Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1487
2006-10-23 06:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETING WITH FM

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KG 
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1747
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1261
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0327
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1544
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001487 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETING WITH FM
JEKSHENKULOV

BISHKEK 00001487 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001487

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETING WITH FM
JEKSHENKULOV

BISHKEK 00001487 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum and Ambassador
Yovanovitch met with Foreign Minister Alimbek Jekshenkulov
October 17 in Bishkek. DAS Feigenbaum stressed our
multi-dimensional commitment to Central Asia and to
Kyrgyzstan. He said that a difficult period over the summer
had raised questions about the bilateral relationship, but
there was now an opportunity to demonstrate tangible
improvement. Jekshenkulov said that approval of Kyrgyzstan's
Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Country Plan would be
the "best sign" for strengthening the relationship and
boosting development. Jekshenkulov criticized the Kyrgyz
political opposition for its "radicalism" and lack of
constructive proposals. He cautioned the U.S. side that
continuing to meet with "former government officials" (who
were now in the opposition) raised anti-American sentiments.
He also urged the U.S. to observe "balance" in its approach
to Kyrgyzstan, noting that "democracy" can be used as a cover
for "religious extremism." Feigenbaum replied that for us,
"balance" means engaging with all sides -- the government,
civil society, and the opposition, and he pressed the Foreign
Minister for support in resolving bilateral issues and moving
forward on reforms. END SUMMARY.

REBUILDING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


2. (C) DAS Feigenbaum began the meeting by stressing U.S.
commitment to the region and to Kyrgyzstan. The U.S.
approach is multi-dimensional, working on security, economic
development, energy, the environment, and democratic reform
with each country in the region. Certain U.S. priorities are
cross-cutting, such as the rule of law promotion, which
affects not only democracy and human rights but also seeks to
improve the business climate. While we focus on the
countries of the region individually, we also view Central
Asia as part of a larger picture, and look to strengthen its

ties to Western organizations, such as the OSCE and the EU,
and develop its economic ties in all directions on the
compass.


3. (C) Turning to the bilateral relationship, Feigenbaum said
that while ties had been strong over Kyrgyzstan's nearly 15
years of independence, U.S.-Kyrgyz relations had reached a
low point this past summer. The negative events of the
summer -- particularly the expulsion of two U.S. diplomats --
had raised questions at senior levels in Washington about the
GOKG's vision and direction. Feigenbaum said that relations
were now better, but in order to repair more fully the
damage, he urged the Kyrgyz Government to take action on four
key points. He asked for the Minister's support in getting
the Embassy's Surveillance Detection Team up and running
again. Feigenbaum urged that the GOKG take the steps
necessary to attract international investment; for example,
in the energy sector, the American firm AES was ready to sign
an MOU with the GOKG but had received mixed signals from
members of the government. Feigenbaum said that the MCC
would soon consider Kyrgyzstan's Threshold Country Plan, but
it would help the chances of a positive outcome if Kyrgyzstan
immediately took steps on its own to begin reforms of the
judiciary and law enforcement sectors, as well as having
President Bakiyev invest himself in the reform process by
speaking publicly for judicial independence. And finally,
DAS Feigenbaum stressed the importance of the American
University of Central Asia (AUCA) as a symbol of the
bilateral relationship, and he asked for the GOKG's support
in resolving AUCA's accreditation issues.

ENERGY SECTOR: NO AGREEMENT ON PRIVATIZATION
--------------


4. (C) Acknowledging the recent difficulties in the bilateral

BISHKEK 00001487 002.2 OF 003


relationship, Jekshenkulov joked that sometimes it was
necessary to fight to show that the relationship was strong.
Jekshenkulov said that resolving the issues surrounding the
SD Team was a matter for the MVD and SNB, not the MFA.
Regarding the energy sector, Jekshenkulov said the
government, in principle, welcomed the participation of
foreign companies -- from any country. Asked whether Vice
Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov's recent comments to AES
indicated that the government was against U.S. participation,
Jekshenkulov said that Usenov's views flatly contradicted the
President's, and, in any event, "he (Usenov) may say
something different tomorrow." The real problem, he said,
was that Kyrgyzstan had not yet decided internally how to
reform the energy sector. While the President and the
government fully supported establishing "consortia" in the
sector, the Parliament firmly opposed privatization to
foreign companies.

