Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1602
2006-11-14 02:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

EAC MEETING RE ABDUCTION OF USAID OFFICER'S SPOUSE

Tags:  ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8536
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 4232
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 1361
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RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 0846
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001602 

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

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DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DS/IP/SPC DON WEINBERG DS.IP/NEA-SA F SCOTT GALLO
ASTANA FOR LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG
SUBJECT: EAC MEETING RE ABDUCTION OF USAID OFFICER'S SPOUSE

BISHKEK 00001602 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Marie L. Yovanovitch for reasons 1.4 (d) & (g)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001602

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DS/IP/SPC DON WEINBERG DS.IP/NEA-SA F SCOTT GALLO
ASTANA FOR LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG
SUBJECT: EAC MEETING RE ABDUCTION OF USAID OFFICER'S SPOUSE

BISHKEK 00001602 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Marie L. Yovanovitch for reasons 1.4 (d) & (g)


1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Bishkek
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on November 13. Present at
the meeting were: AMB, DCM, POL/ECON, POL/RA, MSG, PAS, MGT,
DAO, SAO, CONS, USAID, MED, INL, CLO, RLA, USAID, RSO, Peace
Corps, U.S. Treasury Representative, and Manas Air Force Base
representatives.


2. (C) RSO summarized the events of the past two days,
describing the abduction of Gulnura Abduldayeva, the spouse
of USAID Country Director, Cliff Brown, at gunpoint at
approximately 1530 on Saturday, November 11, 2006. It
appears that the spouse was specifically targeted because of
her relationship with her husband, who is the USAID Country
Director. The three Kyrgyz abductors, reportedly in their
early 20's, specifically stated that her husband owed their
boss $300,000. It appears that they had been surveilling her
and when she exited a downtown hair salon and entered her
vehicle, they forced their way into her diplomatic licensed
vehicle, commandeered it, tied her hands and feet and forced
her into the back seat and onto the floor. They drove to
Tunguch, a remote location southwest of downtown Bishkek,
where they tossed her into a ditch and drove away in her
vehicle. A young child came by and was able to unfasten the
rope binding her feet, enabling her to walk to a nearby field
where workers untied her hands and offered her a cell phone
to call her husband.


3. (C) The abductors stated that they knew where she lives,
naming the address (only partially correct),and her
husband's position, and that he owed their boss $300,000.
When they approached the area where they deposited her in the
ditch, one of the abductors commented that their boss was in
the area because they had passed the boss's car. The
abductors kept the spouse's keys (vehicle, apartment and

commissary warehouse) and purse, which contained her
identification, embassy security badge, cell phone, and
wallet.


4. (C) The husband phoned the RSO at approximately 1700,
who alerted the A/RSO and the DCM. The DCM informed the
Ambassador. At this point, only preliminary information
regarding the incident was available. The RSO accompanied
the victim and her husband to the two district police
stations whose jurisdiction was involved, to file a claim and
answer several hours of police questions. At approximately
2330, the police took the victim back to the field where she
was released, and recovered the belt and rope used to bind
her. The police released the victim at approximately 0200 on
November 12. At RSO's recommendation, the couple spent the
evening at the DCM's residence.


5. (C) RSO informed the EAC that the incident appeared to
be focused exclusively on the USAID couple, and at no point
was there any indication of a threat to other Americans in
the community. The RSO reported on security measures
implemented to protect the USAID couple, including: staying
at the DCM's residence; changing the locks on their apartment
the morning of November 12 and initiating change of key for
the building on November 13. In addition, and until there
are further developments in the case, on November 12 RSO,
assigned surveillance detection team members to monitor the
apartment building; on November 12 the RSO assigned 24-hour
Embassy and 24-hour SNB armed MVD guards to the apartment
building. On November 13 the RSO coordinated the assignment
of an MVD body guard to the USAID Director and his spouse and
provided an armored Embassy vehicle for them to travel in at
all times. In addition, on the morning of November 12 the
Embassy activated the emergency phone tree to notify all
Embassy employees of the incident.


