(C) MERKEL AFTER ONE YEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 003490

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: (C) MERKEL AFTER ONE YEAR

REF: (A) 2005 BERLIN 3138 (B) BERLIN 3395 (C) BERLIN

2769 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Timken, Jr. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d
).

Introduction and Summary
--------------


1. (C) Improving the tone of transatlantic relations has been
a key goal of the first year of Angela Merkel's
chancellorship, and she largely has succeeded, to the benefit
of the U.S. and Germany. Merkel has not taken bold steps yet
to improve the substantive content of the relationship,
however. Many factors constrain German-American relations
under her leadership, including the partnership with the SPD,
Germany's role in the EU, public opinion, and Merkel's
operational style, which in many ways is tactical rather than
strategic. In engaging with Merkel and her government, there
is a premium on targeting specific areas for cooperation and
challenging Germany to work with us to elaborate the improved
relationship her leadership has made possible. Because she
is often unwilling to re-open decisions, early consultations
with the Chancellor and her closest advisors will be
important. End Introduction and Summary.

The Framework for Merkel's Foreign Policy
--------------


2. (C) Merkel has expressed clearly her desire to make
improved transatlantic relations a hallmark of her
government. As Chancellor, she has ultimate authority over
foreign policy, yet she faces some fundamental constraints.
Her Foreign Minister is a Social Democrat, Frank-Walter
Steinmeier; Merkel cannot dismiss him without the consent of
the SPD, which limits her authority over the Foreign
Ministry. Steinmeier's recent visit to Syria, which he
undertook despite the Chancellor's opposition, is indicative
of these limitations. Only after Steinmeier came back from
Damascus empty-handed did Merkel use the opportunity to
articulate a policy of no high-level contacts for the time
being. Other such initiatives from the Foreign Ministry are
possible, where Merkel herself might not be in favor but will
have to accept unless she is prepared to provoke a government
crisis.


3. (C) There are further constraints on Merkel with regard
to the U.S., including:

-- Germany's EU role. Berlin will have to promote consensus
in its upcoming presidency capacity. This will diminish
Germany's ability and desire (limited to begin with) to
impose its will upon the EU.

-- The CDU/CSU-SPD Coalition Agreement. It puts strengthened
multilateral European policy and transatlantic relations on
an equal footing. The European policy recommendations are
much more fully developed.

-- Public opinion, including strongly held views in the Grand
Coalition parties. Though Steinmeier's SPD favors eventual
Turkish EU accession, its own membership supports this
position only weakly. The strong opposition within the
CDU/CSU and the public at large tend to confirm Merkel's
tough line on Turkey.

A Search for Balance
--------------


4. (C) There are a few issues on which Merkel appears to be
driven by principle; Turkey's relationship with the EU and
her stand on the role of German troops in Afghanistan may be
two examples. On the latter, she privately (and publicly)
resented our efforts to move her government in the days
before Riga. On most other matters pragmatism characterizes
her approach. This should not be mistaken for passivity --
Merkel actively seeks viable balances, even if they anger
part of her constituency. This was the case with the
Coalition's health reform package, which many in the CDU
opposed. The Chancellor is adept at finding allies and
utilizing them to advance her preferred outcomes, such as in
preparing public opinion for a German UNIFIL deployment that
she favored but that was met with initial skepticism by
public opinion. It is noteworthy that Merkel let SPD
Chairman Kurt Beck be the first to speculate publicly about a

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German role, followed later by CDU figures. Only once the
outlines of a German deployment were socialized, without
public uproar, did the Chancellor articulate her vision of
the mission and its connection to German interests.


5. (C) On transatlantic relations, Merkel is rhetorically
strong, especially before transatlantic audiences. But with
the general public she studiously acknowledges multiple
points of view and sets up parallels that suggest a more
modest role for her transatlanticism. In her speech to the
CDU's national convention in November, she paired relations
with the U.S. and Russia. "We need the U.S.A., just as the
U.S.A. needs us," was followed by "Just as indispensable for
our future is a strategic partnership with Russia." In this
pervasive search for balance, the Chancellor and her
government may sometimes see the achievement of agreement as
more important than its content. And there is also a sense
of grievance in the chancellery that, despite the notable
improvement in the tone of our relations and the convergence
in our strategic vision, we continue to press for more
tangible changes in German policy.

Consultation and Sticking with Decisions
--------------


6. (C) Merkel's history indicates she has worked hard to
analyze and overcome her domestic political shortcomings,
such as an earlier reluctance to consult widely and trust
others. She may still be engaged in a similar learning
process as a foreign policy leader. Her recent proposal for
a "revision clause" in Turkey's EU accession negotiations was
launched, as far as we can determine, without prior
consultations with key European partners or the U.S.


7. (C) Merkel's pragmatism should not be taken as a lack of
commitment to her decisions. On the contrary, once she has
made a decision, all the evidence is that she can be
extremely stubborn in defense of it. Her approach to
Germany's ISAF caveats in the run-up to the Riga Summit is a
prime example.

Conclusion and Recommendation
--------------


8. (C) Merkel clearly likes and admires much about the U.S.
-- particularly the American emphasis on freedom. She
believes Germany needs, and she wants to be seen as having,
good relations with the U.S. This holds true particularly
for the U.S.-EU summit this spring, which German officials
see as showcasing Merkel as a leader. Left to her own
instincts, we believe she will tend to emphasize the positive
tone of German-American relations but not put her government
or its key European relationships at risk to increase
cooperation with the U.S.


9. (C) We should continue to laud the improved spirit and
seek to use it as a starting point for specific, targeted
initiatives aimed at Merkel and her team. Civil-military
engagement in Afghanistan is perhaps one area for increased
cooperation. We should seek detailed discussions on Merkel's
offer to train more Iraqi security forces (outside Iraq) as
well. As seen in the UNIFIL deployment and the FM's Damascus
visit, Merkel and Steinmeier have embarked on a more
ambitious German role in the Middle East -- but have focused
mainly on form rather than substance so far. Regardless of
the issue, we should make use of the Chancellor's tenacity by
consulting early with senior German officials. If we can win
her to our side, she has the capacity to carry our common
agenda over considerable obstacles.
TIMKEN JR