Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1517
2006-10-27 11:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETINGS WITH

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001517 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETINGS WITH
OPPOSITION LEADERS

BISHKEK 00001517 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001517

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETINGS WITH
OPPOSITION LEADERS

BISHKEK 00001517 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum and Ambassador
Yovanovitch met former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev and MP
Omurbek Tekebayev October 17 to discuss their plans for a
mass protest against the government on November 2. Atambayev
and Tekebayev, leaders of the "For Reforms" opposition
movement, accused President Bakiyev of creating the current
crisis by monopolizing power and criminalizing the
government. They said they would try to persuade the
government to make concessions on reform over the next two
weeks, but failing that, the goal of the protest would be to
force Bakiyev and his government from office. In a separate
meeting on October 18, former Ambassador to the U.S. Roza
Otunbayeva characterized November 2 as the "second part" of
the country's revolution. Unfortunately, the country got the
"wrong leader" in 2005, and it was now necessary to force him
to compromise or resign, but Otunbayeva also worried that the
protest could exacerbate north-south splits in the country.
In both meetings, DAS Feigenbaum urged that any protest
action be non-violent, that protest and response be legal and
constitutional, and that any reform process must be open,
transparent, and accepted by the people. END SUMMARY.

Making a Case against Bakiyev
--------------


2. (C) DAS Feigenbaum and Ambassador Yovanovitch met October
17 with former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev and former
Speaker and current MP Omurbek Tekebayev. Atambayev and
Tekebayev are leaders of the opposition "For Reforms"
movement, which is organizing a mass anti-government protest
on November 2. Tekebayev said the current crisis had brought
the country to a historical moment, ready for the "next
stage" of its development. The concentration of political
power in the hands of President Bakiyev had led to a
usurpation of the role of parliament, as well as to abuses by
those surrounding the president, resulting in a monopoly of
economic power, corruption, and a merger of criminal and

government authority. Tekebayev said the key to solving the
current crisis was to allow free and equal competition in
politics, economics, and the mass media. If the opposition
could force the government to make concessions on
constitutional reform, Tekebayev said, then the country would
move to a parliamentary form of government ("more suitable to
our current stage of development"),which would prevent any
group from having a monopoly on power.


3. (C) Asked if the current dispute was over policy
differences or simply was an intra-elite struggle for power,
Atambayev averred that the November 2 protest was not a
struggle for office. Atambayev claimed that Bakiyev earlier
had offered him the post of prime minister, but he had not
wanted to work for a "government of bandits." Bakiyev's
family had embezzled the property stolen by (former
President) Akayev's family, rather than returning it to the
state, and Bakiyev's brother Janesh was behind the planting
of heroin in Tekebayev's luggage in September -- an act which
the President continued to cover up, according to Atambayev.
Bakiyev's policies were producing a north-south split in the
country, as well as heightening ethnic tensions between
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Bakiyev had reneged on his promises of
reform and was ready "to commit any crime" to stay in power.
Tekebayev added that law had lost its meaning under Bakiyev.
Atambayev said that merely changing presidents would not be
enough; the opposition, therefore, wanted a new constitution
that would protect from authoritarian rule.

Planning for November 2
--------------


4. (C) Atambayev said that the opposition had decided to go
forward with the mass protest on November 2 because no one

BISHKEK 00001517 002.2 OF 003


trusted Bakiyev's written or spoken pledges. The protest was
a "last chance" for the country that would force Bakiyev
either to reform or to resign. If the opposition delayed
action until the spring, Atambayev feared that the government
would use the time to put the opposition leaders "behind
bars, one by one."


5. (C) Asked what would happen on November 2, Atambayev
acknowledged that there could be bloodshed. He claimed that
Bakiyev's son, Maxim, had delivered threats to MPs from the
south, and that Janesh Bakiyev had opened an office in
Bishkek to direct the MVD and SNB in using force against the
rally. Atambayev also predicted, however, that a large
number of law enforcement personnel would join the protesters
in demanding that the government resign. DAS Feigenbaum
registered his concerns that there be no violence at the
protest, and that protest and response be conducted legally
and constitutionally.


