GETTING MORE FROM GERMANY ON AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003452

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS AID ECON AF PK GM
SUBJECT: GETTING MORE FROM GERMANY ON AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: Germany remains a key partner in
Afghanistan and Chancellor Merkel is committed to succeeding,
but we need to find new ways to increase German resolve and
resources. Post believes the Germans can do more in the near
term in many of the key areas Embassy Kabul has identified in
recent messages, such as police training, development
assistance, and counter-narcotics. More military support
might be possible in the longer term, but it would require
engagement at the highest levels to strengthen Chancellor
Merkel's personal investment in Afghanistan, as well as a
renewed effort to convince the German public and parliament
that NATO and the international community have an integrated
strategy for success that is making progress. Germany's 2007
EU and G-8 presidencies present an opportunity now to
redouble our efforts. End summary.


2. (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel is the key decision-maker on
overall Afghanistan policy (Foreign Minister Steinmeier
appears to be the other key voice). The pre-Riga debate over
German military flexibility in northern Afghanistan made this
clear, as the Chancellor repeatedly spoke out publicly to
stress the limits of Germany's ISAF mandate, even as some
other parts of the government (including within her
chancellery staff) were considering ways Germany might do
more. A more forthcoming German position on Afghanistan will
happen only if the Chancellor presses for it; we should
engage accordingly and consider making use of the EU and G-8
summits to this end. Merkel has never visited Afghanistan as
Chancellor, although the Afghanistan team at the chancellery
has advocated a trip. A visit there -- especially if it were
not confined only to the German-commanded northern region --
could increase Merkel's personal investment in success, her
appreciation of the challenges, and perhaps her government's
readiness to do more. We should do what we can to encourage
a visit.

"Comprehensive Approach" Key for Germans
--------------

3. (S/NF) Merkel and her government pride themselves on
their "comprehensive" policy in Afghanistan, fusing
political, military, and development efforts in a "networked
security" approach. Germans at times may need to be reminded
that we also follow the concept; there is little in the
German media about what the U.S. in doing there, other than
militarily. In discussing Afghanistan with the Germans, we
should agree with their concept but identify specific areas
where the civilian effort is falling short, and ask them what
they can do to help, especially on reconstruction and
development, counternarcotics, and police training.

2007 Summit Opportunities
--------------


4. (S/NF) Germany will assume January 1 the presidencies of
the EU (for six months) and G-8 (for twelve months); this
presents an opportunity to leverage our strong relations to
achieve greater commitment by other partners as well. Berlin
is ready to address Afghanistan in both fora, urging EU
consideration of an expanded ESDP police training role and
raising the possibility of inviting Presidents Karzai and
Musharraf to attend part of the June 6-8 G-8 Summit in
Germany.


5. (S/NF) Merkel's team is particularly interested in a
successful U.S.-EU summit in Washington this spring; we
should use this desire to spur greater German activism and
leadership on Afghanistan within the EU. The European
Commission recently proposed an increase of 32 percent in EC
assistance through its "Neighborhood Policy" (which does not
include Afghanistan). We should explore whether Germany
could seek similar increases in EC and member-state
assistance to Afghanistan, which we could profile in the
U.S.-EU summit.


6. (S/NF) Some German initiatives, such as hosting a
late-January 2007 meeting of the G-8/Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board (JCMB) at the Political Director level,
present opportunities but also pose the risk of showing the
appearance of action without the substance. We should make
clear to the Germans that we support their efforts and are
ready to work with them in the expectation they will yield
concrete results rather than a duplication of existing
mechanisms.

Reconstruction/Development
--------------


7. (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel, in parrying suggestions that
Germany is not pulling its weight in Afghanistan, has made a
point of emphasizing that Germany is the lead provider of
security in an area that is home to 40 percent of the Afghan
population. We should use this rhetorical point to encourage
greater German bilateral support for reconstruction and
development. German aid to Afghanistan (including German
payments through the EU) between 2002 and 2006 will amount to
about 1.5 billion euro, compared to our announced 10.3
billion at the London Conference between FY 2001 and FY 2006.
We should particularly encourage greater German civilian
assistance in the south and east.

