Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERLIN2820
2006-09-25 10:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
IRAN/EXPORT CONTROLS - GERMAN UPDATE ON EU EFFORTS
how-toVZCZCXRO8732 OO RUEHAG DE RUEHRL #2820 2681046 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 251046Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5412 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0071 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0222 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 8832 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0391
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 002820
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, NEA, AND EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL KNNP MTCR MNUC IR GM
SUBJECT: IRAN/EXPORT CONTROLS - GERMAN UPDATE ON EU EFFORTS
TO DRAFT IRAN-SPECIFIC WATCHLIST
Classified By: EMIN Robert F. Cekuta for reasons 1.4 (b),
(d),and (e).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 002820
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, NEA, AND EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL KNNP MTCR MNUC IR GM
SUBJECT: IRAN/EXPORT CONTROLS - GERMAN UPDATE ON EU EFFORTS
TO DRAFT IRAN-SPECIFIC WATCHLIST
Classified By: EMIN Robert F. Cekuta for reasons 1.4 (b),
(d),and (e).
1. (C) German MFA Export Control Division Deputy Director
Markus Klinger provided Global Affairs officer September 22
with an update on EU3 efforts to raise awareness in other EU
capitals of the risk of diversion of sensitive technology to
Iran's nuclear and missile programs. As part of an effort to
persuade EU member states to tighten their export controls
concerning Iran, Klinger said, Germany, France, and the UK
have been demarching EU capitals to urge EU members to
"exercise the utmost vigilance" concerning the export of
dual-use and other sensitive goods to Iran.
2. (C) Klinger said the EU3 began using expert-level
discussions in relevant EU fora in May 2006 to promote the
idea of an EU-wide, Iran-specific watchlist. Klinger said EU
members have reacted positively, but progress to date has
been slow. Draft lists under discussion include NSG- and
MTCR-listed goods, along with some items covered by the
Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. Klinger said
draft lists also include some non-listed goods that could be
used to advance a nuclear or missile program.
3. (C) Klinger said Germany strongly favors a presumption of
denial for watchlisted goods, but has encountered resistance
from some EU member states. Klinger said many EU members
continue to cite domestic pressure from industry to exclude
certain sensitive technologies. Klinger said German
demarches have pointed out that industry would benefit from
clear and consistent guidance in the form of a watchlist.
4. (C) In response to a question, Klinger speculated
formulation of a similar entities list would prove far more
problematic, particularly with respect to achieving consensus
on which type of entities to include and whether such a list
would serve as a blacklist or just raise red flags.
TIMKEN JR
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, NEA, AND EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL KNNP MTCR MNUC IR GM
SUBJECT: IRAN/EXPORT CONTROLS - GERMAN UPDATE ON EU EFFORTS
TO DRAFT IRAN-SPECIFIC WATCHLIST
Classified By: EMIN Robert F. Cekuta for reasons 1.4 (b),
(d),and (e).
1. (C) German MFA Export Control Division Deputy Director
Markus Klinger provided Global Affairs officer September 22
with an update on EU3 efforts to raise awareness in other EU
capitals of the risk of diversion of sensitive technology to
Iran's nuclear and missile programs. As part of an effort to
persuade EU member states to tighten their export controls
concerning Iran, Klinger said, Germany, France, and the UK
have been demarching EU capitals to urge EU members to
"exercise the utmost vigilance" concerning the export of
dual-use and other sensitive goods to Iran.
2. (C) Klinger said the EU3 began using expert-level
discussions in relevant EU fora in May 2006 to promote the
idea of an EU-wide, Iran-specific watchlist. Klinger said EU
members have reacted positively, but progress to date has
been slow. Draft lists under discussion include NSG- and
MTCR-listed goods, along with some items covered by the
Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. Klinger said
draft lists also include some non-listed goods that could be
used to advance a nuclear or missile program.
3. (C) Klinger said Germany strongly favors a presumption of
denial for watchlisted goods, but has encountered resistance
from some EU member states. Klinger said many EU members
continue to cite domestic pressure from industry to exclude
certain sensitive technologies. Klinger said German
demarches have pointed out that industry would benefit from
clear and consistent guidance in the form of a watchlist.
4. (C) In response to a question, Klinger speculated
formulation of a similar entities list would prove far more
problematic, particularly with respect to achieving consensus
on which type of entities to include and whether such a list
would serve as a blacklist or just raise red flags.
TIMKEN JR