely scare tactics. Lajcak understands that others
including the USG do not think Moscow will veto a resolution.
He hopes he is wrong and they are right.


2. (C) A dour MFA PolDir Miroslav Lajcak convened the
Ambassadors/Charges of the "Quint" on November 27 to provide
his very pessimistic assessment of the status and future of
the Kosovo process, based on his recent meetings in Belgrade
and Pristina and a November 24 dinner with Martti Ahtisaari
in Bratislava. Lajcak did not propose an alternative
strategy, but emphasized that the Contact Group has already
lost control of the process and had to think of changes to
strategy and tactics if it were to regain control. Lajcak
said his pessimism was based in large part on his assessment,
which he acknowledged did not accord with that of the USG or
other governments, that Moscow would veto any UNSCR. While
Ahtisaari believes he can present his plan in Belgrade around
January 30 after the elections, Lajcak thinks that the
leadership in Belgrade will not accept a visit. In this case,
Ahtisaari quipped to Lajcak and FM Kubis, he would send it by
DHL. Internal EU disunity is another key reason for Lajcak's
pessimism. Ahtisaari told the Slovaks 11/24 that he was
worried that the Quint was silent, and that opposition to
independence was noisier. He said he would like to see
greater Quint activism.


3. (C) Elaborating, Lajcak no longer believes there is a
window of opportunity between the January 21 elections and
the seating of a new government to present the Ahtisaari

proposals. There would be no legitimate parliament, and no
caretaker would be willing to accept responsibility. With no
parliament to back him, President Tadic would not be wiling
to receive the report. The alternative would be to table a
UNSC resolution between the elections and a new government
taking power, but Russia and Belgrade would present moral
arguments for why such a momentous issue should be presented
only after a new government is in power. Lajcak found the
Serbian government confident of their hand, and said that
advisors to Tadic with whom he spoke did not really provide
greater light than did those to Kostunica. The Serbs were
expecting further delays in the report and suggested to
Lajcak that everyone consider 2007 as a year of negotiation.
As for Belgrade's negotiating stance, they described their
vision to Lajcak: Kosovo not part of the UN; Belgrade
controls foreign policy and borders; parallel contacts
between Kosovar Serb municipalities and Belgrade (already in
plan); possible review of arrangement after 5-6 years. Lajcak
said he knew Pristina would never accept this.


4. (C) Likewise, Lajcak thinks Ahtisaari is expecting that
the "political" arguments of his report will be more
persuasive than will be the case. Lajcak does not believe
warnings of a return to the 1990's absent a UNSC resolution
will sway either Belgrade or Moscow.


5. (C) While others think Moscow would abstain on a UNSCR,
Lajcak has been led by Moscow's Ambassador in Belgrade to
think that only a veto would serve Moscow's interest. Lajcak
bluntly warned that the international community needed to
"wake up" to the fact this is not the same Russia the West
has been dealing with in past years, citing its behavior in
Georgia as an example. Russia wants to show that no global
issue can be solved without its input, and believes that the
lack of a solution sets a helpful precedent for other frozen
conflicts. Moscow probably thinks very few nations would
recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by
Pristina. The Russian Ambassador to Belgrade told Lajcak the
GOR has made its views far too public to back down and
abstain on a resolution. Doing so would involve Moscow
sharing responsibility for a bad international decision.


6. (C) The bottom line: Lajcak fears that if Pristina says
yes to independence and Mitrovica no, the stage will be set
for partition. He could not rule out the Serbs sending police
forces there per UNSCR 1244. It's a far-out scenario, he
admitted, but not impossible.


7. (C) As for Lajcak's ideas for next steps, he said we
needed to think about alternative scenarios. FM Kubis does
not want to change plans or the GOS position, but the Slovaks
are wondering whether alterations to the plan for instruments
of sovereignty could provide for greater international
involvement, thereby improving prospects for broader
acceptance. In the meantime, Lajcak will invite the Visegrad
4, Austria and Luxembourg to Bratislava this week. UN Deputy
Special Envoy Rohan will attend as well. Lajcak urged contact
by all with the Spanish and Romanians, although he thought
that we could be naive to think either would change its
position. Lajcak discussed with Ambassador Polt our view that
there should be a UNSCR even without the support of all EU
members.


8. (C) Comment: Lajcak knows he is in a minority in thinking
Russia will veto a UNSCR. He strongly hopes we are right and
he is wrong. He was definitely spooked by the statements of
the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade; time will tell if those
statements were genuine reflections of policy or a kind of
scare tactic. He engaged us because Slovakia continues to
fully support Ahtisaari's work, and does not want the
international community's efforts to be undermined by Russia.

VALLEE