PRESIDENT AND PM IMPROVISE ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000807

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI SR LO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT AND PM IMPROVISE ON KOSOVO

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reason
1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica capitalized
on missteps by Prime Minister Fico and President Gasparovic
during his October 2 visit to Bratislava. Resulting media
reports give the erroneous impression that Slovakia agrees
Kosovo should remain part of Serbia. The MFA tried to set
the record straight October 5 in a presentation to the
diplomatic corps. MFA officials had prepared extensive
materials and provided lengthy briefings to Fico, Gasparovic,
and Parliamentary Speaker Pavol Paska. They are very
frustrated with Kostunica and the media for ignoring the real
message, and with the naivete of their own political leaders.
The MFA quickly issued a press statement clarifying
Slovakia's official position of full support for UN Special
Envoy Ahtisaari and the Contact Group, and will be demarching
Belgrade, Pristina, and European capitals to re-emphasize
this position. While the immediate job is to repair the
damage, the issue of ensuring the prime minister and foreign
minister are both on message, at least on Slovakia's top
foreign policy priorities, remains to be dealt with. End
summary.

The MFA Prepared
--------------


2. (C) The October 2 visit of Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav
Kostunica to Slovakia backfired. The MFA had intended to
deliver a tough message on Kosovo while providing some
incentives for better Serbian cooperation in final status
negotiations and with the ICTY, such as discussions on trade,
visa liberalization, and support for eventual integration
into Euro-Atlantic structures. Kubis, Political Director
Miroslav Lajcak, and Director for the Balkans and CIS Stefan
Rozkopal put extraordinary effort into preparing briefing
papers and tutoring Slovakia's leaders to make sure everyone
was on message. Lajcak told the Ambassador September 26 that
he had spent an hour and a half with PM Robert Fico in New
York during UNGA, and that FM Kubis spent two and a half
hours with President Ivan Gasparovic on September 26 going
over and over Slovakia's official policy. Lajcak's
assessment at that time was that Kostunica would try to drive
a wedge into the Slovak position, but that Slovak leaders
would be well prepared to deliver the right message. He
claimed that Prime Minister Fico, particularly, accepted the
MFA's approach, trusted Kubis, and would follow Kubis' lead
on foreign policy issues.

Gasparovic and Fico Screwed Up
--------------


3. (C) Nonetheless, both Gasparovic and Fico "improvised"
during the visit, and Kostunica capitalized on their
missteps. The resulting message in the press was that
Slovakia believes Kosovo must remain part of Serbia.
Rozkopal confirmed to Pol-Econ Chief October 3 that MFA
officials had provided extensive briefings and materials to
Fico, Gasparovic, and Speaker of Parliament Pavol Paska. He
said Paska made no mistakes. Kubis was open and tough.
Gasparovic delivered the full set of talking points
flawlessly. However, at the end of the meeting he added,
"Personally, I'm not in favor of the splitting of Serbia."
Although there was no press conference, Kostunica left the
meeting and informed the traveling Serbian press that this
was Slovakia's position; it became the headline of the trip.
Rozkopal said that PM Fico was also mostly on message.
Nonetheless, he made a mistake when he said he would like to
support a solution to the Kosovo issue which could be
reviewed in the future. This is absolutely against the
Slovak "official" line, which considers a temporary solution
unacceptable, and that the final status talks are final.
Kubis has said as much to the Serbian leadership in Belgrade.
Kostunica's spin on this was that Fico opposed Kosovo's
independence. However, contrary to some press reports, Fico
never stated that he opposed independence for Kosovo or that
Kosovo should remain a part of Serbia.

Trying to Undo the Damage
--------------


4. (C) Rozkopal (please protect) blamed Fico's misstep on a
"total lack of foreign policy experience." Kostunica is a
clever politician, and Fico, Gasparovic, and the entire media
succumbed to his manipulation of the message. Kubis, Lajcak,
and Rozkopal met the afternoon of October 2 to strategize on
how to repair the damage as much as possible. They issued a
press release reiterating the basic policy points on Kosovo.
(See para 5). They are sending a circular to EU partners,
Belgrade, and Pristina clarifying Slovakia's position.
According to Rozkopal, Lajcak was furious, and was going to
use his participation in an October 3-4 meeting of new-EU
member Political Directors and U.S. officials in Slovenia to
explain to us and others what had happened.


5. (C) Informal Translation of the MFA Press Release:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, with
regard to the visit of the Prime Minister of the Serbian
Republic Vojislav Kostunica to Slovakia on October 2, 2006,
and his discussions with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Slovak Republic Jan Kubis, confirms that in the matter of
Kosovo, Slovakia supports the activity of UN Special Envoy M.
Ahtisaari based on the guiding prinicples of the Contact
Group. It is expected that M. Ahtisaari will present his
report and recommendations for resolving the question of
Kosovo in the coming weeks. After its publication, Slovakia
will take a concrete position on its recommendations.

The highest constitutional officials of the Slovak Republic
confirmed and conveyed this position to the Serbian side
during discussions in Bratislava, during which they
emphasized that the main goal of Slovakia's activities in the
Western Balkans region is to achieve regional stability,
prosperity, and the successful integration of the region and
its countries into the EU. The resolution of the Kosovo
question should support the achievement of this goal. The
decisive conditions of the solution should allow a dignified
and forward-looking life for all the residents of Kosovo.

