FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE ELECTION: CONTINUITY, OR

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000471

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC PLEASE PASS DAMON WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2026
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KDEM SOCI UNSC LO
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE ELECTION: CONTINUITY, OR
A CHANGE OF DIRECTION?

REF: A. BRATISLAVA 455

B. BRATISLAVA 436

C. BRATISLAVA 401

D. BRATISLAVA 450

E. BRATISLAVA 434

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Slovak foreign policy during the second
Dzurinda government of the past four years has been extremely
complementary to U.S. interests. If the coalition that
results from June 17 parliamentary elections is led by
Dzurinda's SDKU and made up mostly of center-right parties,
we can expect continuity. A government led by Smer could be
more problematic. The party is more euro-centric and
anti-American than the current government, and its void in
foreign policy expertise is so far being filled by radicals
from Slovakia's communist and HZDS past. Membership in the
EU, NATO, and the UNSC, especially if accompanied by
coalition partners from the present government, will place
constraints on how far foreign policy can wiggle.
Nonetheless, we may have to work much harder to convince a
Smer-led government on U.S. foreign policy priorities. End
Summary.

Unlikely Candidates for the MFA Post
--------------


2. (C) Of the eight parties most likely to enter Parliament
and potentially participate in the next governing coalition,
only a few desire to gain control of the foreign ministry.
Although the four parties described below would not run the
MFA, their philosophies would certainly influence the foreign
policy direction of any governing coalition they might join
after the elections. In some cases, this could have a
positive moderating effect, such as in a coalition of Smer
with KDH and/or SMK. In other cases it would reinforce
negative tendencies, such as in a Smer-SNS alliance. Those
that have little realistic chance to control the MFA include:

--The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). As a member of
the governing coalition, KDH supported the active foreign
policy of the Dzurinda government. Although the party
initially opposed the invasion of Iraq, it is now in favor of
maintaining troops for humanitarian and reconstruction work
as long as the elected Iraqi government deems necessary. KDH
hopes for a gradual drawdown that would bring Slovak soldiers
home within four years. Leaders of the party are
particularly active on human rights issues, for example
supporting dissidents in Cuba. On the other hand, KDH is
Euro-skeptic (it fears European liberal ideas will be forced
upon Slovakia's more religiously-conservative population) and
tends to be somewhat isolationist in outlook. Its highest
foreign policy priority is passing domestic legislation to
implement the treaty Slovakia signed with the Vatican. KDH's
determination to stand up against the European mainstream on
social issues such as abortion and homosexual partnerships
makes many Europeans wary of this conservative party.
Chairman Pavol Hrusovsky recently told the Ambassador that
KDH would favor the justice and interior ministries, and
acknowledged European skepticism toward a possible KDH
foreign minister (ref A). We don't see anyone within the
party who would fight hard for the MFA post, although former
Interior Minister Vladimir Palko has told people he might be
interested.

--The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). Like the KDH,
the SMK was very supportive of the Dzurinda government's
foreign policy goals. Countering the recent announcement
that Smer would consider immediately withdrawing troops from
Iraq if elected, SMK leader Bela Bugar expressed the
unequivocal intent to stay as long as necessary. One of the
two State Secretaries (Deputy Ministers) at the MFA for the
past four years has been SMK appointee Joszef Berenyi, and
although we have not been extremely impressed by his
intellect or his leadership, he has always been willing to
implement the policies we advocated. SMK could be a
responsible partner, but will not control the MFA; the 90
percent of the population that is ethnic Slovak would reject
an SMK personality as the face of Slovakia to the world. As
one MFA insider put it, "Slovakia is still not ready for a
Hungarian foreign minister."

--The Slovak National Party (SNS). This party is
unapologetically isolationist, and has little interest in
foreign affairs. SNS opposed Slovak membership in NATO,
although it would not attempt to leave the treaty now. The
party accepts EU membership, but is against further political
integration (ref B). It would prefer to withdraw all troops
from Iraq immediately, and limit involvement of foreign
troops abroad in general. We have heard that European
political groups have expressed strong reservations to
various Slovak political parties about SNS. While there is
still a chance the party could be included in a future
governing coalition, we doubt it would have great influence
on foreign policy issues.

