Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERLIN3402
2006-11-30 15:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

ENGAGING WITH THE GERMANS ON THEIR EU CENTRAL ASIA

Tags:  PREL ZKGM EU GM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 03402

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DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: POL:JKOENIG
DRAFTED: POL:MMARTIN,BMCCUEN
CLEARED: ECON:CCONWAY, POL:JBAUMAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003402 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PREL ZKGM EU GM
SUBJECT: ENGAGING WITH THE GERMANS ON THEIR EU CENTRAL ASIA
STRATEGY


Classified By: DCM John Koenig for reasons 1.5(b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003402

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PREL ZKGM EU GM
SUBJECT: ENGAGING WITH THE GERMANS ON THEIR EU CENTRAL ASIA
STRATEGY


Classified By: DCM John Koenig for reasons 1.5(b),(d).


1. (C) (Summary) Germany has made engagement with Central
Asia a top priority for its upcoming EU presidency. The
Germans hope to strengthen regional cooperation in Central
Asia, expand the region's economic options, increase
cooperation on energy, promote the rule of law, and expand
contacts between Central Asia and the West in such fields as
education. Above all, the Germans hope to create a
sustainable basis for deeper relations between the EU and
Central Asia that will long outlive the German presidency.
Germany does not aim to bring significant new EU resources to
bear in Central Asia, but plans to make EU programs more
coherent and more focused on regional coordination.


2. (C) We see significant opportunities for fruitful
U.S.-German cooperation during the presidency to advance our
priorities in Central Asia. Germany, although a leader in
the EU in terms of contacts with Central Asia, needs
encouragement to think ambitiously and strategically. Our
contacts have stressed their desire to consult closely with
us as their Central Asia strategy emerges. This openness to
cooperation is partly motivated by the realization that the
EU simply does not carry the same weight in the region as
other major powers do. Given the Germans' keen interest and
relative regional strength compared to other EU member states
(Germany is the only member state with embassies in all five
capitals) Germany is likely to remain an EU leader on Central
Asia for the foreseeable future. For that reason, developing
a close working relationship with Germany on Central Asia
during their presidency should help ensure sustained U.S.
influence on EU policy toward the region well into the
future. Among the kinds of cooperation with the EU we should
consider launching during the German presidency are:

--joint initiatives on regional anti-terrorism and
anti-narcotics programs in Central Asia
--joint initiatives linking Central Asian countries with
Afghanistan through investment, combined police training, and
involvement in civilian reconstruction
--support for construction of additional energy pipelines
--cooperation with donors like Japan and international

financial institutions to promote regional Central Asian
transportation infrastructure
--joint initiatives promoting rule of law
--joint initiatives on exchange programs in such areas as
education. End Summary.

Cooperation on Programs


3. (C) The October visit of DAS Feigenbaum and Assistance
Coordinator Klepp created a foundation for closer
coordination on assistance programs. Regular contact between
American assistance coordinators and counterparts from
Germany and the Commission, both in capitals and in the
various Central Asian countries, should help us to shape the
overall EU assistance package and to build close coordination
with the U.S. into the EU's approach to the region. We
should encourage other EU countries to commit to expanding
their diplomatic presence in the region during the German
presidency to build a foundation for closer coordination with
them.

Regional Cooperation


4. (C) While the Germans have promoted their Central Asia
strategy as a major initiative, they stress that its funding
is limited. The 2007-2013 EU budget allots about one billion
euros for Central Asia, and the Germans do not foresee any
substantial additional EU or German funding during this
timeframe. The main thrust of the German plan will be to
recast the EU's aid program by creating a regional strategy
with greater focus than the current country specific action
plans. We should, of course, encourage greater EU financial
commitment to the region, but also support the German
interest in focusing much of the available resources on
regional cooperation. Some areas where Germany hopes to
increase cooperation include security (terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, and border security),natural resource
management (water and energy),and economic development. All
of these are areas where we should seek opportunities to find
synergies in our Central Asian assistance programs.


