BATTLE BEGINS OVER NEW KYRGYZ CONSTITUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001643

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, SCA/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ASEC KG
SUBJECT: BATTLE BEGINS OVER NEW KYRGYZ CONSTITUTION

REF: A. BISHKEK 1587

B. BISHKEK 1586

C. BISHKEK 1554

D. BISHKEK 1537

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Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Kyrgyz government, opposition, and civil
society leaders are still assessing the impact of the new
constitution adopted November 9, and the political
maneuvering over its implementation is well underway even
though the official text has yet to be published. Reactions
to the new constitution have ranged widely, with some seeing
it as a complete victory for the opposition and shift of
power to Parliament, others seeing it as "win-win," and still
others believing that nothing will change since the players
remain the same. Prime Minister Kulov characterized the new
constitution as generally a step forward, though he and many
others have noted that several irregularities needed to be
worked out.


2. (C) While the political compromise that led to the new
constitution effectively ended the public protests for now,
most observers agree that the Kyrgyz came very close to a
more serious conflict, and that the political battles have
just begun. Opposition members have made clear that high on
their agenda is getting rid of PM Kulov, while presidential
staff has told us they are calculating the benefits of
calling new parliamentary elections soon. There are
indications that the tandem emerged stronger than ever and
that the government will try to unite the various parties it
controls. Parliament, however, is showing some divisions.
Already divided between pro-Bakiyev and anti-Bakiyev
deputies, the opposition, having briefly united to force a
new constitution, is now also exhibiting splits. END SUMMARY.


What Does It All Mean?
--------------


3. (C) A week after a compromise on a new constitution
effectively ended the opposition's street protest (Ref B),
Kyrgyz government, opposition, and civil society leaders are
still assessing the impact of the new constitution, often
based on divergent interpretations of the text, which has yet
to appear in its official form. (COMMENT: There is some
cause for concern as in 2003 President Akayev engineered a
bait and switch with texts of the constitution. While
presidential administration sources tell us that &such a
deception8 is not possible now, they remain quiet about
exactly what the problems are with the November 8 text and
when it will be officially issued. In the meantime, the
opposition is moving forward with the text they have in hand.
END COMMENT) Reactions to the compromise have ranged widely,
with some characterizing it as a complete victory for the
opposition, others saying it was "win-win," others saying it
did not matter as all the players remain the same, and at
least one (FM Jekshenkulov) maintaining that nothing
fundamentally had changed -- at least in Foreign Affairs.


4. (C) Most see the new constitution as only a first step.
On November 13, Parliament began the long process of drafting
legislation to conform existing laws to the new constitution;
how the new Constitution is implemented will be key.
Personalities will also play a big role. Many serious
differences remain between the president and opposition
leaders, and the opposition has given no indication that it
plans to back away from its other demands.

Close to a Larger Conflict
--------------


5. (C) There was a sense of relief that the week-long
demonstrations ended peacefully, but there is a consensus

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that the Kyrgyz came very close to a more serious conflict.
Several commentators have said that the country came close to
a "civil war." Interior Minister Suvanaliyev told the
Ambassador that he was glad that MVD troops had done a good
job managing the demonstrations. He said they had taken
strong measures to separate the pro- and anti-Bakiyev
demonstrators on November 6, because if there had been a
clash, it would have been north vs. south, which could have
led to a much more serious conflict. Opposition MP Temir
Sariyev also expressed concern to the Ambassador that they
had come "very, very close" to a more serious conflict during
the protest, with the President being "provoked" several
times by Kulov to take stronger measures against the
protesters. Sariyev said that during the demonstration,
Bakiyev, fearing a repeat of March 2005, reached out to his
neighbors, including Putin, for help. In a &dry
conversation8 Putin reportedly told Bakiyev that he "didn't
need" demonstrations in the streets and for Bakiyev to "get
this resolved in parliament."

Bakiyev Stronger?
--------------


6. (C) Some of the president's supporters argue that
Bakiyev's powers have been strengthened by the new
Constitution. State Secretary Madumarov said that the
parliament could not form a new government without the
approval of the President. Foreign Minister Jekshenkulov
said that the President was still in charge of foreign
policy, and that he would still report to the President.
Head of Presidential Administrative Department Kurmanbek
Temirbayev told the Ambassador that he had advocated
dissolution of Parliament on November 7, but the President
chose the path of compromise and would rely on the support of
pro-Bakiyev deputies in the Parliament. Given the importance
of political parties under the new constitution, he said
pro-Bakiyev parties were already working to consolidate, so
as to be able to form a majority in Parliament and control
the government.


