Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRASILIA918
2006-05-10 19:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL; LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING

Tags:  ETRD ECIN KSUM PREL BR 
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VZCZCXRO0436
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0918/01 1301922
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101922Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5341
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5406
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3727
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3990
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 4556
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2971
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6224
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1800
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 5481
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0058
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 4739
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 2037
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 6913
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1486
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000918 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO USTR MSULLIVAN
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN
TREASURY FOR FPARODI
AID/W FOR AA/LA
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/SHUPKA
USDOE FOR GWARD/SLADISLAW

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD ECIN KSUM PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL; LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING
LATAM-EU AND EU-MERCOSUL SUMMITS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000918

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO USTR MSULLIVAN
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN
TREASURY FOR FPARODI
AID/W FOR AA/LA
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/SHUPKA
USDOE FOR GWARD/SLADISLAW

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD ECIN KSUM PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL; LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING
LATAM-EU AND EU-MERCOSUL SUMMITS


1. (SBU) Summary. Brazilian officials admit that their
game-plan for achieving results at the May 12 EU-Latin
American summit in Vienna, followed by a May 13 EU-Mercosul
bilateral in the same locale, is now in question. While they
had hoped to use the opportunity of the summits to have
President Lula press heads-of-state on WTO issues, they worry
that Bolivia,s nationalization of the oil industry last
week, and its stated intention to take similar action in
other areas, will overshadow all else. Venezuelan leader
Hugo Chavez, set to attend the event, could well steal the
show given his penchant for sensationalism, further
highlighting the divisions between Brasilia and Caracas and
the wider instability in the region. Notwithstanding
Mercosul,s efforts to emulate the EU in terms of true
regional integration, the southern cone trade bloc looks to
be more divided than ever, as does the Andean Community. In
light of all the region,s internal tensions, EU
interlocutors will likely find it difficult to achieve
concrete results at the twin summits. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On May 9, the U.K. Charge made the following points
to POlCouns about the upcoming EU-Latin American and
EU-Mercosul summits in Vienna:

-- Lula had pressed hard for private bilaterals with both
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and Germany,s Angela Merkel
(to the extent that Lula,s foreign affairs advisors told the
British that if Lula did not get a meeting with Blair, he
would not even go to Vienna). Both meetings are now
scheduled.

-- Based upon its conversations with the GOB, the U.K.
Embassy, believes that Lula's agenda in Vienna will be
principally WTO-related. Lula wants to talk to Blair and
Merkel about agriculture market access and what it would take
to get the outlines of a deal before the window of
opportunity closes on the Doha Round. As always, Brazil
would push for the EU to come off its hard EU position on
agriculture. Lula,s plan appears to be to use Blair and
Merkel to leverage the French.

-- As a breakthrough on agricultural issues would enable
Lula to mute the (increasingly vociferous) critics of his
foreign policy in one fell swoop, the Brits expect Lula to
hammer them and the Germans on this at every opportunity,
from Vienna to the July 15 G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg.


3. (SBU) Also on May 9, Econoff contacted Ministry of
External Relations (MRE) Economic Department officials to
inquire about Brazil,s objectives for the upcoming meetings.
We were told their expectations for the EU-Latam summit and
the EU-Mercosul session were now unclear. While the GOB,s
primary objective had been to press at the head-of-state
level for concessions to break the logjam in Doha Round
talks, the concern now is that inevitable discussion of the
Bolivian situation will undermine their ability to adequately
focus leaders, attention on the WTO trade negotiations.


4. (U) As noted in a report in the influential daily &Folha
de Sao Paulo,8 while it is possible to avoid the Bolivia
issue in the heads-of-state plenary, this topic will
inevitably arise in side discussions. The Folha article
fretted that Lula will be seen at the summit as a
&weakened8 leader, in comparison to Chavez and Bolivian
President Evo Morales, limiting his ability to pursue his own
agenda.

BRASILIA 00000918 002 OF 002




5. (SBU) Comment. Within the region, Lula must increasingly
feel hemmed in on all sides. Mercosul, Brazil,s principal
trade/political bloc, is plagued by internecine feuds while
Venezuela appears to be egging Bolivia on in that country,s
&war8 against Brazilian investment. On both fronts, the
situation is likely to get worse before it gets better.
Meanwhile, domestic criticism of Brazilian foreign policy is
mounting. Achieving a breakthrough on Doha Round
agricultural issues would indeed help Lula stem the critics
and regain some of the visibility he has lost to Chavez.
Whether at this late date his WTO arguments -- particularly
in the absence of any specific Brazilian concessions -- will
change any minds in Vienna, however, is a different story.

Chicola