Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRATISLAVA360
2006-05-05 13:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

SLOVAKIA WANTS TO TAKE IT SLOWER IN KOSOVO

Tags:  PREL ECON KPAO PGOV YI LO 
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VZCZCXRO5470
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0360/01 1251352
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051352Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9805
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0041
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0052
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0011
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000360 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PREL ECON KPAO PGOV YI LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA WANTS TO TAKE IT SLOWER IN KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 59894

B. BRATISLAVA 310

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000360

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PREL ECON KPAO PGOV YI LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA WANTS TO TAKE IT SLOWER IN KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 59894

B. BRATISLAVA 310

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo was frank in
discussions with the Slovak MFA on Kosovo that the impasse
must come to an end soon and that independence is the only
real option for Kosovo. MFA Director for CIS and the Balkans
Stefan Rozkopal told her Slovakia agrees in general, but
believes Ahtisaari and the contact group want to move forward
too quickly; in Slovakia's view the process is as important
as the final status. DAS DiCarlo's visit revealed gaps in
GOS information about behind-the-scenes talks being held by
the contact group and Ahtisaari, and were a useful step in
starting to bring the Slovaks closer to the U.S. point of
view. Discussions with MFA PolDir and Balkans expert
Miroslav Lajcak May 2-4 provided the crucial next step. End
summary.

PROCESS VS. STATUS
--------------


2. (C) On April 27, EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo met with MFA
Director for CIS and the Balkans Stefan Rozkopal (in the
absence of PolDir Miroslav Lajcak),Kosovo Desk Officer
Michal Pavuk, and representatives from the EU-Common Foreign
and Security Policy Department to exchange views on Kosovo
status talks and other developments in the Western Balkans.
The discussion followed on the heels of UN Special Envoy
Martti Ahtisaari's April 21 meeting with Foreign Minister
Eduard Kukan in Bratislava, and the briefing on U.S. Kosovo
policy that the DCM gave to Rozkopal April 18 (refs A and B).



3. (C) DiCarlo urged Slovakia as an EU member to help engage
the Serbs, giving tangible signs and incentives that an EU
perspective is real. It is not in the EU's interests for the
Western Balkans to remain a pocket of instability on the
continent. Rozkopal responded that Slovakia is urging the
Serbian government to be part of the process, but that the EU
was not yet convinced it should offer Serbia an EU
perspective, saying some "old countries" were not helpful.

DiCarlo also said we would look to Slovakia as a UNSC member
to support resolutions on the final status, and Rozkopal said
Slovakia would do so.


4. (C) DiCarlo pointed out that the U.S. does not see an
option for Kosovo other than independence; it would be
impossible to return to Belgrade's rule. We are not going
public yet with this view; we need to give Belgrade time to
adjust. We also need to find a way to put leverage on Kosovo
Albanians; they must be more flexible, and they will have
tremendous responsibility to implement future agreements. An
independent Kosovo must be multi-ethnic, with a viable role
for Kosovo Serbs. We have seen some breakthroughs in Kosovo,
but in response Belgrade seems to be retrenching and pulling
back. We don't want to repeat the mistakes made in Bosnia by
creating a "Serb" entity. France, Germany, and the UK share
our views; but we are not hearing from Belgrade what they
need.


5. (C) Rozkopal agreed that some kind of conditional
independence is inevitable. However, Slovakia's priority is
the process, rather than simply reaching final status. As in
the "Velvet Divorce" between Slovakia and the Czech Republic,
most issues should be settled in advance to avoid conflict in
the future. Rozkopal agreed that it was difficult to
understand what Belgrade wants, since they don't express
their views, even to sympathetic parties like Slovakia that
are willing to help them. He suggested there were two issues
affecting Belgrade's will to prepare an exit strategy: what
kind of borders will exist between Kosovo and Serbia
(Rozkopal seemed to frame this as a question of
administration rather than changing borders) and membership
for Kosovo in the United Nations. Rozkopal agreed with the
desire for a multi-ethnic Kosovo, but also expressed doubts.
Kosovo Albanian leaders may be saying the right things, but
the situation on the ground is different. He said there must
be a way for Serbia to save face so that "psychological
issues" like a desire for vengeance don't surface in the
future.


