Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1762
2006-12-14 12:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON MANAS AIR BASE INCIDENTS

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001762 

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR SCA/FO - FEIGENBAUM AND SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON MANAS AIR BASE INCIDENTS

BISHKEK 00001762 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001762

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DEPT FOR SCA/FO - FEIGENBAUM AND SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON MANAS AIR BASE INCIDENTS

BISHKEK 00001762 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Speaking privately, Deputy FM Sarbayev
told DCM that U.S. delay in responding to the diplomatic
notes on the Manas shooting incident is creating a growing
political problem for the GOKG that damages U.S. interests
and that could jeopardize the continued operation of the
base. End Summary.


2. (C) In a 90 minute one-on-one discussion with DCM on
December 14, Deputy FM Kadyrbek Sarbayev said that the lack
of response from the U.S. to the substantive requests
conveyed in the four diplomatic notes the MFA has sent the
embassy regarding the December 6 shooting incident is killing
the government and is becoming a "huge political problem."
Parliament, whose leaders told Sarbayev as recently as
December 8 that they would steer clear of the shooting
incident, started two days of discussion December 14 on the
incident (along with other controversial issues such as
Krygyzstan's participation in HIPC). MPs are asking Sarbayev
and others, "What is the response to the diplomatic notes?"
The longer the government is silent, Sarbayev said, the worse
the political situation becomes. As examples, he noted that
recently members of the Duma in Russia began calling for the
closure of the base, opposition parliamentarians have called
for a review of the 2001 agreement, and there are rumors of
possible anti-U.S. demonstrations at the airport.

Appeal for Cooperation on the Investigation
--------------


3. (C) Sarbayev said that the Ministry of Interior (MVD)
investigators working the case have told the MFA that the two
keys to resolving the investigation are MVD access to Airman
Hatfield and the pistol. Without access to either one, the
MVD can't bring the investigation forward. The MVD can
"broaden" it, e.g. by interviewing other fuel truck drivers
and airport personnel, but the U.S. refusal to grant direct
MVD access to Airman Hatfield or the gun have frustrated MVD
efforts to move forward jointly on the investigation.



4. (C) In appealing for flexibility on the access issue,
Sarbayev claimed the U.S. allowed local law enforcement to
question a U.S. serviceman in a previous rape case in
Okinawa, thereby setting a precedent. He asked rhetorically
how the government can explain the delay in the U.S.
response, or refusal to allow the MVD the same access it is
allowing U.S. investigators. (Note. MVD allows OSI
investigators to participate in and pose direct questions
during interviews it is conducting with airport personnel.)


5. (C) Sarbayev also asked whether the U.S. could agree to a
Joint Commission to look into this and future incidents. He
also wondered when the MFA could expect to receive the U.S.
report on the late September collision between a refueling
tanker and a Kyrgyz civilian airliner.


6. (C) In response, DCM said that the issues raised by the
Ministry,s diplomatic notes involved complex legal and
political issues, and deserved a considered response. He
assured Sarbayev that officials in Washington were focused on
responding as quickly as possible. Sarbayev should not
underestimate the importance of the fact that Airman Hatfield
remains in Krygyzstan as an indication or our commitment to
cooperate. In the meantime, we were concerned by inaccurate
information that has appeared in the press and in quotes from
Kyrgyz officials. For example, the media is reporting that
an earlier automobile accident involving an airman from the
base resulted in the deaths of two Krygyz nationals. This
was wrong. A 2002 incident resulted in the injury, not
death, of two civilians, who subsequently received
significant compensation. DCM also clarified for Sarbayev
the results of two incidents when U.S. vehicles damaged
Kyrgyz aircraft; Sarbayev mistakenly believed both were

BISHKEK 00001762 002.2 OF 002


unresolved. In both instances the U.S. side agreed to pay
compensation, in spite of the fact that the U.S. was under no
legal obligation to do so under the terms of the 2001 base
agreement.


7. (C) Regarding the ongoing investigation, DCM noted that
from the U.S. perspective, cooperation between OSI and MVD
investigators was good, and the two sides were exchanging
information on a daily basis. Investigators are awaiting
results of two key events to help clarify the incident. The
first is the autopsy of the driver, which was conducted by
Krygyz officials (with OSI present). OSI expects the autopsy
report December 14 or 15, which should clarify whether the
driver was shot in the chest or the back (as is alleged in
the press),and determine the trajectory of the bullets both
in entering and leaving the body. The second event is the
analysis of the pistol. Both a ballistic test and a DNA test
should be conducted. The latter can only be done in the
U.S., and may help determine the distance between the gun and
the driver when the shots were fired. The former can, in
theory, be done in Kyrgyzstan or the U.S., but might taint or
destroy the DNA evidence if done before the DNA analysis.
This was one of the many issues under discussion in
considering our response to the Ministry,s diplomatic note
on this point.


8. (C) On the question of a Joint Commission on the
incident, DCM noted that the U.S. was always ready to discuss
bilateral issues of concern, but that we were still
considering the Kyrgyz request. Finally, DCM noted that we
expected the report on the collision to be out soon, but
could not offer a firm date.


9. (C) Comment. Sarbayev did not raise the immunity issue
at all, which we take to indicate he understands the U.S.
will have little flexibility and discussion would not be
productive. Instead, the Krygyz are pressing for flexibility
on the issues of access to Airman Hatfield and the gun, where
they hope we may be able to show the Kyrgyz government and
people a tangible commitment to work through this incident
together.


10. (C) In the absence of any U.S. gesture, the atmosphere
is quickly becoming more confrontational. Immigration issues
were raised by the GOKG last week, and on December 13, a
Krygyz government commission publicly blamed the U.S. tanker
crew for the September collision; the Krygyz Air Traffic
Control Agency accused the base of owing $15 million in fees
for services, and threatened to stop servicing U.S. military
aircraft; and Manas airport trade unions called on the Krygyz
government to review the base agreement so the airport can
demand compensation from the U.S. for any future incidents.
In the event we are not able to be forthcoming on any of the
Krygyz requests as conveyed in their diplomatic notes, we can
anticipate an increasingly difficult, if not hostile,
environment that could seriously restrict or impede
operations of the air base.
YOVANOVITCH