MCA: PUSHING FOR A POSITIVE DECISION
--------------


5. (C) Jekshenkulov said that a favorable decision on
Kyrgyzstan's MCA Threshold Country Plan would be the "best
sign" of a strengthening relationship. Even if Kyrgyzstan
did not meet the "highest standards," a political decision to
approve the program would help Kyrgyzstan to carry out its
reforms. DAS Feigenbaum countered that it was not a
political decision, that the criteria the MCC uses to assess
countries were objective. While we were hopeful of a
positive outcome in November, there was no guarantee that MCC
would approve the plan, as there was concern in Washington
that Kyrgyzstan was regressing on some key indicators.
Feigenbaum suggested that Kyrgyzstan could help its case by
taking immediate steps on its own to begin reform of the
judicial and law enforcement sectors targeted by the
Threshold Country Plan. For example, the government could
adopt the new laws that it had undertaken to pass as part of
the MCA reform process, and President Bakiyev could take
steps to demonstrate public support for real judicial
independence.


6. (C) Jekshenkulov said there should be greater appreciation
for the government's efforts on reform and stability, but
there were limits to what the government could do. Progress
on the new laws, he said, was blocked by the political
opposition in parliament. Reform in the judicial and law
enforcement sectors was hampered by the low quality of the
cadres. He added that even most of the country's lawyers
lacked understanding of how to proceed on judicial reform.
He said that a new generation of educated specialists was
needed to lead the civil service, the judicial sector, and
the law enforcement agencies. Jekshenkulov agreed with DAS
Feigenbaum on the importance of education to Kyrgyzstan's
future, but offered nothing specific on AUCA.

CRITICIZING THE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION (AND THOSE WHO TALK
TO THEM)
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Jekshenkulov continued his criticism of the members of
the political opposition, charging that there was
"radicalism" in their agenda and that they had no
"constructive proposals." He also raised a question about
those who meet with the opposition. Jekshenkulov cautioned
the U.S. side that continuing to meet with "former government
officials" (who were now in the opposition) raised
anti-American sentiments. He urged the U.S. to observe
"balance" in its assessment of the situation in Kyrgyzstan,
noting that "democracy" can be used as a cover for "religious
extremism." Islamic radicalism had been "quiet" for a while,
he said, but once it was "out," it would be hard to control.
He pointed to the example of Imam Kamalov, who was shot dead
by Kyrgyz security forces in August. Kamalov had been with a

BISHKEK 00001487 003.2 OF 003


group of IMU members who disobeyed police orders to stop and
opened fire on police; his death was not a "political
killing."


8. (C) Jekshenkulov complained of U.S. criticism over the
decision to return five Uzbek asylum seekers in August; he
claimed there were no similar statements when other countries
(Russia, Kazakhstan) returned refugees. In any event, he
said, Procurator General Kongantiyev had acted on evidence
that those returned to Uzbekistan had been involved in drug
smuggling and murder. Noting that Kyrgyzstan had a
complicated mix of ethnic groups, parties, tribes, and clans,
Jekshenkulov said that it had caused difficulties when the
Ambassador met last spring with an Uzbek leader in the south.
The fact of the meeting led people to believe that the U.S.
supported his cause, and it fed the leader's ambitions
because he, too, believed he had U.S. support.


9. (C) DAS Feigenbaum replied that we have a different view
of "balance." For us, "balance" means engaging with the full
spectrum of Kyrgyz society -- the government, civil society,
and the opposition. This engagement and dialogue promotes
understanding and tolerance. Feigenbaum also rebuffed
Jekshenkulov's complaints about lack of balance in the
criticism over refoulement, pointing out that we had publicly
praised Kyrgyzstan when it had protected asylum seekers, and
that we held Kyrygzstan to the same international standards
to which we all have obligated ourselves.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) After starting slowly, Jekshenkulov became
increasingly engaged as the meeting progressed. He offered
no indication that he would make any effort to respond to any
of DAS Feigenbaum's proposed areas for improved cooperation.
Rather, he seemed to expect the U.S. to accept that reforms
are stalled and to refrain from meeting with the opposition.
Jekshenkulov's cautions, however, were only a prelude to MFA
actions later in the day. MFA officials contacted the
diplomatic missions in Bishkek, including us, to request that
the diplomatic corps not attend an October 19 briefing by the
"For Reforms" movement, lest the "For Reforms" movement
portray attendance as international support for its planned
anti-government rally on November 2. Despite the warning,
representatives from the Kazakhstani, Tajik, French,
Japanese, and U.S. embassies and from the UN attended the
briefing. We also understand that Jekshenkulov has
instituted new procedures to control Embassy meetings with
Ministries; we do not plan to comply. END COMMENT.


11. (U) DAS Feigenbaum has cleared this cable.
YOVANOVITCH