Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERLIN3391
2006-11-29 17:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

INTERAGENCY DELEGATION URGES U.S-GERMAN

Tags:  PTER PREL GM TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1690
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #3391/01 3331719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291719Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6227
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0177
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 003391 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PGI, EUR/AGS, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL GM TU
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DELEGATION URGES U.S-GERMAN
COOPERATION AGAINST PKK

REF: A. STATE 179961

B. BERLIN 2400

C. BERLIN 1650

D. BERLIN 1443

E. BERLIN 1109

F. BERLIN 988

G. BERLIN 889 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 003391

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PGI, EUR/AGS, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL GM TU
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DELEGATION URGES U.S-GERMAN
COOPERATION AGAINST PKK

REF: A. STATE 179961

B. BERLIN 2400

C. BERLIN 1650

D. BERLIN 1443

E. BERLIN 1109

F. BERLIN 988

G. BERLIN 889 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. A U.S. delegation sought expanded German
actions against the PKK and proposed closer cooperation
between Germany and the U.S., as well as among Turkey,
Germany, the U.S., and other EU member states. German
officials acknowledged the importance of fighting the PKK.
The Interior Ministry appeared satisfied with the current
level of efforts, but when pressed, officials there
criticized the lack of political will in other EU states to
combat the PKK. The delegation's brainstorming with
officials at the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry produced
new ideas to increase the pressure on the PKK. End Summary.

--------------
INTERIOR MINISTRY: ALREADY DOING ALL WE CAN
--------------


2. (C) Federal Ministry of the Interior (MOI) Deputy Director
General for Counterterrorism Gerhard Schindler explained the
MOI coordinates German actions against the PKK and he
described German strategy and actions (refs B - G) that can
be traced back to the 1993 German PKK ban. He explained a
primary German tactic is to target upper level leaders by
charging them with any possible criminal offense rather than
going after them only on terrorism-related charges. Germany
believes its actions have achieved results because high level
PKK leaders had fled Germany and others avoid visiting. That
said, there are mid-level PKK officials who have remained in
Germany. Also, the PKK leadership has for years continued to
instruct its representatives in Germany and other countries
where the PKK is active on how much money to raise. This
reality, Schindler said, continues.


3. (C) Schindler was hesitant in discussing ways other EU
countries could do more to fight the PKK. He said his
ministry and German law enforcement authorities have numerous
contacts and excellent working relationships with their EU

counterparts. "All EU police agencies agree, they all see
the problem as we do," Schindler said, "but the political
class is different." Schindler resisted clarifying his
remarks, but ultimately agreed when U.S. team leader Urbancic
asked whether the problem in other EU countries is the lack
of political will to follow police and security
investigations with prosecutions. Schindler was reluctant to
criticize his EU partners and followed up by praising French
prosecutors for investigating and detaining a terrorist who,
under German law, German officials had been unable to arrest.
Urbancic clarified the delegation did not intend to ask
other EU countries simply to copy the German model.


4. (C) Responding to a question from the delegation,
Schindler said he thought Germany had followed up the EU
listing of the PKK as a terrorist organization by proposing
specific PKK leaders for derivative designation. Schindler
added that the amount of money frozen subsequent to EU and UN
terrorist designations had not been large. It is right to
list leaders and organizations, he said, but that is not the
way to reach their money. Concerning the previous German ban
of the PKK-linked newspaper Ozgur Politika, which has been
overturned by a German court, Schindler confirmed that
Germany is redrafting the law to reinstate the ban.

--------------
CHANCELLERY: NEW IDEAS INFORMALLY FLOATED
--------------


5. (C) Chancellery Deputy Director General for
Counterterrorism and Organized Crime Hans Vorbeck admitted
the PKK was not Germany's highest CT priority, but noted
authorities here have been fighting them for years.
Chancellery desk officer for North American and European
Security Policy Volker Pellet said German courts are
skeptical of Turkish extradition requests, but he expects the
situation to improve gradually. Asked about the utility of
expanding EU sanctions, Vorbeck said they are not much use
and the trend to make such EU actions more transparent might
limit their effectiveness further. Nevertheless, Vorbeck
assessed that German measures had pushed PKK senior

BERLIN 00003391 002 OF 002


leadership to the Benelux countries and Switzerland.


6. (C) Asked about expanded U.S.-German information sharing
to combat the PKK, Vorbeck stressed the MOI lead in the
German government's efforts. Chancellery Desk Officer for
International Terrorism and Organized Crime Alexandra
Schaefer-Borrmann said there is already a good exchange of
information among EU members; she suggested the U.S. might be
able to join that existing dialogue. Pellet asked about U.S.
actions against the PKK in Northern Iraq; EUR/SE Director
Silliman responded by describing the U.S. strategic approach
and his recent visit to the region.


7. (C) In closing, Vorbeck observed that the German
interagency Joint Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ) is limited
to addressing Islamic terrorism. Its structures can
therefore not be used against the PKK. Schaefer-Borrmann
hinted that the Center's mandate could eventually be
broadened, but that controversy surrounding the GTAZ's
establishment had to be limited by narrowing its scope to
only one type of terrorism. The GTAZ enables collaboration
between the federal and state levels, as well as nearly 40
police, security, prosecution, asylum, and other authorities
via numerous working groups all while taking into account the
German constitutional and legal hurdles that can affect such
information sharing. Vorbeck admitted Germany should do more
against the PKK.

--------------
FOREIGN MINISTRY: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES
--------------


8. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office Director for
Counterterrorism Matthias Sonn said his tour in Ankara in the
late 1990s and his subsequent posting as MFA Office Director
for Turkey meant he was very familiar with the PKK problem.
He criticized the PKK's "corrosive influence on
Turkish-German society." Sonn appreciated hearing the
delegation's assessment that Germany had done much to combat
the PKK, but he thought it was embarrassing the EU had not
done more and that it had fallen to the U.S. to seek more
action on European territory. Sonn mentioned several
obstacles that hindered Germany's effort: (1) the belief
among some senior German officials that the PKK represents
oppressed Kurds and their "legitimate fight" against Turkish
security forces, (2) the German tactic of prosecuting PKK
leaders for criminal offenses meant the police and courts in
numerous German federal states were taking inconsistent
approaches, (3) German courts had been skeptical of Turkish
extradition requests, and (4) Germany could revoke asylum
status, but it was a long judicial and administrative
process. Despite these hindrances, Sonn mentioned two areas
where Germany might be able to apply more pressure on the
PKK: (1) by seeking an EU listing of the PKK-affiliated
newspaper Ozgur Politika (and its affiliates) that MOI had
tried to ban, and (2) by increasing the scrutiny of travelers
departing on the regular flights from Northern Iraq to
Frankfurt, in particular to find PKK cash couriers.


9. (C) As to measures to pressure the PKK outside of German
jurisdiction, Sonn called the EU travel ban "useless" because
organizations did not travel; also, the end of border
controls among Schengen states meant unhindered travel for
PKK-affiliated individuals. He added Turkey expects the U.S.
to "resolve the PKK issue in Northern Iraq."

10 (U) S/CT Urbancic and EUR/SE Silliman cleared this cable.
TIMKEN JR