Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRATISLAVA476
2006-06-14 14:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

SLOVAKIA'S JUNE 17 NATIONAL ELECTIONS: UNCERTAINTY

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI LO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8872
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0476/01 1651405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141405Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9950
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000476 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA'S JUNE 17 NATIONAL ELECTIONS: UNCERTAINTY
IS A CERTAINTY

REF: A. BRATISLAVA 471

B. BRATISLAVA 455

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
).

6 TO 8 PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT: RECIPE FOR A GRAND COALITION?
--------------------------------------------- --------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000476

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA'S JUNE 17 NATIONAL ELECTIONS: UNCERTAINTY
IS A CERTAINTY

REF: A. BRATISLAVA 471

B. BRATISLAVA 455

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
).

6 TO 8 PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT: RECIPE FOR A GRAND COALITION?
-------------- --------------


1. (C) With 6 major political parties likely to pass the 5
percent parliamentary threshold (and two more within easy
striking distance) in Slovakia's June 17 national elections
-- and none of them positioned for such a decisive victory as
to allow for a two-party coalition -- it will likely be a
long, hot summer for Slovak politics. With parties working
hard not to burn any bridges (PM Dzurinda even took the
opportunity of a televised debate with Robert Fico a week
before the elections to acknowledge the possibility of his
party working with Fico's Smer),we are left with the
possibility of a "grand coalition" made up of a handful of
parties who will put their campaign trail vitriol aside to
rule together. The two key factors, assuming that Fico gets
a plurality, are whether Fico passes the 25 percent mark and
whether the gap between Fico and Dzurinda is small enough to
give the PM enough leverage to resurrect a center-right
coalition. Otherwise, Fico can hire off Dzurinda's former
partners to make a grand coalition of sorts.


2. (C) The unpredictability of the result stems also from
the high proportion of undecided voters, in addition to the
traditional disconnect between polling numbers and actual
votes on election day (Smer usually gets fewer votes than
polls indicate, while SDKU fares better). According to the
Slovak Radio pollster, who was most accurate in the 2002
elections, 16 percent of Slovak voters decide who to vote for
while standing in the voting booth. Keeping with the
country's trend of decreasing voter turnout, pundits have
looked at the "perfect storm" of predicted sunny weekend
weather and scheduled World Cup games on election day and
have predicted that, again, many Slovaks will decided they

have "better things to do" than to cast a ballot. We predict
a turnout in the lower end of the 50-60 percent region.


3. (C) Conventional wisdom holds, however, that low voter
turnout favors incumbent SDKU, which is strong in Slovakia's
economically thriving cities (Bratislava, Kosice) and weaker
in the countryside, where Smer is capitalizing on the lack of
economic prosperity among Slovakia's poor and pensioners.
The Slovak Radio Pollster claims that SDKU's campaign has
been "the most effective" at boosting its numbers.

SMER WILL DO BEST AT THE POLLS...
--------------


4. (C) While the large number of parties likely to cross
the parliamentary threshold means no coalition building can
begin until final numbers -- and resulting seats in
parliament -- are announced, there are a few things that are
clear. Robert Fico's Smer party will again take the most
votes during national elections, and is likely to receive
anywhere between 20 and 30 percent of the vote. A
sympathetic President Gasparovic reportedly has already
pledged Fico the first crack at forming a new government.
While the party is popular among youth, Smer has recently
been focused on the older, impoverished Slovak voters who
have traditionally -- and reliably -- turned out in droves
for former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's HZDS party. Smer
will consider a partnership with Hungarian coalition party
SMK, which is almost guaranteed its usual 10 percent take in
addition to votes from Slovaks who appreciate the
"reliability" of the party and its stances.


5. (C) Depending on the exact distribution of seats on
election day, Smer will likely be able to form a coalition
with only two other partners. In the past weeks, a possible
coalition between Smer, nationalist party SNS (which is
polling at around 10 percent),and Meciar's HZDS has been
widely discussed in the media; whether a trial balloon by
Smer or a campaign tactic by Fico's enemies, SDKU's numbers
have gone up in response to the possibility of this "worse
case scenario." We do not think Fico would be so
shortsighted to form a Smer-HZDS-SNS coalition that would
immediately cause him embarrassment and international
skepticism, and raise the chances he would not be able to
serve a full term (as SNS boss Jan Slota noted, explaining
why a HZDS coalition might not hold together "is like having
to explain why acid dissolves things."). Professor (and
former SDL party head) Peter Weiss told us that some consider
a Smer-SDKU-SMK coalition to be "ideal" for Slovak voters.
Smer and SDKU, they reason, can keep an eye on each other's
"sticky fingers," and no one can accuse the government of

BRATISLAVA 00000476 002 OF 003


ignoring minority rights. Weiss also noted that SMK is
widely viewed as a "stable" coalition partner.

