DINNER WITH FICO: SLOVAKIA'S OPPOSITION LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000131

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DAMON WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM ECON SOCI CVIS LO
SUBJECT: DINNER WITH FICO: SLOVAKIA'S OPPOSITION LEADER
LOOKS INTO HIS CRYSTAL BALL

REF: A. 05 BRATISLAVA 991


B. BRATISLAVA 101

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador hosted Smer Chairman Robert
Fico and Vice Chairman Pavol Paska (who also chairs
parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee) at a February 15
dinner, during which Fico and Paska made their predictions
about what post-June 17 election Slovakia would look like in
terms of foreign and economic policy. Fico predicted that
his party would win 22 to 25 percent of the vote, but that PM
Mikulas Dzurinda's SDKU would do better (with around 15
percent) than it is doing in the polls now (8 percent). He
did not rule out a possible Smer-SDKU coalition. While he
does not expect foreign policy to play a role in the
elections, Fico recently told a gathering of EU Ambassadors
that a Smer-led Slovakia would have an EU, not Transatlantic,
outlook. He expressed anti-privatization views in the energy
and transportation sectors, especially related to the rail
cargo sector and the privatization of Bratislava's airport.
Fico also mentioned his desire for an official visit to
Washington in late March. END SUMMARY.

FICO: THIS CAMPAIGN IS ABOUT DOMESTIC POLICY
--------------


2. (C) During a February 15 dinner, Smer party Chairman
Robert Fico told Ambassador and DCM that this will be the
first election fought on the basis of domestic issues, not
personalities or existential matters like EU entry. He
reiterated that healthcare would be front and center. Fico
castigated the government for allowing grave inequalities in
pension structures that left many Slovaks to exist on
stipends that do not allow them to pay rent, nor buy clothes
and food or other services. Asked if there was a chance of
any consequential legislation passing in the run-up to the
election, he thought that all the parties would agree to
reforms in this area before the election; Smer would press
the issue.


3. (C) Otherwise, Smer will campaign on the need to
establish the "social state" in Slovakia to even-out
development across the country. This "social democratic"
model would not include an extensive rollback of reforms, as
some have tried to portray. He would not do away with the
flat tax and would keep the corporate rate of 19 percent. He
would lower non-corporate rates to create a more
"progressive" tax system. He strongly advocated for a return
to a tax on dividends, as well. The Slovak government was
foregoing potential revenues that other states used to
finance governmental programs.

WHO WILL BE IN PARLIAMENT?
--------------


4. (C) According to Fico, in June 17 national elections
Smer, KDH, SDKU, SMK, HZDS, the Communist part (KSS),Slovak
Nationalist Party (SNS),and Freedom Forum (SF) will all
reach the 5 percent threshold and will be included in the
National Council (parliament). Fico said he would still like
eventually to raise the threshold from five to seven percent
to cut down the number of parties in parliament. He believes
a governing coalition should have two, or at the most three,
parties, but predicted that the next coalition would have
four or five.

HUNGARIANS MAKING "STUPID" MOVES
--------------


5. (C) Fico, who made public statements to the effect that
no Hungarian would ever lead the Slovak parliament, is said
by party insiders to have a close relationship with SMK and
its Chairman, Bela Bugar, in particular. That said, Fico
called ethnic Hungarian Deputy PM Pal Csaky "stupid" for
pushing an initiative to allow Slovak towns named for
historical Slovaks to use their traditional Hungarian names
as well. Fico says this will only move votes towards Jan
Slota's nationalist SNS party, and that it is these kinds of
issues which make Fico believe that SNS will garner perhaps
seven percent of the vote this summer.

SMER'S COALITION PROSPECTS
--------------


6. (C) Smer will fare well in the upcoming elections,
according to Fico and Paska, receiving between 22 and 25
percent of the vote (though Paska said he believes they may

BRATISLAVA 00000131 002 OF 003


get more). Asked what he considered the most important
qualification for becoming one of his party's 150 spots on
the ballot nationwide, Fico responded with one word: loyalty.
Clearly, he is not one to brook great policy differences in
his caucus. Fico told us that 80 percent of Smer's party
list this year would be identical to the party list in the
last election.


7. (C) As for partners, Fico did not rule out a deal with
SDKU, even with Dzurinda a member of the cabinet (Note: Other
Smer operatives have told us that they believed the
personality conflict between Fico and Dzurinda was too great
to overcome. End Note). Fico said that "it was a mistake
last time to rule out any potential partners," and speculated
that SDKU would get 15 percent in the elections, as ANO and
SF voters are likely to look there. Smer, he said, would not
ally with KSS or SNS. Fico did not rule out cooperation with
HZDS if Meciar were no longer in control, and if some members
were willing to break with the party and join Smer or
otherwise ally on issues. Paska doubted that Meciar would
ever relinquish leadership of the party.


8. (C) Fico took the opportunity to criticize the rumored
potential cooperation between SDKU and HZDS, stressing that
as long as Meciar led the party, it was essential to keep it
in the opposition, so as to continue the process of
destroying Meciar's relevance. Paska noted that many members
would break with Meciar if he was, once again, in the
minority in parliament.


