SUBJECT: GERMAN SECURITY POLICY WHITE PAPER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 003145

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PREL GM
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: GERMAN SECURITY POLICY WHITE PAPER
APPLAUDED, QUESTIONS REMAIN

Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission John M.
Koenig for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. Chancellor Merkel and her cabinet approved
October 25 a White Paper on security policy and the future of
the Bundeswehr, the first since 1994. The document is on the
whole a success, defining priorities in a manner consistent
with that of the U.S. and reaffirming the role of NATO and
the German-U.S. partnership. The paper leaves some questions
unanswered, particularly on how to boost defense spending or
to improve NATO-EU relations. But the White Paper is a clear
signal of Germany's commitment to a close security
partnership with the U.S. and a definitive rejection of the
vision of Europe as a counterweight to the United States.
The English version of the White Paper can be accessed at
www.weissbuch.de/download/White Paper 2006.pdf and the
summary is available at www.weissbuch.de/download/
White Paper 2006 Summary.pdf. End Summary.


2. (C) The new security strategy defines Germany's national
interests, which in itself is an achievement and a departure
from Germany's post-War tendency to define itself through its
engagement in multilateral organizations and arrangements.
The paper identifies global threats in a way strikingly
similar to the U.S. and provides at least a partial strategy
to deal with them. It highlights the three security concerns
facing Germany today: international terrorism, weapons of
mass destruction, and regional conflicts and failing states.
The policy concludes that meeting these threats requires
preventive (even pre-emptive),efficient and coherent
cooperation at both the national and international levels.
However, the question of when Germany should actively engage
on certain matters, which goals take priority, and how they
can be achieved is not discussed, most likely because of
differences of opinion within the coalition government. In
some ways a compromise document, one can detect in some
portions of the paper the fissures between the CDU/CSU and
SPD. The paper stresses the need to boost spending and
continue the transformation of the Bundeswehr but offers no
budgetary targets.

NATO First...
--------------


3. (C) NATO is described as the "strongest anchor" of German
security and defense policy, essential for meeting Germany's
security challenges. The paper is strong on transformation,
partnerships, and NATO action to meet global challenges. It
also calls for more expeditionary capabilities. The paper
defines relations with the U.S. as central to German foreign
and security policy, to "shape the transatlantic partnership
in the Alliance with the future in mind, and to cultivate the
close and trusting relationship with the USA. Now and in the
future, the fundamental issues of European security can be
only addressed together with the USA."


4. (U) The paper states that German security policy is
multilateral in character, and that risks and threats must be
addressed with a comprehensive approach of suitably matched
instruments, including diplomatic, economic, development
policy and policing measures as well as military means. In
order to respond more aggressively to security concerns, the
White Paper calls for the establishment of an
inter-ministerial approach called "networked security"
including federal intelligence and military intelligence
services, the MoD, MFA and the Bundeswehr. (White Paper
detractors question what networked security means in
practice.)


5. (C) European integration is also considered vital to
German security policy, and the paper supports an enhanced
strategic partnership between the EU and NATO - not as
competitors but as coordinated contributors to global peace
and security. The paper mentions "Berlin Plus" as a vehicle
for cooperation but otherwise fails to provide concrete steps
to achieve a better relationship. Special attention is given
to the relationship with France and the United Kingdom as
partners for peace and stability throughout Europe.
Attention is then focused on areas where additional emphasis
is required: Central Asia, Russia, and Ukraine in particular,
in addition to a general treatment of other regions of the
world.


6. (C) The paper observes that Germany has become one of the
largest troop contributors to international peace missions )
a sea change in tangible German participation in
international security and a radical departure from the
German role during the Cold War. It praises the NATO
Response Force (NRF) and calls for renewed efforts toward
inter-operability, enhanced strategic airlift capabilities,
and increased dialog between the EU and NATO. The White
Paper confirms Germany's commitment to have available --
although not necessarily all at one time -- 15,000 troops for
the NRF and 18,000 for EU Battlegroups. (These numbers
include troops on rotation, in instruction or on leave.)


Domestic Bundeswehr Deployments Remain Controversial
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The White Paper further notes that the employment of
the Bundeswehr within Germany already "is...permissible under
certain conditions to support the police forces in the event
of imminent danger to the existence of free democratic basic
order" but points out that the constitution does not allow
the use domestically of equipment and munitions unique to the
military. (Note: this is a reference to a 2006
Constitutional Court ruling that the Bundeswehr could not
shoot down a roque aircraft. End note.) With the rise and
threat of terrorism within German borders, the White Paper
states that the "Federal Government therefore considers it
necessary to expand the constitutional framework for the
deployment of the Armed Forces" -- specifically for air- and
sea-based defense. (Note: This limitation to air and sea
reportedly is a concession to the SPD, and especially Justice
Minister Zypries, who had opposed earlier, more general,
draft language in this section. There is no consensus within
the Coalition Government yet on the details of such a
constitutional change. The Interior, Justice, and Defense
Ministries may not be able to easily resolve their differing
views on the circumstances in which the Bundeswehr would be
used, and how it would be used. End note.)

Role of Nuclear Deterrence Unchanged
--------------


8. (C) The White Paper also recognizes the role nuclear
deterrence plays in the security environment, stating that
the Alliance will continue to need "nuclear assets in the
foreseeable future" and that Germany is prepared to make its
contribution "towards nuclear participation commensurate to
its role in the Alliance." The end goal remains, however,
the eventual worldwide elimination of all weapons of mass
destruction. Indeed, on arms control and disarmament, the
White Paper reiterates Germany's support for the NPT, CWC,
BWC, PSI, the Ottawa Convention and opportunities to further
control small arms and light weapons.


9. (C) The paper sticks with conscription in Germany and
underscores that only volunteers or career soldiers would
take part in the response or stabilization forces.


10. (C) Comment: The White Paper is an important and
positive step forward in German security policy that the USG
should welcome; it anchors Germany in a close partnership
with the United States, confirms NATO as the preeminent
Transatlantic security organization, and prepares Germany for
a more active security role in meeting 21st-century threats.
Although it fails to resolve some key issues, most notably
the use of the military within Germany, this is an important
milestone that advances our Transatlantic agenda. We will
need to continue to press Germany on insufficient defense
spending, still a critical shortcoming. But the White Paper
provides a compass that will guide German security policy in
a direction with great potential for increased cooperation
with the U.S. and our allies.
TIMKEN JR