...BUT MAY LEAVE DZURINDA SOME ROOM TO MANEUVER
-------------- --


6. (C) Prime Minister Dzurinda's SDKU will likely come in
second, taking 12 to 18 percent of the vote. Based upon
predictions, SDKU would be forced to form a broad coalition
with at least three other parties in order to control the
government. An SDKU contact told us June 14 that while the
PM wants to be a part of the government, he would have
trouble doing so as an obvious junior partner, and is
considering going into opposition even if Fico made an offer,
in hopes that a Fico government will not last. It all
depends upon the gap between Smer and SDKU on election day: a
Smer take in the low 20s will be seen as a failure (for a
party that has consistently polled over 30 for most of the
past few years) and could be seen as an indication to
Dzurinda that he has a real shot at forming a government; a
25-30 percent Smer take would be seen as a Fico victory.
Unlikely as it is, a Smer take over 30 percent would put Fico
in the driver's seat with respect to coalition forming and
ministerial portfolios.


7. (C) If Dzurinda takes the initiative and tries to form a
coalition, he will likely try to do so with SMK, KDH, and
possibly HZDS, although Dzurinda would first have to
reconcile KDH and HZDS, as KDH has vowed not to work with
Meciar's party. Pundits also point out that SDKU has not
ruled out cooperation with SNS, although a coalition with
this party would be an obvious last resort.

WHAT SMER CONTROL COULD MEAN FOR SLOVAKIA
--------------


8. (C) A strong Smer showing would likely give Fico
reassurance that he has the political capital to undertake
broader reforms; it could also have foreign policy
ramifications (ref A). Moreover, a strong Smer government
would have a more symbiotic relationship between the
government and the President, something Slovakia has not
experienced under Prime Minster Dzurinda and President
Gasparovic. Gasparovic's own HZD party will not get enough
votes to enter parliament on election day, making Gasparovic
-- whose rhetoric has often mirrored Fico's -- particularly
pliable for Smer.

HOW THE REST WILL TEST
--------------


9. (C) One of the only certainties or near-certainties:
Hungarian coalition party SMK and nationalist SNS (whose
campaign motto has been "A Slovak Government for Slovaks!")
will not serve in a coalition together. In addition, the
Communist party KSS -- currently teetering on the threshold
of parliamentary accession -- would be the proverbial last
kid picked on the playground.


10. (C) SNS -- although not represented in the previous
parliament -- is polling slightly above 10 percent and seems
poised to take a significant number of seats on election day.
The disappointing unwillingness of mainstream parties to
rule out cooperation with the nationalists means that we may
have to face dealing with Slota as a government minister,
something that will be hard for us to do. On the other hand,
most parties are aware that including the nationalists will
bring discredit upon Slovakia in the international arena.


11. (C) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) chairman Pavol
Hrusovksy told Ambassador June 6 that KDH prefers a repeat of
the center-right coalition of KDH-SMK-SDKU, but said that --
despite his lack of trust in Fico -- a SMK-KDH-Smer
combination could be presented to Smer as an alternative to
the "catastrophic" Smer-SNS-HZDS coalition that public
commentary and polling suggests is a possibility, despite
Slota's June 14 declaration that he could never work with
HZDS boss Vladimir Meciar. We have heard that Hrusovsky has
told the party faithful in recent days that KDH would accept
an offer to join Smer and SMK. Center-right stepchild Free
Forum (SF),once considered a shoe-in for parliament, will
need to make up ground in the final days before the vote in
order to cross the 5 percent threshold. SF's internal
infighting also stands to hurt the PM. If SF fails to get
in, its votes will be divided among those parties that do,
enlarging any Smer majority. SDKU's hope is that the
disillusioned SF voters, who came from SDKU anyway, would
simply vote SDKU out of realism.

MECIAR'S STAR MAY HAVE FALLEN
--------------

BRATISLAVA 00000476 003 OF 003




12. (C) Former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has been
totally unimpressive as a candidate in this election cycle,
even showing up at the last minute for the main debate with
Dzurinda, Fico, and Hrusovsky. His campaign appears to
suffer from a "has been" character that may result in a lower
vote count on June 17, which could make him more unattractive
as a coalition partner. Fico's active targeting of HZDS
voters may mean that Smer, too, smells blood in the water and
is attempting to capitalize on HZDS' lack of momentum.
However, HZDS is still polling near 10 percent, and may find
itself sitting in too many parliamentary seats to not get
asked to the dance by Dzurinda. Another possibility is that
Dzurinda or Fico could try to split off HZDS MPs if Meciar is
seen as having failed the party.

INVESTORS, ECONOMISTS WATCHING CLOSELY
--------------


13. (C) The final debate between Meciar, Fico, and Dzurinda
will be held June 15, and many believe Fico will be well
prepared for the showdown. ING Bank just released an eight
page analysis of the Slovak elections titled "Too Close to
Call?" which advises "investors to stay on the sidelines" due
to the "significant inherent risk" and calculates an 80
percent chance that Smer is in the government. It estimates
a 50 percent chance that Smer enters the government with at
least "one reform-oriented party" (specifically mentioning
KDH and SMK as real possibilities),and gives an
"opposition-only" government victory a 30 percent chance.
ING further evaluates Slovakia's 2009 Euro adoption timeline
to have only a 55 percent probability after the elections.

VALLEE