--The Slovak Communist Party (KSS). The foreign policy
stance of KSS closely resembles that of SNS. The party would
pull troops not only from Iraq, but from all foreign
missions. Pollsters say this party will get into parliament
only if voter turnout is very low. KSS does not expect to be
in the next government (ref C),let alone control the MFA.

A Vote for Continuity
--------------


3. (C) Several parties with the potential to control the MFA
after elections would likely continue the pro-U.S outlook and
robust "transformational diplomacy" activities that have been
the status quo. Of these friendly parties, the SDKU has the
best chance of forming the future government and implementing
a strong policy. The other parties have good foreign policy
goals, but would likely be pressured to compromise in a
government led by a party with different principles. The
"continuity" parties include:

--The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU). The
party of Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda and Foreign Minister
Eduard Kukan is instinctively pro-American and favors active
engagement in the world, especially in Slovakia's foreign
policy "niche capabilities" of the Western Balkans, Ukraine,
and Belarus. This pro-U.S. stance predominates throughout
the MFA. U.S. talking points or non-papers are always
included in Kukan's briefing book for GAERC meetings and
other international assemblies. The foreign ministry is
extremely receptive and responsive at all levels to U.S.
demarches and information, and has worked closely with us on
occasion to change the stream of thought within the EU, for
example on Belarus and Cuba.

What may change if the SDKU holds onto the MFA reins is the
Foreign Minister. Kukan would like to continue in the post,
and his chief of staff told us that Fico has already asked if
he would stay at the helm even in a Smer-led government
(Kukan said yes). Kukan is the longest-serving foreign
minister in the EU and respected by his peers. He is also
widely respected by his own MFA staff, several of whom have
told us they are proud to work for him. On the other hand,
he is 66 years old and has served as foreign minister for
eight years already. One leading candidate for the post if
Kukan steps down is current State Secretary Magda Vasaryova,
a former actress who founded the Slovak Foreign Policy
Association, ran unsuccessfully for president, served as
Ambassador in Austria and Poland, and has a high position on
the SDKU candidate list. Her stage presence is great,
although her depth of knowledge doesn't always come through.
Another said to want the job is career diplomat Maros
Sefcovic, Slovakia's Ambassador in Brussels (to both the EU
and bilateral missions). In our view, MFA political director
and diplomatic superstar Miroslav Lajcak could be another
strong candidate.

--Free Forum (SF). Weeks ago it seemed like Free Forum was a
sure bet for a minor role in any future government. Internal
party problems now make it doubtful that the party will make
it into parliament (septel). On the off-chance the party
survives, it would be a good choice to head the MFA. Party
leaders have told us they agree completely with the foreign
policy of the Dzurinda government and would not make drastic
changes. Free Forum's foreign policy expert is
former-diplomat-turned-think-tank-brain Ivo Lancaric.
However, more likely candidates for the MFA post are
former-Ambassador to the U.S. Martin Butora and current
Ambassador to the U.S. Rastislav Kacer, both of whom are
close to SF leader Zuzana Martinakova.

--Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The party of
Vladimir Meciar once earned Slovakia the label "black hole of
Europe." Desperation to overcome that legacy has resulted in
a party whose foreign policy is largely consistent with that
of the current government. HZDS MPs supported controversial
foreign policy questions such as expanding the mandate for
Slovak troops in Iraq, when even some members of the
coalition government opposed them. In addition, though

Meciar's anti-democratic tendencies delayed Slovakia's
entrance to NATO and could have derailed EU membership as
well, since the 2002 election campaign, HZDS has been as
pro-NATO and pro-EU as anyone (ref D). One weakness we
foresee is support for transformational diplomacy carried out
by NGOs. Because many Slovak NGOs were formed to advance
democratic principles in Slovakia and thwart then-PM Meciar,
HZDS continues to view them with distrust. HZDS Vice-Chair
Milan Urbani has been courting the favor of the U.S. and EU
embassies, in an aggressive attempt to convince us Meciar is
a changed man who should now be internationally "acceptable."
We are not yet convinced, and therefore we cannot imagine
Meciar as foreign minister. Rather, Urbani himself has
admitted he covets the post. He is not qualified, in our
view.

