Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERN2109
2006-11-24 12:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bern
Cable title:
DEPUTY S/CT URBANCIC URGES SWISS ACTION ON PKK
how-toVZCZCXYZ0009 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHSW #2109/01 3281200 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 241200Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY BERN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3448 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0122 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0025 RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0231 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0114
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 002109
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/SE, EUR/AGS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2031
TAGS: PTER ETTC TU SZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY S/CT URBANCIC URGES SWISS ACTION ON PKK
REF: SECSTATE 179961
Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 002109
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/SE, EUR/AGS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2031
TAGS: PTER ETTC TU SZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY S/CT URBANCIC URGES SWISS ACTION ON PKK
REF: SECSTATE 179961
Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d
1.(C) Summary: A USG interagency team led by Deputy
Counterterrorism Coordinator Frank Urbancic visited Bern on
November 13 to encourage the Swiss to step up efforts against
PKK/Kongra-Gel criminal activity in Europe. Swiss government
officials appeared receptive to the USG proposal to cooperate
on criminal investigations of the PKK, while setting aside
bilateral differences over the PKK's status as a terrorist
group. Swiss officials also appeared receptive to the USG
proposal to cooperate on criminal investigations of the PKK,
while setting aside bilateral differences over the PKK's
status as a terrorist group. Swiss officials also were open
to increased judicial assistance to the Turks in order to
improve Ankara's ability to assemble cases that pass European
muster when extradition requests are filed. Pursuing the PKK
is nonetheless likely to remain a low priority for Swiss law
enforcement officials focused on more high-profile threats in
Switzerland, unless persistently pushed by the USG, Turkey
and European neighbors. End summary.
2.(C) Deputy S/CT Urbancic led an interagency delegation,
including EUR/SE director Doug Silliman, Treasury Department
Advisor on Terrorism Finance and Financial Crimes Justin
Serafini, and S/CT officer Zachary Rothschild, to Switzerland
as the final stop in a six-nation swing through Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, UK, and Turkey. The delegation's goal
was to raise awareness of the PKK's criminal threat to Europe
and to engender cooperation in diplomatic, law enforcement,
financing, and intelligence sharing areas.
-------------- --------------
Overview of USG Strategy - Pursue as Organized Crime
-------------- --------------
3.(C) In the meeting with Swiss interagency officials
(paragraph 12),Urbancic laid out the USG's three-fold
strategy for combating the PKK/Kongra-Gel. First, with
regard to the PKK's operational use of Northern Iraq, General
Ralston had been appointed to work with Turkish and Iraqi
counterparts to diminish PKK abilities there. Second, the
USG is working with Turkish authorities to improve internal
law enforcement and judicial practices. Third, the USG would
work with key European capitals to tackle the PKK problem as
an organized crime problem, effectively sidestepping the
political question of whether the PKK is a terrorist group.
The focus on this latter effort is to cut off the source of
funding for the PKK.
4.(C) EUR/SE Doug Silliman offered an overview of PKK
criminal activity, including trafficking in persons, drug
trafficking to the UK, extortion, and protection rackets.
The PKK raises an estimated 100 million Euros per year in
Europe. A large part of this money goes toward the PKK's
media operations, including KOJ TV out of Denmark and various
print outlets. The second largest use for the funds is
maintenance expenses for PKK/Kongra-Gel operatives in Europe.
Another large sum is converted into cash and carried by
couriers into northern Iraq to finance terrorist activities
directly.
--------------
Some Receptivity, but Swiss Standards High
--------------
5.(C) Urs von Daeniken, Director of the Swiss Service for
Analysis and Prevention (the internal intelligence service)
described the PKK presence in Switzerland as small and mostly
non-violent domestically. While the Swiss do not label the
PKK/Kongra-Gel a terrorist group, the Federal Police consider
it a violent extremist organization and keep tabs on its
activities, he claimed. He described cooperation within
Europe as very good and noted that, since 1996, there had
been 20 U.S.-Swiss bilateral exchanges of information
(Comment: According to ORCA, nearly all of these "exchanges"
involved one-way provisions of information to the Swiss. End
comment.)