5. (C) The Germans plan to encourage Central Asian countries
to strengthen ties with surrounding countries--e.g. to deepen
relations with countries like Afghanistan. German contacts
said that officials from isolated countries like Turkmenistan
told Foreign Minister Steinmeier during his recent trip to
Central Asia that they are interested in the Trans-Afghan
pipeline. They also note that Tajikistan already cooperates
with Afghanistan, on some security issues. We should urge
the Germans to give special emphasis to encouraging Central
Asian cooperation with Afghanistan. Joint U.S.-EU
initiatives to encourage investment and trade by wealthy
Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan in Afghanistan are
one possibility. Another would be to encourage EU police
training programs that increase cooperation between
Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries on
counternarcotics issues. Another, more ambitious,
possibility would be to try to draw Central Asian expertise
into the civilian reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.

Energy Cooperation


6. (C) Energy will loom large during the German EU
presidency with a "Strategic Energy Review" expected in
January and the adoption of an energy action plan in March.
In Central Asia, the Germans would like to foster the
development of a regional energy market by rehabilitating the
north-south energy grid and providing technical expertise to
modernize the Central Asian energy infrastructure. While MFA
contacts state that the EU has neither the means nor ability
to finance the construction of pipelines, our contacts
frequently note the importance of increasing energy options
both for Europe and for Central Asia We should seek to
ensure that discussion of alternative energy pipelines and
sources from Central Asia remains a key part of the EU energy
discussion.

Economic Integration


7. (C) As noted above, the Germans expect the EU to stick
to its traditional role of providing technical assistance and
training as opposed to becoming involved in expensive
infrastructure projects. However, the Germans can be
encouraged to work more closely with other large donors such
as the Japanese, who are involved in larger projects. The EU
could provide technical assistance to support those projects.
In addition, they could use their influence with
international financial institutions to draw more
infrastructure investment into the region. The Germans
concede the importance of regional integration and opening up
Central Asia to broader economic options. We should
encourage them to use their influence to ensure that the
practical basis for integration such as highways and other
transport links receive due weight in their strategy.

Rule of Law


8. (C) While German officials share our concerns about human
rights and democracy in the region, they argue that we must
have realistic expectations about progress in these areas.
Some officials, such as Political Director Michael Schaefer,
argue that it will take a generation before significant
progress can be achieved. The Germans and the EU have some
programs, such as judicial training programs, to promote the
rule of law. Regarding human rights, they generally argue
the best way forward is to keep the regional leaders engaged
in a dialogue. For example they hailed the recent agreement
by Uzbekistan to participate in regular dialogue with the EU
on human rights in general and the Andijon incident in
particular.


9. (C) We should note that we also have realistic
expectations for the region. We should not let semantic
distinctions between democracy promotion and promoting rule
of law obscure the fact that most of our work in these areas
aims at the same goal. We should encourage Germany and the
EU to develop a more coherent strategy for improving the rule
of law in Central Asia and then coordinate our programs with
theirs. At the same time, we should stress the importance
of maintaining human rights standards. We should, for
example, support EU efforts to draw Uzbekistan out of its
shell through dialogue, but when the question of EU
sanctions on Uzbekistan comes up for review during the German
presidency, we should remind the Germans that dialogue
cannot be a substitute for progress on the ground in human
rights practices.

Exchanges


10. (C) Since the Germans expect progress on human rights
and rule of law to be slow, they are looking for programs
that gradually open up the Central Asian societies to new
influences over the long term. During Foreign Minister
Steinmeier's recent trip to the region all five Central Asian
countries indicated an interest in more assistance in
education, and the Germans plan to make this an important
focus of EU work. This would mainly take the form of
technical assistance to improve teacher training and the
administration of national education systems. MFA contacts
have also suggested expanding the German-Kazakh University,
created in 1999 and located in Almaty, into a regional
center.


11. (C) Germany hopes the interaction with EU officials and
increased familiarization with EU standards will allow these
programs to become models of good governance and provide
models of best practices. Exchange programs that enabled
educators from Central Asia to visit and work in Europe would
be another element of this strategy. We should stress that
we, too, see the importance of exchange as a way of opening
up the region to new influences, and consider what kind of
parallel programs we can develop with the EU.

TIMKEN JR