Smer: Reason for Concern
--------------


4. (C) The party that will likely win a plurality of votes
and could form the next government is also the party most
likely to present the greatest challenges to U.S. foreign
policy goals: Robert Fico's Smer ("Direction"). Smer's
instincts are Euro-centric, and slightly anti-American,
seeing no need to differ from "older, more experienced" EU
members on foreign policy issues. The party lacks members
with substantive expertise, and instead forms policy stances
based on public opinion polls. Smer's inattention to foreign
policy issues, uncertainty about its international
priorities, and direct hints to us that the party is not
seeking the MFA lead us to believe Smer could let this post
could go to a coalition partner. Nonetheless, Slovakia under
Fico would be less likely to be out front on democracy
promotion and other transformational diplomacy initiatives,
or to follow the U.S. lead on key international issues.


5. (C) At a June 6 foreign policy conference organized by
Smer's new think-tank ASA ("Analyses, Strategies,
Alternatives"),speakers ranted against globalization, U.S.
unilateralism, and the "dangerous" foreign policies of the
Dzurinda government. The assembled crowd was made up mostly
of former Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and
Slovak Democratic Left (SDL) members (including former HZDS
Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavol Hamzik). Radovan Geist --
political scientist, Smer darling, and editor of the SDL
newspaper "Slovo" ("word") -- argued that Slovaks prefer
multilateral approaches and that they, even more than other
Europeans, want the EU to be the counterbalance to U.S.
hegemony. Czech citizen Oskar Krejci, Dean of the Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy Faculty at Matej Bel University
(where many of Slovakia's future diplomats study) said it is
an illusion that Slovakia can have any affect on U.S.
unilateralism. He added that the role of NATO is decreasing,
which is not a bad thing because the Alliance has become a
tool of U.S. interests. Krejci was exposed later in the
evening by Slovak television as a former State Security
"Rezident" (a most trusted agent under Communism). Economist
Peter Stanek warned that if left unchecked, foreign companies
would soon flood Slovakia's economy, only to pull out in 8-10
years and leave it in ruins. Then, in a conclusion that made
us wonder if he had even been paying attention to the other
speakers, Smer's Shadow Foreign Minister Juraj Zervan
(himself a mid-level Slovak diplomat) assured the crowd that
a Smer government's foreign policy posture would not be
radically different from the current government.


6. (C) Just as worrisome was a conversation we had with
Zervan and Smer MP Boris Zala on the margins. When Pol-Ec
Chief praised the active work of the GOS and Slovak NGOs in
supporting transformational diplomacy, expressing hope this
would continue after the elections, Zala responded that the
NGOs had been founded in opposition to former PM Vladimir
Meciar and therefore could not be trusted. A common theme at
the event was that Slovakia, as a small country, was a
consumer of foreign policy rather than one of its creators.
Zervan told the audience that Slovak people did not see a
need to play a role in democracy promotion efforts abroad; he
suggested, for example, that Slovakia follow the lead of
older EU members with experience in specific regions, such as
Spain when dealing with Cuba. Our message must have sunk in
a little bit, because in a June 12 meeting with the DCM Zala
claimed that he understands Slovakia's responsibilities and
value-added in the international arena, and said a Smer-led
government would maintain funding to NGOs.

Would Fico Really Be So Stupid?
--------------


7. (C) Various interlocutors have told us that ASA does not
have any real influence on the top Smer politicians. Rather,
it provides a forum for marginal members to air their views
and feel like they are heard. The attitude of the young Smer
staff members who helped organize the ASA assembly was
telling; they were barely able to hide their disdain for some
of the speakers. A representative from NGO Pontis later
confided that he had been approached by Smer's international
secretary during the coffee break who encouraged him to ask

SIPDIS
tough questions and "burn Zervan!"


