Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1268
2006-08-29 11:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZ-UZBEK RELATIONS CONTINUING TO THAW

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON ENRG UZ KG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001268 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG UZ KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ-UZBEK RELATIONS CONTINUING TO THAW

REF: A. BISHKEK 1226

B. BISHKEK 1159

C. BISHKEK 1109

BISHKEK 00001268 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001268

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG UZ KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ-UZBEK RELATIONS CONTINUING TO THAW

REF: A. BISHKEK 1226

B. BISHKEK 1159

C. BISHKEK 1109

BISHKEK 00001268 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. SUMMARY: Continuing the trend of the past two months (Ref
C),Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations appear to be slowly warming.
Foreign Minister Jekshenkulov reported progress from his
August 24-25 trip to Tashkent in the areas of visa reform and
border delimitation, and he was hopeful that Uzbekistan would
not raise gas prices substantially this winter. The
president's foreign policy advisor was less optimistic that
progress would be made on wither issue when President Bakiyev
travels to Tashkent, possibly in late September or October.
Neither official had any information on the reported
disappearances of Uzbek asylum seekers from Kyrgyzstan (Ref
A),although many suspect that disappearances are evidence of
increased security cooperation between the two countries.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In an August 28 meeting, Kyrgyz Foreign Minister
Alikbek Jekshenkulov provided Ambassador an upbeat assessment
of his August 24-25 working visit to Tashkent. He went to
Tashkent to prepare for President Bakiyev's upcoming visit,
which he said was tentatively set for September 29-30.
Economic issues remained the biggest problem between the two
countries, but he said there had been progress on visas,
border delimitation issues, and gas. He said that the two
sides had agreed on a text for suspending visa requirements
for travel between the two countries for up to 60 days.
(NOTE: Currently, only citizens resident in designated
border areas are allowed visa-free travel for up to five
days. END NOTE.) He also said that there would be an
agreement resolving most border issues between the countries.
Jekshenkulov said that gas prices would rise from the
current USD 55/Mcm to perhaps USD 70 or more, but not the
doubling of prices mentioned in the press, which he said was
an attempt to "scare" the Kyrgyz. He also said he had had

good discussions on participation in regional organizations,
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the
Eurasian Economic Community.


3. (C) Presidential foreign policy advisor Ermek Ibraimov was
less positive in his assessment of progress on issues between
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In a separate August 28 meeting,
he told the Ambassador that with the Uzbeks, there were
always difficult political issues. He said that no dates had
been agreed for the President's visit to Tashkent, although
he hoped the visit could take place in October. He did not
expect progress on changing the visa regime between the
countries. He said the Uzbek Government was pressuring the
Kyrgyz to sign a border agreement covering most of the
border, but leaving small areas undecided. Ibraimov said
that the Kyrgyz would not sign an agreement until all
disputed areas were delimited, because of the threat from the
"crawling expansion" of the Uzbek population in those areas.
Ibraimov said the issues surrounding gas deliveries were not
economic, but were political, and he raised the concern that
the Uzbeks would use gas this winter to put pressure on the
Kyrgyz Government.


4. (C) Uzbekistan's Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Alisher
Salakhitdinov, told the Ambassador August 26 that no date had
been set for the presidential visit, but it might occur in
October. He thought that the visa regime was the most
important current issue, and he favored the proposal for
60-day visa-free travel between the countries. He also
reported that while the issue of raising the price of gas had
not been on the table during Jekshenkulov's visit, the real
issues were the volume and timing of deliveries, not the
price.


5. (C) Neither Jekshenkulov nor Ibraimov could shed any light
on the recent reported disappearances of Uzbek refugees and
asylum seekers from Osh (Ref A). While agreeing that the
matter needed to be investigated, Jekshenkulov said he had
only incomplete information from the mass media, and he

BISHKEK 00001268 002.2 OF 002


speculated that the disappearances could be connected to
corruption within the law enforcement agencies or to
religious extremists in the area. Ibraimov said he had
inquired into the reports, but he had no additional
information. He wondered if the Uzbeks had not returned home
voluntarily, given the strong familial ties Uzbeks feel
toward their neighborhood institutions, or mahallas.


6. (C) COMMENT: Neither Kyrgyz Government official offered
much on the most widely noted areas of cooperation between
the two countries: security and anti-terrorism. Many
believe that the disappearance of asylum seekers (Ref A) and
the refoulement of registered refugees (Ref B) from
Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan are evidence of increased security
cooperation -- as well as a "gift" to Karimov to set the
stage for Bakiyev's visit, whenever it takes place. END
COMMENT.
YOVANOVITCH