Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1723
2006-12-06 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

ACTION REQUEST RECOMMENDING RESUMPTION OF

Tags:  ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG 
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O 061503Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8659
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 4249
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 1651
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 1403
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0285
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 0866
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001723 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST RECOMMENDING RESUMPTION OF
OPERATIONS AT USAID OFFICE IN OSH, KYRGYZSTAN

REF: BISHKEK 1621

Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001723

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST RECOMMENDING RESUMPTION OF
OPERATIONS AT USAID OFFICE IN OSH, KYRGYZSTAN

REF: BISHKEK 1621

Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This cable contains an Action Request; see para 8
below.


2. (C) On November 16, 2006, the USAID office in Osh, Kyrgyz
Republic temporarily suspended operations due to a perceived
security threat. The perceived threat centered around the
recovery of a stolen diplomatic vehicle that reappeared in
Osh. The vehicle was stolen in Bishkek from the spouse of
the USAID country director, but was found a few days later in
the parking lot of the USAID office in Osh (Reftel). Due to
an increased local police (MVD) presence in and around the
USAID office in Osh, the USAID city director decided to
suspend temporarily operations and close the Osh office. In
addition, the USAID city director was scheduled to depart
post for R&R travel and would not return until December 9.
Coupled with the Thanksgiving holiday, and the hope that the
investigation into the case would yield further information
regarding the vehicle's ppearance in Osh, the decision was
made to continue the suspension of operations in Osh through
the holiday period. The USAID employees in Osh have
indicated that they do not feel threatened and expressed a
desire to return to work.


3. (C) During the three weeks that USAID operations have been
suspended in Osh, the increased MVD presence has ceased with
the removal of the stolen diplomatic vehicle to an MVD
compound. An FBI evidence collection team has recovered
evidence, in cooperation with the MVD, from the vehicle. The
MVD is working to locate the individual identified as having
driven the stolen vehicle to Osh, but to date the search
continues. Initial concerns that a commercial firm that has
been located in the same building as the USAID office for the
past two years may have been involved in a car smuggling ring
have not been substantiated, but the bona fides of the firm
remain uncertain. During the intervening three weeks since
operations were suspended, no direct or indirect information
has been received to suggest that the physical integrity of
the office, or the personal safety of its employees is at
risk.


4. (C) In consultation with DS, CA, USAID, and other
represented agencies, Post requests the Department's
concurrence to resume operations and reopen the USAID office
in Osh. Absent a specific threat to the office in Osh, the
consensus of the EAC is that continued suspension of
operations is no longer necessary.


5. (C) The Emergency Action Committee met on December 6
(septel) and recommends resuming operations at the USAID
office in Osh, under the following conditions:


A. Ensure that all three (3) local police (MVD) on the USAID
floor, at the front entrance, and in the booth of the parking
lot are armed (currently, only the MVD guard in the parking
lot is armed);


B. Encourage and assist the MVD to continue to investigate
the appearance of the vehicle in Osh and the circumstances
surrounding the theft of the vehicle in Bishkek, including
checking the bona fides of the commercial firm located in the
USAID building;


C. Explore ways to close or restrict parking in the adjacent
parking lot;


D. Seek DS funding to fund security upgrades, such as
enabling record capabilities to existing CCTV;


E. Request DS send a Threat Assessment team to Bishkek and
Osh. In Osh, the team should examine the building and assess
the threat in light of numerous events surrounding this, and
previous security cases in Kyrgyzstan.


6. (C) Post recommends Item A in para 5 as a pre-condition to
resuming operations; RSO believes that we could secure MVD
agreement to arm the two guards during the week of December
11-15, at which time we propose proceeding with resumption of
operations. This would also allow the USAID city director,
who returns from R&R on December 9, to have a few days to
assess the situation prior to resumption of operations.


7. (C) Post recommends pursuing items B-E concurrently with

BISHKEK 00001723 002 OF 002


the resumption of operations. Post will contact MVD re
investigating the appearance of the vehicle in Osh and the
activities of the commercial firm located in the USAID
building, and will contact the landlord regarding closing or
restricting parking in the adjacent lot. Post will request
additional DS funding, and the DS Threat Assessment Team
visit, via septel.


8. (C) Action Request: Post requests that th Department
approve the resumption of operations of the USAID Osh office
under the conditions outlined above.

YOVANOVITCH