Military and Civilian Efforts
--------------


8. (S/NF) There is a widespread notion in Germany that ISAF
(as well as OEF) operations in the south and east amount to
an attempt to achieve a purely military solution. The strong
public perception is that Germany is doing the "right" things
in the north and the U.S., Canada, and the UK are doing the
"wrong" things in the south and east. Chancellor Merkel and
her government have done little to counteract this perception
and at times have encouraged it. Our task is complicated by
the possibility (supported by reporting in more sensitive
channels) that some senior Afghan officials have offered this
interpretation to German counterparts as well. The visit
December 14 of the delegation led by SCA DAS John Gastright
will be a valuable opportunity to help reverse these
misperceptions. In particular, post recommends we focus to
the extent we can publicly on progress in the east that
demonstrates our own concerted effort in civilian and
military areas.


9. (S/NF) In the short term, we expect Chancellor Merkel to
stick to a strict interpretation of Germany's ISAF mandate,
which allows German forces to support deployments outside the
north and Kabul only temporarily and when absolutely
necessary for fulfillment of the mission. As frustrating as
we find this position, Germany has made tiny steps in the
direction of more flexibility: German officials refused two
months ago even to acknowledge their C-160 flights to
Kandahar, fearing a negative public reaction (which never
came). Now Merkel openly cites this support as evidence that
Germany is not hunkered down exclusively in the north. We
should continue to encourage Berlin to fill -- even if only
temporarily -- ISAF shortfalls such as reconnaissance
aircraft, UAVs, or MEDEVAC. Keeping up the pressure will
help expand the public and official readiness to discuss
increasing flexibility more generally.


10. (S/NF) In the longer term, we should work to surmount
German caveats. The upcoming visit of to Washington of NSA
Christoph Heusgen should leave him with a clear understanding
of how we would like to see German policy develop. We should
also focus on key German parliamentarians, who have indicated
more creativity than Merkel's government on this issue.
Senior Foreign Affairs Committee members have suggested that
they could support a re-evaluation of Germany's posture --
and possibly raising the 3,000-troop ceiling by another 500
or 1,000 -- if it were part of an ISAF-wide re-evaluation of
its requirements and if other Allies did their part. The
Bundestag could possibly address the matter in conjunction
with an early renewal of the ISAF mandate in the spring
(which would be several months before the current mandate
runs out in September 2007). An early renewal is a hotly
debated topic within government security circles and would
have to be approved by Merkel. Her decision would be the
key, but the obstacle of public opinion would remain -- this
would be an uphill battle for the government. Merkel has
demonstrated that she is capable of this sort of leadership,
however -- she orchestrated support for Germany's
unprecedented UNIFIL deployment last summer, turning
two-thirds public opposition into majority support over the
course of several weeks.

Police Training and Counter-Narcotics
--------------


11. (S/NF) Germany has 40 police trainers in Afghanistan in
its capacity as G-8 lead nation (compared to approximately
400 U.S./contract personnel in the USG police training
effort). There is discussion of raising this perhaps to 50,
but the MFA pins more hopes on the current EU fact-finding
mission enabling a doubling of trainers -- but even that
amount is modest. We continue to encourage Germany to find
creative ways to put more police officials at federal
government disposal, especially since the need for
international police forces and trainers is only increasing,
including in places like Kosovo. We should keep up this
pressure, and make clear what we expect from Berlin in its EU
Presidency role: it is not clear whether the additional
European police officials that the Germans think might be
within reach would lead to a qualitative difference in the
effort in Afghanistan.


12. (S/NF) The Germans have been cautious on
counter-narcotics issues, fearing ill-will that could
endanger their relatively small number of forces in places
like Badakhshan. They adhere to their opposition to
eradication and the need for alternative livelihoods. With
indications of increased Afghan government commitment to
implementing its counter-narcotics strategy, now is the time
to stress with Berlin the importance of eradication this year
in Badakhshan and the need for Germany to find ways to
support all aspects of the CN program.

Comment
--------------


13. (S/NF) The Germans have done a lot in Afghanistan since

2002. In our discussions with them, we should recognize
those contributions while underscoring that there is a
difference between doing a lot and doing enough: it is the
latter that we and the rest of the international community
should strive for together. End comment.


14. (U) Post provides below a timeline of some key events in
upcoming months in which increased commitment to Afghanistan
could be advanced:

December 8: Visit of Foreign Minister Steinmeier to the U.S.

January 11-12 Meeting of U.S.-EU Political Directors (Dresden)

January 29 EU-Afghanistan troika meeting (Afghan attendee:
FM Spanta) (Berlin)

January 30 Meeting of JCMB Political Directors (Berlin)

January 31 G-8 Political Directors (Berlin)

Mid-February EU-Pakistan troika meeting (Berlin).


TIMKEN JR