6.(C) According to Von Daeniken, PKK/Kongra-Gel in
Switzerland comprises 400 members, of which about 100 are
officers. In addition, some 1.5 million Swiss Francs are
estimated to be collected in Geneva and 1 million more in
Basel; funds are routed by couriers, not banks. In the past,
Swiss police confiscated documents and attempted to prosecute
PKK members for extortion, but cases inevitably faltered due
to withdrawn testimony from victims. There was evidence of
the PKK "taxing" drug smugglers as well, but insufficient to
prosecute a case. He also averred that the PKK were involved
in human smuggling and forged documents. Von Daeniken
welcomed evidence of funding connections to northern Iraq. A
hopeful sign, he offered, was that the police had detected a
fall-off in PKK fund-raising success in recent years. He
asserted that, as extremists, suspected PKK/Kongra-Gel
members are not permitted to own firearms. Anyone suspected
of extremism is denied entry.
7.(C) On this last points, Urbancic challenged von Daeniken
as to why the European head of PKK/Kongra-Gel, Zubeyir Aydar,
was living in Switzerland. Von Daeniken skirted the
question, noting that the organization seemed not to be very
hierarchical; the Zurich head of the organization seemed to
operate fairly independently from other PKK officials.
8.(C) Asked what type of information Swiss authorities would
need to pursue the PKK, Von Daeniken expressed interest in
evidence about the courier routes and destinations for funds
raised in Switzerland. He assured the delegation that U.S.
intelligence information could be used in Swiss courts
without the sources and methods being divulged to the
defense. Swiss Federal Prosecutor Claude Nicati interjected
that all information would be welcomed, as long as it added
value. For the Swiss to launch a criminal investigation,
there needed to be a criminal act beforehand, he stressed.
Nicati concurred that pursuing the PKK through criminal
investigation was a promising avenue, but underscored that
Swiss standards are very high. To prosecute someone for
giving funds for a criminal or terrorist activity, it must be
proven that the giver knowingly and willingly did so. Asked
to define further the level of evidence needed, Nicati
replied that he would prefer that there be at least one
witness to interview. Silliman and Legatt expressed hope
that the Swiss would be prepared to take USG leads and launch
their own investigations.
--------------
Immigration Track -- Denial the Easiest Tool
--------------
9.(C) Pius Betschart of the Federal Office of Migration
described the challenges his office faces in deporting
extremists already granted asylum. Just as asylum is granted
through an administrative procedure, so it can be revoked in
the event of a crime or the determination that there is a
security threat. However, a judicial appeal can supersede
deportation if a judge determines there is a risk of torture
in the destination country. This remains the problem with
Turkey. The easiest option, Betschart asserted, would be to
have as much information on suspected PKK members before they
apply for entry, since the threshold for denial of entry is
very low.
--------------
Improving Turkish Judicial Practices
--------------
10.(C) Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud of the Department of
Foreign Affairs Center for Security Policy emphasized the
importance of improving both the Turkish penal system and
practice of assembling cases along Western lines. It was not
sufficient for the Turks to ask for the extradition of a
suspect if the charges were solely "member of a terrorist
group." Asked if the Swiss would be willing to assist the
Turks in this field, Pitteloud readily agreed.
-------------- --------------
Turkish Ambassador: Complaints, some encouragement
-------------- --------------
11.(C) Following the lunch, Urbancic and DCM called on the
resident Turkish Ambassador, Alev Kilic. Urbancic laid out
the three-pronged USG strategy on the PKK, as described in
paragraph 3. Kilic provided the USG delegation with a
one-page outline of PKK activity in Switzerland, wherein he
estimated the PKK/Kongra-Gel strength here at 4 thousand.
