INDUMIL DOWNSTREAM: TIGHTER CONTROLS, FEW LEAKS

S E C R E T BOGOTA 007397

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECSTATE/DDTC - C. EDWARD PEARTREE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MOPS CO KOMC ETTC OTRA PARM
SUBJECT: INDUMIL DOWNSTREAM: TIGHTER CONTROLS, FEW LEAKS

REF: A. 05 BOGOTA 07332


B. 05 BOGOTA 09715

C. BOGOTA 03156

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reasons: 1.4(a),(b),(d)

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Summary
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1. (S) Responding to possible weapons leakage to terrorist
groups from state weapons manufacturer INDUMIL, econ/poloffs
went beyond a routine factory licensing review (reftel C) to
investigate inventory controls in the later stages of
storage, transport, and retail sales. INDUMIL outlined
comprehensive security measures implemented last year, and
COLMIL intelligence assured us that military leaks account
for a tiny portion of weapons captured from illegal groups.
Most originate from cross-border sources. Police
intelligence, in a reversal of their previous reports of
INDUMIL corruption, corroborated the improvement. Tighter
controls and police stings have made systematic siphoning
from INDUMIL stocks more difficult and more uncommon. End
Summary.

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Context: Upstream OK, Downstream A Concern
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2. (C) A factory visit in March to parastatal weapons
manufacturer INDUMIL (reftel C) determined that sufficient
safeguards existed at the production facility to satisfy
State Department licensing requirements. Still, in light of
past seizures of INDUMIL-made armaments from illegal armed
groups, doubts remained about leakages downstream in the
supply chain. At the factory door, munitions leave INDUMIL
control and become the responsibility of the COLMIL, through
stages of storage, transport, and distribution via three
channels -- military, commercial, and retail. Econoff and
poloff investigated controls at these final stages and
consulted with military and police intelligence on the
sources of armaments to terrorist groups.

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Arms Depots: Security, Surveillance, Screening
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3. (C) The COLMIL takes possession of armaments at the gate
of the production plant. INDUMIL's Director of Security, COL
Nemesio Bojaca, said the military owns and controls a storage
depot co-located at each of INDUMIL's three factory sites but
delimited by fencing so as to be on separate COLMIL premises
guarded by COLMIL troops. These depots follow the same
security scheme as implemented within the plant, including
civilian guards, military security, electronic surveillance,
covert security, and counterintelligence. Screening of
employees before hire includes a review of their records with
all law enforcement authorities, a visit to the employee's
home, and a 'loyalty test.' During the day, workers pass
through metal detectors at factory entry and exit, wear
pocketless uniforms, are forbidden to carry food or other
property onto or off of factory premises, and are observed on
security cameras.

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Transport: Secrecy of Orders, Escorted Travel
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4. (C) From the three central depots, arms are transported
to commercial customers (mining companies using explosives)
and to 37 retail outlets on COLMIL bases around the country.
Product orders transmitted electronically are encrypted, and
delivery logistics schedules are hand delivered in person to
avoid interception. When shipments leave the main depot for
the open road, they do so in columns of 10-20 trucks
accompanied by sixty soldiers distributed through the convoy.
During the trip, the soldiers have uninterrupted radio
access to their command, and they call in at predefined
points along the route. INDUMIL says problems at the
transport stage are rare: the last was three years ago, when
raw material for explosives were transported unguarded,
intercepted by the FARC, and subsequently recovered by the
COLAR. After that episode, the current safeguards were
introduced. There have been no further incidents.

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Retail: Inventory Auditing and Buyer Vetting
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5. (C) Controls at retail outlets are twofold, relating to
monitoring of arms inventory and screening of weapons sales
to the public. Major (Ret.) Lucenie Torres, in charge of
commercial outlets, said inventories are checked at multiple
stages: verification on arrival (by item-specific serial
numbers),daily stock count at close of business, monthly
report to headquarters, and surprise spot checks by auditors.
Computerized scanning and real-time database linkage to the
MoD (reftel C) is limited to INDUMIL factories and to
products destined for COLMIL use. Torres said this will
someday be extended to retail outlets and to items for sale
to the public, but she also said that goal will take a long
time to implement. Sales to the public are authorized by the
COLAR's Department of Commercial Arms Control (DCCA) based on
a lengthy application form and law enforcement vetting
checks. Sales are recorded in the National Arms Registry, a
data base accessible by all COLMIL units that provides buyer
name, purchase date, and weapon make and serial number.