7. (C) Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration
Sadyrkulov told the Ambassador he was calculating the
benefits of dissolving Parliament and calling new
parliamentary elections ) and perhaps even new presidential
elections so the president could reaffirm his mandate with
the voters and sever his ties with the opposition leaders who
brought him to power in March 2005. Sadyrkulov said the
Parliament was already dividing and it would be possible to
engineer dissolution of Parliament from within, as was done
in 1994. He said the tandem had finally become a strong
working partnership with Bakiyev and Kulov coming together on
their own initiative on the critical night of November 6,
rather than brought together by staff. Foreign Policy
Advisor Ibragimov told Ambassador that a number of advisors
in the White House opposed the compromise with the opposition
and implied they were working to walk it back.

Sariyev: The People Won
--------------


8. (C) Opposition MP Temir Sariyev told the Ambassador
November 14 that he was very happy with the outcome of the
opposition protest. Sariyev believes that the parliament has
the authority under the transitional provisions in the
constitution to act immediately, and he laid out an ambitious
list of reforms that the parliament would undertake.
However, on November 17 when the first part of the Opposition
agenda was to be passed, deputies could not convene a quorum.
AkiPress owner Marat Tazebekov made clear to Ambassador that
government manipulation was to blame.

Going After Kulov
--------------


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9. (C) After months of criticizing the Bakiyev-Kulov tandem,
the opposition now clearly has Kulov in its sights. Sariyev
acknowledged that Kulov was a "key figure" whom they had
supported in the past, but the opposition was disappointed by
his conduct during the demonstrations, when he played both
sides but ultimately sided with Bakiyev. Bakiyev clearly
owes Kulov for sticking with him through this, but that also
has made Kulov a target of the opposition. Sariyev said that
the opposition believes that Kulov will always kowtow to the
President and therefore cannot move forward a reform program.



10. (C) He said the Parliament would use its transitional
authority to choose a new prime minister and cabinet of
ministers. (Note: The new constitution allows all elected
officials -- e.g. Bakiyev and Parliament -- to serve out
their terms, but has no such guarantees for appointees --
e.g. Kulov and the ministers. End Note.) Sariyev said that
there were three upcoming events -- the Prime Minister's
accounting to the Parliament of the government's
accomplishments for the year; the presentation of the budget;
and the Parliament's confirmation of the government's program
-- when the Parliament would be able to remove Kulov through
(essentially) a vote of no confidence.


11. (C) Kulov, for his part, has been critical publicly of
the deal on the constitution. He characterized the document
as generally a step forward, but said the great haste of its
drafting and adoption set a dangerous precedent and created
irregularities and contradictions. (Others in both the
government and in the opposition agree that the constitution
is not internally consistent.) Kulov is probably also aware
that under the transition provisions in the document, it
appears that the existing parliament may have the power to
choose a new prime minister who could, in turn, propose a new
government. Interpretations differ, however, and even
opposition Parliamentarians agree that at a minimum a
transition law would have to be passed in order to do this.
Others have raised questions about whether parliament could
take action to form a government without new elections,
including Adilet Legal Clinic Director and opposition leader
Cholpon Jakupova.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) In the aftermath of the demonstrations and apparent
agreement on a new constitution, much of the dust has yet to
settle. While battles, both public and private, continue
over the scope and meaning of the new constitution, it is
clear that the political landscape has been re-aligned. The
current situation creates an opportunity for the Kyrgyz )
and also for the U.S. The window is open wider for our
assistance programs to be successful, whether they are
anti-corruption programs such as the Millennium Challenge
Account Program, or regional emergency reform programs.
Widespread disgust over the lack of unbiased information in
the media similarly could provide us a receptive audience for
press reforms. If efforts to reform the state-owned KTR
television station are successful, we should be ready lend a
hand in helping build a non-partisan news source for the
benefit of all of Kyrgyzstan.


13. (C) We should quickly evaluate current programs and see
where are our opportunities for greatest success. Problems
of corruption and the state of the media have been the major
issues in this latest conflict, and they will continue to be
the driving issues in the coming months. Now is the time for
us to be creative in determining how to use our resources and
increase our influence.
YOVANOVITCH