The paper accused Swiss authorities of tolerating a PKK
presence, allowing use of Swiss banks, and not intervening
when Kurdish protesters stoned the Turkish Embassy in March
2006. The paper also mentioned the July 2006 meeting between
the Geneva-based NGO "Geneva Call" and PKK/Kongra-Gel
members, in which the NGO asked the PKK to refrain from using
land mines against the civilians (but not the Turkish
military). The Turkish Ambassador expressed some optimism
that the Swiss were becoming more cooperative with the PKK --
an imminent test will be Bern's willingness to extradite PKK
member and suspected murderer Mehmet Esiyok. Ambassador
Kilic was very grateful for Urbancic's visit.
--------------
Swiss Participants
--------------
12.(U) The Swiss participants in the delegation meetings were
as follows:
Mr. Urs von Daeniken, Director, Service for Analysis and
Prevention, Federal Police;
Mr. Claude Nicati, Chief Prosecutor, Department of Justice
and Police;
Mr. Pius Betschart, Chief, Analysis Division, Federal Office
of Migration;
Amb. Jacques Pitteloud, Chief, Center for International
Security Policy, DFA (also at lunch);
Ms. Christine Schraner, Counterterrorism Coordinator, DFA
(host of lunch);
Mr. Riccardo Sansonetti, Chief, Financial Crime Section,
Department of Finance
Mr. Andre Schaller, Chief of Western & Central Europe, DFA
(also at lunch);
Ms. Simona Morosini, Sanctions Division, State Secretariat
for Economic Affairs (also at lunch);
Mr. Heinz Walker, Deputy, Economic & Financial Affairs
Division, DFA;
Mr. Urs Hammer, Deputy, Americas Division, DFA;
Mr. Dieter Cavalleri, Deputy to the Counterterrorism
Coordinator, DFA;
Mr. Zolt Madaasz, Chief of Staff, Security Committee of the
Federal Council (lunch only).
--------------
Comment
--------------
13.(C) These consultations were more encouraging than might
have been expected, given the low priority accorded the
pursuit of the PKK/Kongra-Gel by the Swiss. Swiss officials
were receptive to using organized crime fighting methods
against the group; more so because politicians are reluctant
to categorize groups as terrorist entities, absent a UN
resolution. It will likely take regular prompting by
ourselves, the Turks and -- most fruitfully -- European
neighbors to keep the Swiss interagency even minimally
focused on the PKK threat.
14.(C) Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator Urbancic and
EUR/SE Director Silliman cleared on this message.
CONEWAY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/SE, EUR/AGS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2031
TAGS: PTER ETTC TU SZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY S/CT URBANCIC URGES SWISS ACTION ON PKK
REF: SECSTATE 179961
Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d
1.(C) Summary: A USG interagency team led by Deputy
Counterterrorism Coordinator Frank Urbancic visited Bern on
November 13 to encourage the Swiss to step up efforts against
PKK/Kongra-Gel criminal activity in Europe. Swiss government
officials appeared receptive to the USG proposal to cooperate
on criminal investigations of the PKK, while setting aside
bilateral differences over the PKK's status as a terrorist
group. Swiss officials also appeared receptive to the USG
proposal to cooperate on criminal investigations of the PKK,
while setting aside bilateral differences over the PKK's
status as a terrorist group. Swiss officials also were open
to increased judicial assistance to the Turks in order to
improve Ankara's ability to assemble cases that pass European
muster when extradition requests are filed. Pursuing the PKK
is nonetheless likely to remain a low priority for Swiss law
enforcement officials focused on more high-profile threats in
Switzerland, unless persistently pushed by the USG, Turkey
and European neighbors. End summary.
2.(C) Deputy S/CT Urbancic led an interagency delegation,
including EUR/SE director Doug Silliman, Treasury Department
Advisor on Terrorism Finance and Financial Crimes Justin
Serafini, and S/CT officer Zachary Rothschild, to Switzerland
as the final stop in a six-nation swing through Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, UK, and Turkey. The delegation's goal
was to raise awareness of the PKK's criminal threat to Europe
and to engender cooperation in diplomatic, law enforcement,
financing, and intelligence sharing areas.
