Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERLIN3354
2006-11-22 16:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

DAS KRAMER'S VISIT TO BERLIN, NOVEMBER 17

Tags:  PREL PGOV EUN GM RU UP MD GG 
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VZCZCXRO6733
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #3354/01 3261616
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221616Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6170
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003354 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN GM RU UP MD GG
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S VISIT TO BERLIN, NOVEMBER 17


Classified By: POL M/C John Bauman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003354

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN GM RU UP MD GG
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S VISIT TO BERLIN, NOVEMBER 17


Classified By: POL M/C John Bauman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) (Summary) National Security Advisor Christoph
Heusgen, MFA Political Director Michael Schaefer, and other
senior German officials discussed Russia, Moldova, Ukraine,
Georgia, and Belarus in meetings with DAS Kramer who visited
Berlin on November 17. Schaefer and Heusgen argued that we
should not set our expectations too high for Russia right now
and focus instead on long-term engagement. Alexander Rahr, a
leading Germany expert on Russia, suggested that any
differences between the Chancellery and the MFA on Russia
were less related to policy and more related to the
Chancellery's short-term focus on current problems and the
MFA's desire to cultivate a long-term strategy. Most of the
talk on Ukraine focused on the president and prime minister;
Kramer's German interlocutors agreed that Ukrainian PM
Yanukovych is the driving force in Kiev, whom the Germans
have found to be a pragmatic politician trying to resist
being overly dependent on Russia. On Moldova, the Germans
supported in principle the idea of replacing the Russian
peacekeeping force with an EU-ESDP mission, but they believed
progress toward a political settlement would be required
before this idea could move forward. Despite Germany's
engagement in settling tensions between Georgia and Russia,
Berlin is not interested in becoming a mediator and continues
to harbor strong concerns and reservations about Saakashvili.
(End Summary)

Russia
--------------


2. (C) Michael Schaefer, MFA political director, started
his meeting with Kramer by stating that it will take at least
a generation before the state of domestic Russian affairs
substantially improves. Given this prognosis, Germany and
the U.S. needed to be patient and develop a long-term
strategy that did not set unrealistic expectations. Schaefer
agreed with Kramer that bringing Russia into rules based
institutions like the WTO would help bring about the rule of
law and transparency.


3. (C) At the Chancellery, National Security Advisor
Christoph Heusgen said that despite difficulties, the Germans
have had some success with the Russians and pointed towards
the improving relationship between Russia and Latvia. The
relationship with Russia is a "frustrating one," he said, but
"we have to work with these guys, we need them on Iran and
other things." Kramer stated that while there are a number
of areas where we could work with the Russians the list of
concerns about Russia is growing, especially on domestic
trends, policy toward Russia's neighbors, and troubling arms
sales. When the discussion turned to the EU's attempt to
agree on a negotiating framework for the EU-Russia
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Norman Walter,
director for Russia at the Chancellery, suggested that the
Poles were likely to drop their demand that Russia sign the
Energy Charter; however, the Poles were still demanding that
Russia drop its import ban on Polish meat.


4. (C) DAS Kramer also met with Alexander Rahr from the
German Council of Foreign Relations and one of Germany's
leading experts on Russia. Rahr stated that splits in the
German government on Russia result more from a difference of
emphasis than policy. The Chancellery tends to be more
pragmatic and focused on how to work with Russia on today's
pressing issues, while the MFA takes a longer view and is
most interested in slowly building this relationship. Rahr
commented that the both the Chancellery and the MFA are
concerned about the deteriorating U.S.-Russian relationship
and some believe Germany should act as a mediator. Turning
to Russia itself, Rahr noted four major developments that
deserve closer scrutiny. First, Russia is looking toward
China more as a partner than a competitor. Second, Russia is
already in election mode and Putin clearly prefers that
Medvedev succeed him. Third, the role Poland plays in
undermining EU-Russian relations. Fourth, underestimating
the power and possibilities that Russia's energy resources
give it.

Ukraine
--------------


5. (C) DAS Kramer said the USG is realistic about what can
be achieved with Prime Minister Yanukovych, but wants to
engage with him because he is the driving force in the
Ukrainian government. Yanukovych, he said, will visit
Washington on December 4-5. Both Chancellery and MFA
officials agreed that Yanukovych is pragmatic and willing to
work with the West because he does not want to be dependent
on Russia. Chancellery official Norman Walter did note,
however, that many members of the CDU, Chancellor Merkel's
party, are still close to Our Ukraine, and refuse to
recognize that President Yushchenko is losing influence.

BERLIN 00003354 002 OF 003


Kramer said support for Yanukovych's visit to Washington by
both FM Tarasyuk and opposition leader Julia Tymoshenko
suggested that they, too, realize Yanukovych is calling the
shots in Ukraine while Yushchenko is becoming marginalized.



6. (C) Walter agreed with Kramer's assessment that
President Yushchenko is disengaged, and Walter stated that
Yushchenko has been a "puzzle" to the Germans. Even when
Yushchenko is on the telephone with the Chancellor he appears
indecisive, and did not come to Berlin even after he was
personally invited by the Chancellor (Merkel and Yushchenko,
he said, have still not met). Walter said the Chancellery is
considering inviting Yushchenko to Berlin early next year
followed by a visit of Yanukovych one month later; however,
Heusgen said that, for the time being, there are no fixed
plans for inviting Yushchenko or Yanukovych. Several
wondered whether Yushchenko's health was affecting his
ability to lead.