8. (C) As former-SDL leader and now professor of foreign
affairs Peter Weiss reassured emboffs, "I know Robert Fico
very well. He is my political child. He would never be so
stupid." He might not be, but the problem is that we do not
see another generation of real advisors. The party's more
reasonable vice-chairmen want other ministries, such as
health (Pavol Paska) and defense (Robert Kalinak). This
leaves a void that, at the moment, is being filled by
radicals from the "bad old days."

Smer on Iraq: Do They Mean It or Not?
--------------


9. (C) Zala told DCM that Smer would have to keep its
recently-announced commitment to voters to withdraw troops
from Iraq. Nonetheless, Zala claimed a Smer-led government
would consult with the U.S. and coalition partners to discuss
an orderly withdrawal. We told Zala that consultation would
represent a change in Smer's modus operandi, since it
neglected to consult with the Iraqi government or us prior to
issuing its surprise statement calling for withdrawal (ref
E). We also reminded him that the new Iraqi government
wanted coalition members to stay for the time being and that
the situation on the ground in Iraq -- not domestic politics
-- should determine future Slovak plans. Former Meciar-era
Foreign Minister Hamzik quietly told us June 6 that Smer's
promise to withdraw Slovak troops was only a campaign tool
that should not be taken seriously.


10. (C) Likewise, Smer Vice Chairman and chair of
parliament's Foreign Affairs committee Pavol Paska did his
best to convince DCM during a June 6 meeting in his home town
of Kosice that Smer's vitriolic statement on Iraq was just a
political effort to attract more votes. Paska said that Smer
would not control the MFA in any coalition it led, and would
have to adjust its foreign policy to its partners, most of
whom are more in favor of Slovak efforts in Iraq. He claimed
that Slovaks at several rallies throughout Slovakia have
asked Fico to withdraw the troops. Paska said that a
Smer-led government would not at all change Slovakia's stance
toward NATO. (Comment: We appreciated Paska's comments, but
reminded him that, given Smer's recent record of telling us
one thing and doing another, we could only take his
information at face value. End Comment.)

Constraints on Foreign Policy
--------------


11. (C) Despite the disturbing trends in Smer, and
particularly a Smer that might align itself with SNS if it
felt necessary, there is a limit to how drastically
Slovakia's foreign policy could change. Slovakia could not
strike out alone against 24 other EU member states, although
its voice within the EU might not be as loud on democracy
promotion in Belarus, Cuba, and the Balkans. Smer might be
less willing to confront Russia than the current government,
for example, but would not take a stance against the EU
consensus. Fico had at one point envisioned a
Paroubek-Gyurcsany-Fico center-left block in the EU, but
those hopes have been dashed with the Czech stalemate. There
will be tremendous pressure on Slovakia to meet its
commitments to NATO, and to have a well-considered position
on UNSC issues through December 2007.


12. (C) Another point that will work to the U.S. advantage in
influencing foreign policy after the elections, even in the
worst-case scenario, is that the professionals within the MFA
and MOD recognize Slovakia's commitments and will continue to
do their jobs. Many of them rode out the Meciar years, and
they are not strangers to working for Slovak interests even
under a government they may not personally support. The U.S.
has laid good groundwork for future cooperation by treating
Slovak interlocutors as partners, and engaging them
consistently.


13. (C) Finally, despite all the rhetoric coming from various
elements of the party, we do believe it will be somewhat
subdued if Smer has to face the reality of governing. Right
now, the party needs to leave space for ideologues from the
left, who were absorbed into Smer when it merged with SDL.
Paska confirmed this to the DCM, saying Smer is concentrating
on older, more reliable voters for support after learning its
lesson in 2002 when youth supporters didn't turn out. We
trust that operating within the limits of the EU, NATO, the
UN, and other international commitments, a government led by
Smer would have to behave more responsibly than its campaign
rhetoric implies, but our efforts to help make this happen
under a Smer-led government will have to be considerably more
intensive.

VALLEE