U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: SWISS NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA, ISN, EUR

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (RENUMBERED PARAS REORDERED TAGS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PREL KSCA KNNP ENRG PARM ETTC IN SZ
SUBJECT: U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: SWISS NOT
READY TO SUPPORT

REF: A. SECSTATE 42857


B. SECSTATE 34761

C. 2005 BERN 1315

Classified By: Poloff Eric Lundberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d

1.(C) Summary: Swiss officials remain unsure about their
approach to NSG cooperation with India, but have no plans to
raise public opposition. While recognizing the momentum
behind the U.S.-led initiative to cooperate with the Indian
civil nuclear program, the Swiss have strong misgivings about
how such measures will undermine the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Embassy continues to urge
Swiss officials to look beyond the narrow technical aspects
of the NPT and at the broader advantages of closer
cooperation with India and enhanced non-proliferation
cooperation. End Summary.

2.(C) During a March 17 meeting with the Ambassador, Swiss
Department of Foreign Affairs Political Director (and
Ambassador-designate to Washington) Urs Ziswiler downplayed
Swiss concerns with the U.S.-India agreement and indicated
that his government would not make public statements against
the deal. However, he could not say how Switzerland would
approach the issue of opening up Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) cooperation with India.

3.(C) In a more detailed March 15 discussion with Poloff, a
more skeptical Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs
disarmament chief Andreas Friedrich reiterated his views from
July 2005 (Ref C) that granting India an exception to NSG
requirements would weaken the international community's case
against an Iranian nuclear program. The NPT had suffered
several hits in recent years, including the failed Revcon
last year, Friedrich complained. The Swiss did not see how
exceptions to NSG guidelines could be offered to only one
country.

4.(C) Poloff urged Friedrich to view cooperation with India
as the better of two options. While the NPT was important,
it was a tool toward the goal of non-proliferation and not an
end in itself. The Swiss should recognize that bringing
India's program under international scrutiny would contribute
to our mutual non-proliferation goals. India's
non-proliferation record had been constructive. While it
would be ideal were India to follow South Africa's example
and abandon its nuclear weapons program, this was not going
to happen. Bringing India closer to NSG discipline was the
next best option.

5.(C) Friedrich acknowledged Poloff's points, but repeated
his concerns about the validity of the NPT. He expressed
concern about how other countries beyond Iran might react to
a weakened NPT. Given these concerns, Switzerland would not
be prepared for a decision at the March NSG meeting (which
Ref A later clarified would not be sought). He said several
NSG member countries were anxiously looking at the response
in the U.S. Congress (implying that many would be happy to
see the U.S.-India deal ended in Washington). Poloff urged
Friedrich to keep an open mind.

Comment
--------------

6.(C) The technical people in the Swiss DFA, like Friedrich,
are predisposed to reject closer NSG-India cooperation. At
the political level, the Swiss do not want this to be a
bilateral problem (either in their relations with Washington
or New Delhi). Given these opposing concerns, we expect Bern
to raise many questions during the upcoming NSG meeting, but
eventually to go with the consensus.
Willeford