7. (C) On policy issues, Kramer noted the U.S. did not
react strongly to Yanukovych's statements about Ukraine
taking a pause on pursuing NATO membership; he said that the
U.S. position was to tell Ukrainian officials that Ukraine
should proceed toward NATO at its own pace. The USG is
urging Yanukovych to push through the many pieces of
legislation necessary for Ukraine to qualify for WTO
membership. Ambassador Lucas, Special Envoy for Russia at
the MFA, agreed that transparency and elimination of the
middleman are necessary especially in the energy field, but
Yanukovych has done nothing to clean up the murky energy
sector since coming to power. Walter agreed with Kramer's
assessment that Moldova should be a test case for how
constructive a regional role Ukraine would play.

Moldova
--------------


8. (C) Kramer said that in a meeting on November 16 in
Brussels on Moldova, which included representatives from the
EU, U.S., Ukraine and Russia, the Russians indicated they
might be open to replacing the Russian peacekeeping force
with an EU-Russian ESDP mission. Heusgen and Schaefer both
questioned whether a change in the peacekeeping force would
be possible without a political deal. Kramer said a
political deal can only come after something changes on the
ground. Heusgen said he has believed that a deal is possible
to enable an EU-Russian ESDP operation to replace the Russian
force, but Schaefer warned that the EU would be unwilling to
move into a political vacuum. Kramer noted that the U.S.
might not get involved in such an ESDP force, and Heusgen
agreed that U.S. involvement there should not be necessary.
Ambassador Lucas suggested that Ukraine and Kazakhstan might
be willing to contribute to an ESDP mission.


9. (C) Turning to how to move forward on Moldova,
Chancellery and MFA officials argued that Russia was the key
player. Schaefer thought Russia might be more willing to
move forward if Russia's troop presence in Moldova was
de-linked from fulfilling the Istanbul Commitments. Schaefer
in a personal aside stated he did not think the Russian
troops in Moldova fall under the Istanbul commitments.
Kramer pushed back and said the U.S. has a strongly different
view on this. Lucas suggested using the 5 2 negotiating
framework (including Moldova and Transnistria) would work
best. Kramer countered that the 5 2 format is a charade, but
a necessary one so that the parties sit down and talk
instead of engaging in provocations.

Georgia
--------------


10. (C) Heusgen said the Chancellor stresses with both the
Russians and Georgians the importance of scaling down their
rhetoric. She also told Putin that Russia must stop kicking
out Georgian schoolchildren. Chancellery Director Walter
said while the Germans are very active in promoting improved
Russian-Georgian relations, with Foreign Minister Bezuashvili
on the phone virtually every other day with Heusgen, the
Germans are not interested in assuming the role of a public
mediator.


11. (C) Heusgen noted that Saakashvili had gone with
military forces into Ajaria two years ago, and promised to
give greater autonomy to this region, but has failed to do
so. Consequently, concerns about Saakashvili have some
justification. Kramer said that the U.S., while somewhat
frustrated with recent Georgian moves such as the handling of
the arrest of the four Russian spies, has stressed to
Saakashvili that the use of force in Ossetia and Abkhazia is
unacceptable. At the same time, Russia has not completely
given up its repressive measures against Georgians inside
Russia, Kramer emphasized, and Gazprom's doubling of Georgian

BERLIN 00003354 003 OF 003


gas prices was a further provocation and source of political
pressure. Heusgen agreed with Kramer that the ouster of
Defense Minister Okruashvili was a positive development.
Kramer walked through with Schaeffer and others the
confidence building measures the U.S. was proposing to both
the Georgian and Russian sides.

Belarus
--------------


12. (C) NSA Heusgen said that Belarus President Lukashenko
is off balance because he did not expect the Russians to
raise energy prices. He and Kramer agreed that the West's
best strategy for dealing with Lukashenko at this point is to
"watch him squirm" in his current difficulties. Kramer noted
that a Belarus official had recently approached the U.S.
Embassy with a request to meet Kramer in New York because of
Lukashenko's alleged desire to improve relations; but,
Kramer declined and told the official to contact our
Ambassador in Minsk. Heusgen and Kramer agreed that the West
should set clear benchmarks, such as the release of political
prisoners, for any improvement in relations.


13. (C) Amb. Lucas characterized recent German contact with
Minsk as disappointing, with no new thinking on the
Belarusian side and unwillingness to consider even small
steps. Lucas agreed with Kramer that the West should stay
united; we have to wait until Belarus makes some positive
moves. Lucas suggested that while Lukashenko and Putin do
not like each other, Russia does not want to risk losing
Lukashenko and possibly control of Belarus.


14. (C) Alexander Rahr informed Kramer that he was
approached by Belarusian authorities on the possibility of
interviewing Lukashenko for an article in the German daily,
Die Welt, which he has tentatively accepted, although the
date for the interview has not been finalized. Rahr has
heard that other major European papers have been approached
as well including, Le Figaro. Rahr speculated that
Lukashenko's outreach might be caused by increasing pressure
from Moscow. Making it clear that Lukashenko would not be
arrested once he stepped down might make a transition easier,
according to Rahr. Kramer agreed but stated it should be
equally clear that Lukashenko would have to leave Belarus
after freeing all political prisoners.


15. (C) COMMENT: Kramer's visit was a good opportunity for
stock-taking on German views on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
Moldova, and the Russian-Georgian situation, and for the most
part, our views coincide on the key issues, though areas of
emphasis may differ. Rumors that rifts exist between the
Chancellery and MFA were supported in these discussions.
German support for a possible replacement of the Russian
peacekeeping force in Moldova was especially welcome given
resistance to this idea in Brussels at the EU. Similar
assessments on Belarus and Ukraine were also encouraging.
With German ascendancy to EU and G-8 presidency, continued
consultations over the next 12 months on these issues will be
extremely important. END COMMENT


16. (U) DAS Kramer cleared this message.
TIMKEN JR