Tarnished Relationship and Growing Pessimism
--------------


6. (C) MFA officials are very frustrated. They had been
working hard within the EU to encourage greater engagement
and cooperation with Serbia, and they got burned. Rozkopal
said that Kostunica is absolutely immovable. After the
approval of the new Serbian Constitution, he obviously felt
very comfortable and self-confident, and the general mood of
his Bratislava visit was very tough. When Rozkopal met with
the Serbian Charge d'Affaires ahead of the visit, they
discussed the whole agenda (trade, visas, etc). But it was
obvious that Lajcak's prediction was right. Kostunica
arrived with one goal: to find a small mistake that he could
use to his advantage. Slovak diplomats in Pristina, Rozkopal
added, are really under the gun and Slovakia has lost
credibility there.


7. (C) Even before Kostunica's visit, the MFA was growing
increasingly pessimistic about the Serbian leadership's
behavior. Lajcak told the Ambassador it was clear that
Belgrade would not cooperate on Kosovo, so it was the
ultimate responsibility of the international community and
the Kosovars to "impose benefits" on Serbia. Unfortunately,
the Kosovars were more interested in dictating the terms of
the settlement, and getting as much as they could, than in
taking Slovakia's advice to be generous for the sake of
regional stability in the longer term. Lajcak said it was
clear that Serbian elections would delay the process, and
Belgrade's hope was that the over-confident Kosovars would do
something stupid in the meantime and completely derail the
talks. Lajcak also said he was "really disappointed" during
his recent attempt to reinvigorate the NGO sector in Serbia.

Lajcak's Briefing to the Diplomatic Corps
--------------


8. (SBU) Lajcak went even further in an October 5 briefing to
the Ambassadorial Corps. He reiterated the Slovak
government's official position of full support for Ahtisaari
and no public comment at the time on alternatives,
particularly as they await Ahtisaari's plan.


9. (SBU) Lajcak gave a blunt readout on each of Kostunica's
meetings, suggesting that the Prime Minister, the Speaker of
Parliament, and the President had been on message, with the
Serbian press and Kostunica twisting the truth. Kubis'
meeting was most revealing. Kostunica was "harder than
ever," bouyed by the Constitutional vote. Ahtisaari,
according to Kostunica, is biased. He said the Serbs don't
care about Ahtisaari; the Serbs don't need the Europeans to
translate the Russians; they don't need another Sudetenland;
partition would result in "many serious consequences"; and
they have no interest in Parternship for Peace. On ICTY,
Kostunica told Kubis, "I will not do this; ICTY is biased
against Serbs; countries are playing games with Mladic as a
tool." Kostunica would not even bring up the issue of an
alternative.


10. (SBU) Lajcak told the Dip Corps that he was most
distressed by the lack of mention by Kostunica of the Kosovar
Serbs. He is convinced that the Serbs are putting their
hopes on the Russian position. Lajcak noted that his
government's position was at odds with the people of
Slovakia; however, the GOS will not change its position.
When asked by the Ambassador if the meeting produced any
slivers of light, Lajcak said that the situation was "simply
hopeless," that civil society is demoralized, that Tadic does
not speak, that Serbs couldn't care less about the EU, that
visa liberalization is impossible, and that Kostunica's sole
goal was to go down as a national hero who fought to the
bitter end. He said his contacts are warning that the OSCE
may not be allowed to monitor the referendum, creating a
non-transparent vote where the two million Kosovars eligible
to vote could have their rights denied.

The Bottom Line
--------------


11. (C) The MFA assures us that Slovakia's position has not
changed, despite the screaming headlines. Slovakia fully
supports Ahtisaari and the contact group, and sees no
alternative to independence for Kosovo. As Lajcak told the
Ambassadors, this position isn't easy to sell to the Slovak
public, which sees the Serbs as "Slavic brothers" and knows
Albanians are active in organized crime rings in Slovakia.
There is also sensitivity to the separation of territories by
minorities, due to occasional calls for autonomy by radicals
in Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian minority. Nonetheless, the
MFA is committed to trying to help the process along.


12. (C) Comment: MFA officials publicly downplayed the
mistakes by Fico and Gasparovic, saying that it was mostly
Kostunica's fault for twisting the message. What remains
unclear is what measures might be taken to prevent a similar
situation in the future, so that the foreign minister and
prime minister are not delivering conflicting policy messages
on Slovakia's key priority regions. Fico himself told us in
the past that he is more interested in domestic policy, and
planned to leave foreign policy to the expert (Kubis).
Nonetheless, he continues to jetset around to European
capitals. At a recent hockey game with the Ambassador, Fico
was clearly ill and exhausted, stopping play early and
complaining to the Ambassador about the toll of all his
foreign trips. He noted he was leaving at 5:00 a.m. the next
day for Poland and could not reduce the number of foreign
visits at this important time. At the moment, the MFA is
focusing on cleaning up the current mess; we will then talk
with them about how they plan to forestall future ones.


VALLEE