ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S MEETINGS IN GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000455

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: PREL KISL PHUM PTER GM
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S MEETINGS IN GERMANY


Classified By: DCM JOHN CLOUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Senior German officials responded positively
to USG efforts to show solidarity with Denmark and agreed
with the basic principle of using the incident to stress the
importance of building democracy in the BMENA region. The
Germans agreed with the USG assessment that the caricatures,
although clearly offensive to Muslims, were being exploited
by Iran and Syria for their own internal purposes. They
expressed interest in our policy of using American Muslims to
reach out to other Muslims. German officials also briefed us
on Fonmin Steinmeier's just completed visit to Israel and
expressed concern that Israel might be trying to degrade
living conditions in the Occupied Territories under a
Hamas-led government to create conditions for new Palestinian
elections. On Kosovo, Political Director Schaefer briefed us
on intensive German contacts with both the Serbians and the
Kosovars. Schaefer reported indications the Kosovars were at
least considering accepting limited sovereignty and a special
status for Mitrovica. A/S Fried briefed the Germans on USG
energy security concerns in Eurasia. NSA-equivalent Heusgen
reported that the Germans were also sending tough messages to
the Russians on the need to build trust as a credible energy
supplier. Both sides considered next steps in Georgia. End
summary.


2. (U) EUR A/S Daniel Fried and NSC Director for Middle
Initiatives Farah Pandith met with German NSA-equivalent
Christoph Heusgen (accompanied by Chancellery North America
director Dirk Brengelmann) and MFA Political Director Michael
Schaefer (accompanied by North America Desk Director
Christoph Eichhorn, Middle East Director Andreas Reinicke,
and note taker) during their February 14-15 visit to Berlin.
DCM and A/Polcouns (note taker) accompanied A/S Fried and
Director Pandith.

Laying out the USG Strategy
--------------


3. (C) In both meetings, A/S Fried and Director Pandith laid
out the USG response to the controversy created by the
publication (and subsequent republication) of caricatures of
the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper: the USG viewed
the drawings as offensive, but opposed compromise on the
issue of freedom of speech and condemned the manipulations of
Muslim public sentiment in particular by the Governments of
Iran and Syria. Democracy, they argued, was the system of
government best able to reconcile in practice the values of
freedom, respect, and sensitivity at the center of the
current controversy. The U.S. was considering ways to shape
a response to the cartoon issue, including especially using
the Forum for the Future and the Democracy Assistance
Dialogue, to bring together editors and journalists with
experience in dealing with politically sensitive issues with
counterparts and democracy advocates from the Middle East.
These counterparts were to be selected on the basis of their
independence from government control. Efforts to promote
dialogue would be conducted in parallel with our efforts to
build democracy in the region. Pandith told Heusgen and
Schaefer that the USG sought to use the voices of American
(and ultimately European) Muslims to engage with the Muslim
world both to isolate extremists and to emphasize that the
current controversy was not one of "Islam vs. Democracy."
She noted that a Belgian Muslim had told her that Muslims had
come to Belgium and the West because they wanted to enjoy
these freedoms. Fried stressed the USG interest in
supporting an evolving Islam that was modern and enlightened.
He expressed concern that in many instances Muslims continue
to appear to Europeans like an "alien" force.


4. (C) Heusgen told A/S Fried and Pandith that Chancellor
Merkel had called Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen to express
German solidarity with Denmark. She told him that Denmark
had nothing to apologize for and urged Denmark to stick to
its principles. Germany saw clearly that Iran and Syria (and
to some extent Egypt as well) were trying to manipulate
public reaction to the caricatures. Heusgen said he found it
outrageous that Syria was trying to fuel public outrage over
religious sensitivities, given its massacre of members of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in February 1982. Merkel
understood it was important not to offend religious feelings
and wanted to engage in a "dialogue of cultures."


5. (C) Turning to Germany's own Muslim population, Heusgen
commented that many of the Turks now in Germany tended to
live in their own sections of large cities, were generally
from poor families and often had a limited education. Merkel
discussed this issue with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who
argued that Turks in Germany first had to become comfortable
in their "own" culture and language before they could seek to
integrate into a new culture, Germany. Heusgen questioned
this approach and argued that this approach would mean that
Turkish immigrants would never get beyond the first stage of
learning their own culture. Heusgen then argued that
Europeans, including Muslim immigrants, had to better
understand their adopted civilization. Without such
understanding, they could not effectively promote democratic
values in the Middle East.


6. (C) Heusgen said Germany was disappointed at the results
of the November Barcelona Process meeting. The Europeans had
stressed the importance of the rule of law, but no or few
heads of state from the region came, and many others from the
region appeared to reject these arguments. This left the
West in an uncomfortable situation of needing Middle East
governments to help in the War against Terrorism, even if
those governments had poor human rights records. Fried
stressed the need to keep advancing with our shared reform
agenda in the region.


7. (C) Political Director Schaefer noted a broad consensus
on where the problems with the caricatures lay. Limits to
account for religious sensitivities should exist, but these
limits should be tested in the courts and not by throwing
stones and burning buildings. We, in the West, needed to be
aware of how words are being perceived in a different
cultural context. Schaefer saw the genesis of the current
crisis as the translation of a set of caricatures that were
innocuous by Western standards to a cultural context where
they were clearly explosive. Although the West had succeeded
in gaining broad acceptance for certain universal principles,
such as the right to life and human dignity, there are
important cultural values which genuinely differ from one
culture to the next and have to be respected. He gave as an
example his own experiences in dealing with "Asian" values.
In that instance, it was clear that Asian cultures give a
priority to the well-being of the group that is difficult for
Westerners to understand. We faced one additional problem:
we tended to preach to the converted. Who are our
counterparts in the Muslim world? He urged the West to
undertake speaking with "more difficult" people who might
disagree with us but still exhibited a sense of
responsibility.