6. (C) DiCarlo explained that the members of the contact
group had been pushing hard for a bottom-up approach,
resolving core issues related to a settlement before status.
However, there must be buy-in from both sides, and the Serbs
were not helping. She said the international community
believes it can protect Kosovo Serbs. Rozkopal speculated

BRATISLAVA 00000360 002 OF 003


that Serbs would not remain in Kosovo after independence.
DiCarlo said it depended on what signal Belgrade sends;
Kosovo Serbs do not want to leave their land. In addition,
Kosovo cannot become independent without meeting certain,
strong conditions. An international presence with executive
powers will be crucial. There is a need for special
agreements on churches, decentralization, and preserving
links between Serb communities and Belgrade.


7. (C) Rozkopal expressed particular concern that there was
not enough time to accomplish all of this. He could not
imagine resolving all these issues by the fall, as proposed
by Ahtisaari. DiCarlo explained that "in the course of 2006"
was a target, not a deadline, and suggested that if we could
get Serbia engaged, they could make it by the end of the
year. She said that the Serbs are very clever and certainly
know what they want. They simply won't tell us, and keep
putting off meetings. Delaying final status for too long
leads to pent-up frustrations and could possibly result in
violence. In response, DiCarlo credited the Belgrade
government for handling Milosevic's death wisely, and said
work must still be done to convince the public it was
Milosevic who lost Kosovo. In this respect, Rozkopal said,
Slovak NGOs (perhaps with American funding) could be very
helpful, since they already had good programs with local
NGOs, universities, and youth.

ECONOMIC STAGNATION
--------------


8. (C) Rozkopal suggested the poor state of the economy was
another reason to proceed cautiously, since Kosovo is
dependent on foreign aid. DiCarlo explained that we do not
want Kosovo to become a failed state, taken over by organized
crime and a haven for terrorists. Sovereignty is needed to
be eligible for IFI lending; private investment will not
increase until status is resolved. This instability is bad
for Europe and the U.S., and make final status decisions ever
the more urgent. There was a broader discussion of economic
issues over lunch, which was attended by Rozkopal, Pavuk, and
representatives of two Slovak NGOs The NGO voices were
closer to the U.S. position, and argued that only Kosovo's
independence in the near term would help the economy and
prevent further conflict.

MONTENEGRO, BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
--------------


9. (C) Rozkopal told DiCarlo that Slovakia stands firmly
behind the 55 percent threshold for validity in the
Montenegro referendum on independence. He also said that
Slovak facilitator Lajcak had been urging the sides to
consider what the State Union would look like if the
referendum fails, and how to resolve all the issues that will
arise if it succeeds. Based on the "Velvet Divorce"
experience, Slovakia could be helpful in facilitating
communication.


10. (C) Both DiCarlo and Rozkopal expressed regret at the
failure of constitutional reform in Bosnia-Hercegovina,
though DiCarlo noted that at least people had started
thinking about reforms to modernize the Dayton structure.
Rozkopal said that something should be done in Bosnia with
the Croats.

MEDIA INTERVIEWS HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS, PROGRESS
--------------


11. (C) DiCarlo gave interviews to Slovak Radio and to
leading print daily "Sme." The young journalists were keen,
well-prepared, and asked detailed questions on events in the
Balkans and the U.S. point of view. DiCarlo was quoted in an
April 29 Sme article on the constitutional reform vote in
Bosnia-Hercegovina.

COMMENT: GOS APPRECIATIVE, CAN BE MOVED
--------------


12. (C) Slovak interlocutors were very appreciative of
DiCarlo's visit and openness. As Rozkopal explained,
Slovakia has a sincere interest in the Balkans because of
cultural and geographical proximity. However, because
Slovakia is not a member of the contact group, and does not
have a representative on Ahtisaari's team, it is difficult to
stay informed about all the behind-the-scenes discussions.
Therefore, DiCarlo's visit was extremely valuable in starting
to bring the Slovaks closer in line with our vision.
Discussions with PolDir Miroslav Lajcak, who is the Slovak
MFA's real Balkans expert, the week of May 2 will be an
instrumental next step.

BRATISLAVA 00000360 003 OF 003




13. (U) DAS Rosemary DiCarlo cleared this cable.
VALLEE