6. (C) USAID officer Country Director reported that he had
held a USAID staff meeting prior to the EAC meeting and in
discussing the abduction with his staff, was reminded that
approximately three months ago, USAID had made a decision to
discontinue a water and energy project in southern Kyrgyzstan
near Osh. The former chairman of the board of directors for
this project had called and requested a meeting with the
USAID Country Director, but he referred the issue back to the
local organization responsible for the project. In that
phone call the former chairman, Toktaim Umetalieva, was very
upset and stated that USAID owed her project $300,000. The
USAID Country representative Director agreed to accompany RSO
to revisit the local police to share this new information

BISHKEK 00001602 002.2 OF 003


later on November 13.


7. (C) The EAC discussed the option of sending the USAID
Director and spouse out of the country until the perpetrators
are apprehended and the matter resolved; the effect their
leaving the country might have on resolution of the case; and
the location of other NGO implementers involved in the
discontinued project that may also be at risk. The EAC
concluded there was no information suggesting a threat to the
wider American community that would warrant issuing a Warden
Message.


8. (C) As of the time of the EAC meeting, news of the
abduction had not been reported on local news outlets. The
Ambassador asked the PA officer to draft an Embassy response,
which was shared with Washington, for use in case this news
is publicized. The incident has since been briefly reported
by a local wire service, citing local police sources.


9. (C) Some members of the EAC expressed discomfort with
the way and timeliness that decisions were made regarding
notification of Embassy personnel, especially the
notification of the four other embassy personnel who live in
the same apartment building as the USAID couple, since
building security was compromised with the loss of the
couple's keys. The health unit was not contacted to assist
with a medical and psychological evaluation, including
referral for additional resources available to victims of
such events. The MGT officer suggested including a core EAC
committee in the decision-making process, as this would offer
a broader base of information to draw from. The Ambassador
agreed to consider these suggestions.


10. (C) MGT officer reminded the EAC that there have been
several threatening incidents between embassy personnel and
other inhabitants of the apartment building where the USAID
couple live. The Ambassador asked MGT officer to evaluate
the overall security of this apartment building and determine
whether its should remain in the Embassy housing pool. Later
in the day, RSO was informed of possible surveillance of the
apartment building. As a result, RSO coordinated placement
of two marked MVD vehicles at the building's entrance
beginning the afternoon of November 13. The Embassy offered
all Embassy employees resident in the building the option of
moving to either a local hotel or to a residence in the
community. None of the Embassy employees in the apartment
building decided to leave the building, but the offer remains
open to them.


11. (C) It was noted that this attack indicates that
diplomatic license plates did not deter the perpetrators, and
that we need to put the Kyrgyz government on notice that we
take this incident very seriously. EAC members asked if the
FBI will be involved in the investigation, and commented that
if they were, it would send a very effective message to
Kyrgyzstan that these attacks against Embassy personnel are
viewed very seriously by the U.S. government. RSO contacted
Astana Legatt on November 13 to inform him of the incident
involving an "internationally protected person" for
consideration of a possible FBI role in the investigation.
The Ambassador spoke with MVD Minister Suvanaliev on November
13, who responded positively to all of the Embassy's requests.
The Ambassador also spoke with Acting FM Sarbayev, who also
pledged full GOK cooperation.


12. (C) ARSO recommended that EAC consider whether or
not it is safe for the couple to remain at post;
additionally, RSO recommended that EAC consider whether the
apartment building remains safe for other embassy personnel
(four employees and two dependents) housed at that location.
The EAC determined that all necessary support will be given
to accommodate the couple.


13. (C) The Ambassador reminded committee members that
Kyrgyzstan is considered a high threat post, which is one of
the components making this a hardship differential post. She
urged all employees to be alert and cautious, and asked RSO
to distribute a reminder to all embassy personnel regarding
vehicle safety and security awareness. RSO distributed the
security reminder later on November 13.


14. (SBU) The RSO, DCM and Ambassador will monitor this
situation over the next few days and will convene another EAC
Committee meeting later in the week, if deemed necessary.

BISHKEK 00001602 003.2 OF 003



YOVANOVITCH