6. (C) DAS Feigenbaum asked why the opposition expected
Bakiyev to resign in the face of a protest, and Atambayev
replied that it was clear that Bakiyev would have to reform
or resign. Atambayev said he had spoken to the President's
Chief of Staff Abdyldayev, and there was still some chance of
compromise. Atambayev claimed Bakiyev had said that he would
agree to constitutional reform, as long as Kulov were not
Prime Minister, and he added that Kulov hoped for reform
without Bakiyev as President. But if Bakiyev refused to
accede to the opposition's demands, then he would "have" to
resign, because he had lost support throughout the country.
Atambayev added that Prime Minister Kulov would also have to
resign, having "missed his time," unless he took
"extraordinary steps" within the week.

And Then What?
--------------


7. (C) Atambayev said that once Bakiyev and Kulov were driven
from power, the parliament would adopt within a few days a
new constitution based on the June 2005 draft. DAS
Feigenbaum asked whether there was a difference between the
current impasse and the March 2005 protests that drove an
elected president from office by extra-constitutional means,
and Atambayev said that putting Bakiyev in power had been a
mistake. Tekebayev said that, unfortunately, they would have
to violate the constitution a second time to save the
country, but this time they would not make the mistake of
waiting to enact reforms. DAS Feigenbaum said that who runs
the country and what type of constitution are matters for the
Kyrgyz to decide, but we were concerned that any process be
lawful, open, transparent, non-violent, and accepted by the
Kyrgyz people.

Otunbayeva: Nothing Has Changed
--------------


8. (C) In an October 18 meeting, former Ambassador to the
United States and "For Reforms" supporter Roza Otunbayeva
told DAS Feigenbaum and the Ambassador that November 2 would
be the "second part" of Kyrgyzstan's revolution. The country
got the "wrong leader" in March 2005, and nothing changed.
As with Akayev, all of the big industries -- vodka,
cigarettes, cell phones -- were in Bakiyev's hands or the
hands of his close associates. Bakiyev had no interest in
changing the constitution, she said, because he liked
"Akayev's mandate." If certain reforms were undertaken --
transferring the SNB, tax, and customs from the President to
the government; calling back Bakiyev's brothers from
diplomatic service; finishing the Aksy investigation; and
properly sending a draft constitution to Parliament -- then
there would be no need for the November 2 protest. But there
was no sign of compromise from the President, just the offer
of jobs to buy off the opposition's leadership.

BISHKEK 00001517 003.2 OF 003




9. (C) Asked why she had decided to support "For Reforms,"
Otunbayeva said she realized that "there was no other way."
Otunbayeva accused Bakiyev of completely mismanaging the
government, creating tensions in the law enforcement agencies
by filling the high jobs with the "southern cadres," and
provoking religious fundamentalism by addressing "our
believers" with guns. Otunbayeva added that there was a
"poor design" of presidential power, as Bakiyev had poor
relations with Prime Minister Kulov, State Secretary
Madumarov, and Chief of Staff Abdyldayev. In any event, the
opposition had to act, because the people blamed them for
bringing Bakiyev to power ("It was Beknazarov's fault," she
said),and she would use her constitutional right to "go to
the street and protest." November 2 would be the "second
stage" of the revolution.


10. (C) DAS Feigenbaum asked how broad was For Reforms'
following, and Otunbayeva replied that movement included few
or no ethnic Russians, and she raised concerns that
southerners might resent the push to remove Bakiyev -- the
first southerner to lead Kyrgyzstan. The Ambassador asked
how long For Reforms was prepared to carry on the protest,
and Otunbayeva said they were committed to stay, that they
had bought tents, flashlights, and other supplies, and that
they were working on the scenario for round-the-clock
protests. Otunbayeva said that whether the event would be
peaceful depended on the government, and there were troubling
signs: the head of the state railroad was preparing
detention facilities, and pro-government employees from the
electric company were being organized. Otunbayeva also
worried that some groups might use the protest to settle
other scores, such as Chui Oblast residents going against
"squatters" from the south. Again, DAS Feigenbaum stressed
that any protest be lawful, constitutional, and non-violent.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Atambayev, Tekebayev, and Otunbayeva were very clear
as they detailed their criticisms of President Bakiyev and
his administration, and as they made the case for urgent
reforms. They could not explain as clearly why Bakiyev,
having been elected last year, would resign in the face of
the opposition's protests, and they had little idea what they
would do if he did. The talk of possible violence was
disturbing, and we will continue to urge government and
opposition interlocutors that both sides act with restraint,
and that any protest action be lawful and non-violent. END
COMMENT.
YOVANOVITCH