9. (C) Although critical of the Vatican treaty issue (ref
B),Fico did not rule out cooperation with KDH, which he
called "our Taliban." He thought KDH had made a bad mistake
bringing down the coalition, but he was happy that KDH had
accomplished what Smer had failed to do: force early
elections. He did not really understand why KDH decided to
move now, but if they did it to show the public they were
different from SDKU, the move would not help, and meanwhile,
KDH lost their positions and power within the government.
Paska marveled at how, in a country that is 70 percent
Catholic, KDH only gets 10 to 12 percent of the vote.

PRIVATIZATION
--------------


10. (C) Fico differentiated between certain sectors in
which he opposed privatization in principle (though not
necessarily selling minority shares in publicly-controlled
enterprises to private hands),and those which he opposed
because he thought the processes were corrupt. He was
opposed in principle to privatization in the energy,
electrical, and rail sectors, as well as the ongoing sale of
the airports. He categorically told the Ambassador that he
would do all he could to stop the ongoing process --
including a vote of no-confidence in the PM, which he thinks
KDH and HZDS would support -- to privatize rail cargo prior
to the elections, and he thought he would succeed, given that
"no paper had been signed."

THE ECONOMISTS BEHIND THE MAN
--------------


11. (C) When it comes to economics, Fico said he looked to
Peter Stanek of the Slovak Academy of Science for advice,
implying that he would be economy minister in a Fico led
government. On the financial side, Smer gets advice from the
President of the Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
Peter Mihok. (COMMENT: Our preliminary view of these
advisors is that they represent economic "old think." END
COMMENT)

FICO FOREIGN POLICY: EU, NOT TRANSATLANTIC
--------------


12. (C) Fico said that foreign policy would not factor into
the campaign cycle. We emphasized that none of the parties
should try to bring the U.S. into the campaign as an issue,
and that we were comfortably noncommittal on the outcome,
willing to work with a new government selected by the Slovak
people. (COMMENT: Although Fico did not mention
"transatlantic relations" per se, we note that he told an
invited gathering of EU Ambassadors recently that a Fico-led
Slovakia would have an EU, not Transatlantic, outlook. END
COMMENT.) Paska, though, mentioned that recent Embassy and
Department discussions of a "partnership" with Europe were
much welcomed in his party's foreign affairs leadership.


13. (C) Paska and Fico evinced a distinctly softer,
friendlier approach to Russia. When we suggested that Fico

BRATISLAVA 00000131 003 OF 003


take the opportunity of his upcoming March visit to Moscow to
raise with the GOR's recent moves against NGOs and freedom of
the press, Paska and Fico responded with only vague agreement
to respect human rights and a greater appreciation that
countries like Russia and China just need to develop in their
own ways and at their own pace; "stability" was the more
important consideration.


14. (C) We made a strong pitch for a continuing active
Slovak role in promoting democracy, fighting terror, etc.
Fico did not repeat his earlier protest to us that Slovakia
was "too small" to have an active foreign policy (ref A),but
he clearly looked disinterested in Slovak outreach abroad.
Paska, however, agreed that Slovakia's activism had created a
very positive image of the country in Europe and the U.S.,
and was valuable. Fico did respond affirmatively to our
point that we would count on cooperation in the UNSC for the
rest of Slovakia's term there, regardless of who won the
election.

DANISH CARTOONS ILLUSTRATE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
-------------- --------------


15. (C) On other foreign policy issues, Paska launched into
a spirited condemnation of those using violence to protest
depictions of the prophet Muhammed in the European media.
The entire episode demonstrated to Paska that the west and
the Muslim world truly were very different civilizations and
that a "clash" was unavoidable.

IRAQ
--------------


16. (C) Fico reiterated, as he has told us privately in the
past, that if he was PM, he would not try to remove Slovak
troops from Iraq. He added this time that there is not even
any clamoring for such a move within Smer circles.

FICO WANTS TO COME TO WASHINGTON
--------------


17. (C) When the Ambassador raised the issue of Fico's
desire to travel to the U.S. in late March, Fico asked what
PM Dzurinda would get from the USG on the visa issue if/when
he visited in March (Note: Apparently aware of the
confidential nature of the plans, Fico quipped "see how much

SIPDIS
we know about the PM's plans?" End Note). He downplayed
progress on any aspect of the visa issue as not really
important (in terms of vote getting) to the Slovak population
at large, only to a small minority of people who could afford
to travel to the United States. However, both Fico and Paska
seemed suspicious that the PM's proposed visit to the White
House next month might create a "visa surprise."


18. (C) Fico did not push for particular appointments
during his Washington visit, saying he would defer to our
advice on whom and at what level he should meet with USG reps.

COMMENT: FICO MORE RELAXED
--------------


19. (C) In contrast to our last meeting, during which he
was intense and serious, Fico was more engaged and friendly,
obviously trying to look like Prime Minister material. He
reiterated at the end of the dinner that he would not make PM
Dzurinda's close ties with the U.S. a target for his campaign
rhetoric. END COMMENT.

VALLEE