8. (C) Taking A/S Fried's point, Schaefer agreed that fora
like Forum for the Future might offer a good opportunity for
such dialogue. He argued that Turkey also had an important
role to play, but could not be "overburdened" given its own
struggle to build democratic institutions. A/S Fried agreed
with Schaefer on the need to reach out further, but argued
that we still had to be clear that what we were talking about
is democracy. Schaefer noted he agreed largely with the U.S.
approach of using Muslims within American and European
societies to help reach out. Reinicke said the West had to
take into consideration Muslim sensitivities. Schaefer
continued the argument saying that the West had to approach
the Muslim world on democracy with a clear sense of respect.
A/S Fried argued that it was important that the West not cast
the debate in terms of freedom of speech vs. respect for
religious sensitivities. Rather we wanted to promote the
idea of democracy being best able to deal with issues where
there were competing claims like those of freedom of speech
and religious sensitivities.

Steinmeier, Israel, and Hamas
--------------


9. (C) Schaefer asked Reinicke to comment on German Fonmin
Steinmeier's just completed visit to the Middle East
(Reinicke accompanied him),including a visit to Israel.
Reinicke said the Israelis appeared undecided how to respond
to the Hamas victory in January, but at least some are
arguing Israel should make life so difficult for the
Palestinians that a Hamas-led government would fail,
necessitating new elections. The Palestinian response was to
argue that if conditions grow even more difficult in the
Occupied Territories, the Palestinians will blame the West
and not Hamas. Schaefer added that Steinmeier was clear on
the conditions for talking with Hamas, but argued that we
needed to have a "Plan B." A/S Fried argued that we should
avoid a situation where the West was debating what to do
about Hamas. Instead, we should try to force Hamas to debate
what it should do to meet the Quartet,s conditions.
Schaefer agreed with the point.


10. (C) Heusgen told A/S Fried that Merkel spoke with Putin
on February 14 regarding Russia's invitation to Hamas.
Putin, according to Heusgen, agreed to stick to Quartet
decisions on handling Hamas. In a private part of the
meeting, A/S Fried told Heusgen that expressed USG
appreciated Chancellor Merkel clear statements during the
Munich Security Conference.

Kosovo
--------------


11. (C) Schaefer said that the Germans had held and would be
holding a number of further meetings with both the Serbs and
the Kosovars. Yesterday, the Germans met with Kostunica to
discuss the issue of Kosovar independence. The Germans
delivered what Schaefer called a difficult message. There
would be another meeting with Marti Ahtisaari on February 15.
In Schaefer's view, the Serbs needed to be perceived as
getting something for Kosovo's independence. Although the
Serbs would not accept independence de jure, they would
accept it de facto if they obtained compromises on roughly 8
of the 10 issues of concern to them (such as property rights,
churches, decentralization, etc.). To the Kosovars, te
Germans had been equally tough, saying they ha to earn
independence. Schaefer said the Kosovas had to be prepared
for "gracious compromises" ith the Serbs. Schaefer said he
spoke with Albaian Kosovar leader Thaci, who told him the
Kosovars were prepared to consider limited sovereignty an to
accept a special status for Mitrovica. Schafer used the
argument that Germany had limited svereignty in the early
post-war period and was nt a full member of the United
Nations for 25 years. A/S Fried said the USG understood
there had to be a transitional period for Kosovo and
guarantees for the Serbian minority.

Energy Security
--------------


12. (C) A/S Fried told Heusgen the U.S. was aware of the
development of a "Green Paper" within the EU outlining their
thinking on energy security and was pleased that our thinking
largely overlapped. The U.S. emphasized diversification of
energy sources, including from Caspian sources, and multiple
pipeline routes, all on a commercial basis. The USG was
beginning to discuss this with BP and other energy companies.
We were not trying to determine routes, but seeing if these
policies were also supported by the market. Heusgen said
Merkel had told Putin the Russian game in the Ukraine during
the January crisis was not helpful. She said Russia needed
to develop trust and confidence that it was a reliable
producer of energy. Heusgen said it remained to be seen
whether Putin had drawn the necessary lessons from the
experience. A/S Fried noted that the Poles were particularly
upset by the Baltic pipeline, but the Poles believed Merkel
was a vast improvement, and appreciated Germany's decision to
invest 100 million euros in Poland. He argued that the Poles
would show more flexibility once they were certain they were
not isolated in dealing with Russia.

Georgia
--------------


13. (C) A/S Fried said the Russians were continuing to
maintain security links with separatists in South Ossetia and
sending Russian citizens to work in key, senior positions
there. Heusgen said he had spoken with Russian Fonmin
Ivanov, who asked the Germans to urge the Georgians to deal
directly with the Russians. Saakashvili was being
heavy-handed in the German view. A/S Fried said the U.S.
would keep pushing Saakashvili to do the "right thing." In
the meantime, we had to prevent Russia from continuing its
efforts to dismember Georgia.


14. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried.
TIMKEN JR