-------------- --------------
Overview of USG Strategy - Pursue as Organized Crime
-------------- --------------
3.(C) In the meeting with Swiss interagency officials
(paragraph 12),Urbancic laid out the USG's three-fold
strategy for combating the PKK/Kongra-Gel. First, with
regard to the PKK's operational use of Northern Iraq, General
Ralston had been appointed to work with Turkish and Iraqi
counterparts to diminish PKK abilities there. Second, the
USG is working with Turkish authorities to improve internal
law enforcement and judicial practices. Third, the USG would
work with key European capitals to tackle the PKK problem as
an organized crime problem, effectively sidestepping the
political question of whether the PKK is a terrorist group.
The focus on this latter effort is to cut off the source of
funding for the PKK.
4.(C) EUR/SE Doug Silliman offered an overview of PKK
criminal activity, including trafficking in persons, drug
trafficking to the UK, extortion, and protection rackets.
The PKK raises an estimated 100 million Euros per year in
Europe. A large part of this money goes toward the PKK's
media operations, including KOJ TV out of Denmark and various
print outlets. The second largest use for the funds is
maintenance expenses for PKK/Kongra-Gel operatives in Europe.
Another large sum is converted into cash and carried by
couriers into northern Iraq to finance terrorist activities
directly.
--------------
Some Receptivity, but Swiss Standards High
--------------
5.(C) Urs von Daeniken, Director of the Swiss Service for
Analysis and Prevention (the internal intelligence service)
described the PKK presence in Switzerland as small and mostly
non-violent domestically. While the Swiss do not label the
PKK/Kongra-Gel a terrorist group, the Federal Police consider
it a violent extremist organization and keep tabs on its
activities, he claimed. He described cooperation within
Europe as very good and noted that, since 1996, there had
been 20 U.S.-Swiss bilateral exchanges of information
(Comment: According to ORCA, nearly all of these "exchanges"
involved one-way provisions of information to the Swiss. End
comment.)
6.(C) According to Von Daeniken, PKK/Kongra-Gel in
Switzerland comprises 400 members, of which about 100 are
officers. In addition, some 1.5 million Swiss Francs are
estimated to be collected in Geneva and 1 million more in
Basel; funds are routed by couriers, not banks. In the past,
Swiss police confiscated documents and attempted to prosecute
PKK members for extortion, but cases inevitably faltered due
to withdrawn testimony from victims. There was evidence of
the PKK "taxing" drug smugglers as well, but insufficient to
prosecute a case. He also averred that the PKK were involved
in human smuggling and forged documents. Von Daeniken
welcomed evidence of funding connections to northern Iraq. A
hopeful sign, he offered, was that the police had detected a
fall-off in PKK fund-raising success in recent years. He
asserted that, as extremists, suspected PKK/Kongra-Gel
members are not permitted to own firearms. Anyone suspected
of extremism is denied entry.
7.(C) On this last points, Urbancic challenged von Daeniken
as to why the European head of PKK/Kongra-Gel, Zubeyir Aydar,
was living in Switzerland. Von Daeniken skirted the
question, noting that the organization seemed not to be very
hierarchical; the Zurich head of the organization seemed to
operate fairly independently from other PKK officials.
8.(C) Asked what type of information Swiss authorities would
need to pursue the PKK, Von Daeniken expressed interest in
evidence about the courier routes and destinations for funds
raised in Switzerland. He assured the delegation that U.S.
intelligence information could be used in Swiss courts
without the sources and methods being divulged to the
defense. Swiss Federal Prosecutor Claude Nicati interjected
that all information would be welcomed, as long as it added
value. For the Swiss to launch a criminal investigation,
there needed to be a criminal act beforehand, he stressed.
Nicati concurred that pursuing the PKK through criminal
investigation was a promising avenue, but underscored that
Swiss standards are very high. To prosecute someone for
giving funds for a criminal or terrorist activity, it must be
proven that the giver knowingly and willingly did so. Asked
to define further the level of evidence needed, Nicati
replied that he would prefer that there be at least one
witness to interview. Silliman and Legatt expressed hope
that the Swiss would be prepared to take USG leads and launch
their own investigations.
