BISHKEK EAC MEETING ON RECOMMENDATION TO REOPEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001730

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DEPT ALSO FOR DS/IP/SPC - WEINBERG
DEPT ALSO FOR DS/IP/NEA/SA - GALLO
ASTANA FOR LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: ASEC CASC KG PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: BISHKEK EAC MEETING ON RECOMMENDATION TO REOPEN
USAID OFFICE IN OSH

REF: A. BISHKEK 1602

B. BISHKEK 1621

Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired an EAC meeting the morning
of December 6. In attendance were AMB, DCM, POL/ECON,
POL/RA, PAS, MGT, DAO, CONS, CLO, Peace Corps, USAID, MED,
RSL, Manas Airbase, and RSO. Also attending was USAID
Regional Deputy Director Delaney from Almaty.


2. (C) The Bishkek EAC met to discuss making a
recommendation to send forward to the Department (as required
by State 344921, Subject: Guidelines for Temporary Closure to
the Public) on whether to reopen the USAID office in the city
of Osh in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Operations in the Osh office
were suspended on November 16 due to security concerns
following the abduction of the USAID Country Representative's
spouse at gun point on November 11 (See Reftels).


3. (C) DCM briefly reviewed the case and reported that in
the three weeks since the incident there have been a few new
leads, but nothing leading to apprehension of the named
suspect who drove the stolen vehicle to Osh. The FBI sent a
forensics team to Osh to collect DNA, fiber, and other
evidence from the recovered stolen vehicle, but without a
suspect the evidence is of little value to the investigation.
While driving the stolen vehicle from Bishkek to Osh, the
suspect had an accident. The other driver in the accident
has been interviewed and provided the suspect's name and
description and may be able to identify the suspect if he is
apprehended.


4. (C) To date no link has been discovered between the
abduction in Bishkek and the stolen vehicle being dropped off
in the parking lot of the USAID office in Osh. If the driver
of the stolen vehicle could be apprehended, he may be able to
clarify this issue. There is a scrap metal company with
offices in the same USAID office building in Osh. The
company is rumored to have a connection with a member of
Parliament, who is believed to have an affiliation with
organized crime in Osh, but so far no link has been
established nor is there proof of the alleged links to an MP.


5. (C) The investigation has revealed no indications of a
specific threat to USAID employees in the Osh office. As
there also has never been an indication of a threat against
USAID employees in the Bishkek office (aside from the
specific threat to the Country Representative and his wife),
USAID's Bishkek operations have remained open since the
incident. The Ambassador, DCM met with the Osh employees on
December 6, who expressed their desire to return to work and
made some suggestions for improving security at the Osh
building. They recommend a step already considered by RSO:
arming all three MVD guards on site, instead of just one as
is currently the case. They noted that, in their view,
keeping operations suspended actually draws more attention to
them than would resuming operations. RSO will reiterate to
MVD the importance of investigating the possible link of the
firm in the building to the member of Parliament who may be
involved with organized crime. RSO noted that security could
be enhanced by exploring the possibility of restricting
parking around the Osh office building and request Diplomatic
Security (DS)to add recording capability to the security
monitors that are installed around the interior and exterior
of the building. DCM also recommended, with RSO support,
that the Embassy request DS send a Threat Assessment Team on
an urgent basis to assess the Osh office and its location, as
well as USAID offices in Embassy Bishkek, and to recommend
additional security upgrades if necessary.


6. (C) RSO pointed out that the stolen vehicle was moved to
the MVD compound in Osh where the FBI Team collected forensic
evidence, so the large MVD presence drawing attention to the
USAID office is no longer there. The office does not have
signage visible from the street identifying it as a USG
office, but diplomatic plated vehicles are parked in the lot
behind the building. Osh is a small town, and it is likely
that most long-term residents know the office exists even if
they are not aware of its exact location. RSO stated that
the office does not meet DS setback requirements. MGT
officer stated that, given the security problems of the
current office, this may be the ideal time to relocate to a

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different office site that does not pose such risks.
Ambassador noted that such situations transform a security
issue into a budget issue, and that relocating to a new
building would likely take several months, leading to
open-ended suspension of operations in Osh.


7. (C) Following discussion of several scenarios for
resuming operations at the USAID office in Osh, Ambassador
proposed that the Embassy recommend to the Department to
authorize resumption of operations in Osh next week, once the
USAID Osh Director Shelton, who returns from leave December
9, has had an opportunity to reassess the situation on the
ground. Resumption of activities should be contingent on
all three MVD guards being armed. The other steps proposed
by the RSO to upgrade security would be pursued concurrent
with resumption of operations. The committee agreed
unanimously with this recommendation.


8. (SBU) In accordance with the EAC, the Embassy has
submitted a cable to the Department recommending resumption
of operations at the USAID Osh facility, under the conditions
outlined above. Another EAC meeting will be convened as
needed.
YOVANOVITCH