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Leaks Stanched by Controls and Stings
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6. (S) In a visit to the police intelligence directorate
(DIPOL),Major Juan Carlos Buitrago confirmed that these
controls -- many newly implemented late in 2005 -- have
markedly reduced arms leaks from INDUMIL/COLMIL to
terrorists. It is now much more difficult, he said, for
items simply to go missing. The other main limiting factor,
he said, is a series of DIPOL undercover operations that have
dismantled corruption networks within INDUMIL:

- In May 2005, Colombian police (CNP) seized a large cache of
INDUMIL ammunition and grenades, with documents indicating
intended diversion to the FARC; INDUMIL staff were the
primary suspects.

- In mid-summer 2005, police arrested a ring of former
officers and NCOs of the CNP and COLAR, along with active
INDUMIL employees, for diversion of COLAR weapons and
ammunition to FARC, paramilitaries, and narcotrafficking
groups.

- In May 2006, sensitive reporting indicated CNP jungla and
carabinero instructors were under investigation for theft of
armaments with intent to sell to the FARC.

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FARC Explosives: From Ecuador Not the COLAR
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7. (S) Emboffs met with the COLMIL watchdog on internal arms
control, the Center of Military Counterintelligence (CECIM),
to discuss sources of weapons to illegal armed groups.
Concern centered mainly on explosives, the FARC's weapon of
choice in hit-and-run attacks. CECIM's director, Colonel
Gutierrez, said about half of the explosives used by the FARC
were from Ecuador, with a substantial amount also from
Venezuela. The third largest category was homemade, i.e.
concocted by the FARC itself. Sergeant Madrigal of the
COLMIL's Arms Tracking Investigations Center (CIERA)
concurred that Ecuador was the lead source of explosives,
citing corruption, poor military pay, poor inventory
controls, and close relations between the FARC and the
Ecuadorian military in border zones.


8. (S) COL Gutierrez estimated that only about five percent
of FARC explosives were INDUMIL made. Whenever the latter
were found in FARC hands, he said, CECIM conducted an
investigation, tracing the serial numbers to the source of
leakage. Of this amount investigated, CECIM said the
majority tied back to commercial sales in the mining
industry, typically to smaller players lacking proper storage
controls. This was the finding in a recent high-profile case
of INDUMIL explosives captured from the FARC in Tolima: the
units still bearing serial numbers traced back to small

mining companies. Serial numbers had been removed from the
other half of the units. CECIM maintained that only a tiny
portion of explosives captured from the FARC was attributable
to COLAR leaks. That small quantity, said Gutierrez, was
siphoned bit by bit during field operations and gradually
amassed by the FARC.

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FARC Arms & Munitions: Inflows Across All Borders
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9. (S) DIPOL's Major Buitrago agreed with COL Gutierrez's
assessment that INDUMIL products comprised only a small
portion (perhaps two percent) of arms seizures from illegal
groups. With respect to weapons and munitions, those few
made by INDUMIL were mainly stolen during terrorist ambushes
of armed forces who had been legitimately issued the weapons.
Such thefts are decreasing in line with the drop in direct
guerilla attacks on the COLAR and CNP, said Buitrago. There
was only one such attack in Tolima last year, resulting in
the loss of two or three weapons, compared to 60 such attacks
in 2001. The vast majority of arms and munitions come across
Colombia's borders -- primarily from Panama and Venezuela --
sourced from international arms trafficking networks trading
in weapons from Russia, Bulgaria, China, Germany, and the
U.S. Buitrago noted that Peru was the source of a notorious
shipment of 10,000 Russian AK-47's in the late 1990's, and
Brazil is rumored today to be the transit country for
surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs). No MANPADs have ever been
used by the FARC.

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Comment
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10. (C) Any INDUMIL/COLMIL claims regarding internal
controls on weapons warrant skepticism. Their story,
however, is bolstered by confirmation from police
intelligence -- the same DIPOL branch which reported on past
INDUMIL corruption and continues to investigate criminal
activity in the arms supply chain. Ultimately the best proof
of INDUMIL/COLMIL controls will be in continued monitoring of
arms seizures from terrorists.
WOOD