--------------
Immigration Track -- Denial the Easiest Tool
--------------
9.(C) Pius Betschart of the Federal Office of Migration
described the challenges his office faces in deporting
extremists already granted asylum. Just as asylum is granted
through an administrative procedure, so it can be revoked in
the event of a crime or the determination that there is a
security threat. However, a judicial appeal can supersede
deportation if a judge determines there is a risk of torture
in the destination country. This remains the problem with
Turkey. The easiest option, Betschart asserted, would be to
have as much information on suspected PKK members before they
apply for entry, since the threshold for denial of entry is
very low.
--------------
Improving Turkish Judicial Practices
--------------
10.(C) Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud of the Department of
Foreign Affairs Center for Security Policy emphasized the
importance of improving both the Turkish penal system and
practice of assembling cases along Western lines. It was not
sufficient for the Turks to ask for the extradition of a
suspect if the charges were solely "member of a terrorist
group." Asked if the Swiss would be willing to assist the
Turks in this field, Pitteloud readily agreed.
-------------- --------------
Turkish Ambassador: Complaints, some encouragement
-------------- --------------
11.(C) Following the lunch, Urbancic and DCM called on the
resident Turkish Ambassador, Alev Kilic. Urbancic laid out
the three-pronged USG strategy on the PKK, as described in
paragraph 3. Kilic provided the USG delegation with a
one-page outline of PKK activity in Switzerland, wherein he
estimated the PKK/Kongra-Gel strength here at 4 thousand.
The paper accused Swiss authorities of tolerating a PKK
presence, allowing use of Swiss banks, and not intervening
when Kurdish protesters stoned the Turkish Embassy in March
2006. The paper also mentioned the July 2006 meeting between
the Geneva-based NGO "Geneva Call" and PKK/Kongra-Gel
members, in which the NGO asked the PKK to refrain from using
land mines against the civilians (but not the Turkish
military). The Turkish Ambassador expressed some optimism
that the Swiss were becoming more cooperative with the PKK --
an imminent test will be Bern's willingness to extradite PKK
member and suspected murderer Mehmet Esiyok. Ambassador
Kilic was very grateful for Urbancic's visit.
--------------
Swiss Participants
--------------
12.(U) The Swiss participants in the delegation meetings were
as follows:
Mr. Urs von Daeniken, Director, Service for Analysis and
Prevention, Federal Police;
Mr. Claude Nicati, Chief Prosecutor, Department of Justice
and Police;
Mr. Pius Betschart, Chief, Analysis Division, Federal Office
of Migration;
Amb. Jacques Pitteloud, Chief, Center for International
Security Policy, DFA (also at lunch);
Ms. Christine Schraner, Counterterrorism Coordinator, DFA
(host of lunch);
Mr. Riccardo Sansonetti, Chief, Financial Crime Section,
Department of Finance
Mr. Andre Schaller, Chief of Western & Central Europe, DFA
(also at lunch);
Ms. Simona Morosini, Sanctions Division, State Secretariat
for Economic Affairs (also at lunch);
Mr. Heinz Walker, Deputy, Economic & Financial Affairs
Division, DFA;
Mr. Urs Hammer, Deputy, Americas Division, DFA;
Mr. Dieter Cavalleri, Deputy to the Counterterrorism
Coordinator, DFA;
Mr. Zolt Madaasz, Chief of Staff, Security Committee of the
Federal Council (lunch only).
--------------
Comment
--------------
13.(C) These consultations were more encouraging than might
have been expected, given the low priority accorded the
pursuit of the PKK/Kongra-Gel by the Swiss. Swiss officials
were receptive to using organized crime fighting methods
against the group; more so because politicians are reluctant
to categorize groups as terrorist entities, absent a UN
resolution. It will likely take regular prompting by
ourselves, the Turks and -- most fruitfully -- European
neighbors to keep the Swiss interagency even minimally
focused on the PKK threat.
14.(C) Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator Urbancic and
EUR/SE Director Silliman cleared on this message.
CONEWAY