Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERLIN2654
2006-09-12 06:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

DHS COUNSELOR ROSENZWEIG PUSHES FOR CT PROGRESS IN

Tags:  PTER KHLS EAIR PGOV PREL GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002654 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHS FOR PROSENZWEIG
STATE FOR EUR/AGS, EUR/PGI, EUR/ERA, S/CT, EB, INL AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PTER KHLS EAIR PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: DHS COUNSELOR ROSENZWEIG PUSHES FOR CT PROGRESS IN
BERLIN

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002654

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHS FOR PROSENZWEIG
STATE FOR EUR/AGS, EUR/PGI, EUR/ERA, S/CT, EB, INL AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PTER KHLS EAIR PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: DHS COUNSELOR ROSENZWEIG PUSHES FOR CT PROGRESS IN
BERLIN

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Regarding Interior Minister Schaeuble's
planned September 24-26 trip to Washington, German Interior
Ministry Director General Guenter Krause told visiting
Department of Homeland Security Counselor to the Assistant
Secretary for Policy Paul Rosenzweig September 4-5 that

SIPDIS
Schaeuble's priorities include fighting terrorist use of the
Internet, Visa Waiver Program access for German Children's
Passports (Kinderpass),and a registered traveler biometric
pilot program. Counselor Rosenzweig said U.S. priorities
included visa lookout data sharing (HSPD-6) and fingerprint
data sharing. The two also discussed the PNR issue, which
Krause said would not interrupt flights because Lufthansa
would continue to provide the data even without any agreement
in place and other countries' airlines were not subject to
German data protection rules. Krause mentioned German plans
to create a combined counterterrorism database. End Summary.

-------------- -
MINISTER'S VISIT DELIVERABLES: U.S. PRIORITIES
-------------- -


2. (C) HSPD-6: Counselor Rosenzweig said DHS Secretary
Chertoff would have no higher priority than the expanded
sharing of terrorist watch list data. The two sides should
build on the data sharing to boost security for the World Cup
by institutionalizing it reciprocally, he said. Krause said
Germany favored more data exchange: the Pruem agreements
greatly expand data sharing with select EU partners; Germany
needs to think about how to conduct further data exchanges
with the U.S. but the procedures need not be complicated.
Experts from both sides should meet to discuss it, Krause
said repeatedly. The U.S. experts should read the Germany's
Pruem treaty with Austria, Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, and tell Germany

about U.S. concerns regarding German data protection
provisions, he continued. Krause handed Counselor Rosenzweig
an English language (EU "Limitee") text of the Pruem
agreement. Germany wants to be able to answer inevitable
questions from the Bundestag, for example on data protection,
Krause said. Counselor Rosenzweig noted the concern about
Visa Waiver Program vulnerabilities in Congress, especially
after the London airplane plot and added the GAO report to be
released September 7 was titled "Stronger Actions Needed to
Mitigate the Risks of Visa Waiver Program." Congress needs
to see that the USG was addressing risks that might be
associated with the VWP through measures such as via broader
data exchange.


3. (C) Fingerprint Data Sharing: Krause responded to
Counselor Rosenzweig's proposal by saying case-by-case
fingerprint sharing with the U.S. is no problem. However,
broader sharing would require a new law and the MOI would
face many questions. Is it truly necessary to exchange all
data, or only part? Which part? How would data be handled?
Will data be deleted, and when? What will the U.S. do with
the data? It is complicated, Krause explained, but should be
possible if it is reciprocal and acceptable to the Bundestag.
Experts should meet and find a way to proceed said Krause.
A hit/no hit system would be easier to imagine than full
access, he continued. Krause asked about the status of
Interpol's fingerprint data exchange program. Counselor
Rosenzweig replied it was still a long way away; but in
theory it is a good idea in the long term. Krause noted that
a pilot fingerprint data sharing project with Austria in
preparation for the Pruem treaty going into force on November
11, 2006 had produced many fingerprint "hits" -- i.e.,
individuals either convicted or suspected of crimes on both
sides of the German-Austrian border.

-------------- ---
MINISTER'S VISIT DELIVERABLES: GERMAN PRIORITIES
-------------- ---


4. (C) Terrorism and the Internet: Krause reported Minister
Schaeuble decided to make this issue a focus of German G-8
and EU Presidency and would be sure to raise it with FBI
Director Mueller (in Berlin Sept. 19) and in his meetings in
Washington. The Internet had played a key role in
radicalizing the German train bomb plotters and in teaching

BERLIN 00002654 002 OF 003


them how to build a bomb, Krause added. Krause explained
Germany wants to coordinate Internet surveillance,
concentrate on it in the German Joint Counterterrorism Center
(GTAZ),and voluntarily share the workload by sharing
analysts' reviews of websites. Germany had begun discussions
with its EU partners: France is prepared to cooperate and
Spain is doing some work in the area, Krause reported, but
Italy has not turned to the issue and the UK is unwilling to
share its analysts' conclusions. The G-8 is not as far
along, Krause said, and so Germany would only send forward a
proposal for a questionnaire and a best practices paper.
Counselor Rosenzweig responded the Department of Justice or
the intelligence community, not DHS, were more engaged in
website analysis. In principle, the U.S. favors sharing
information, but other agencies had the lead on the issue,
and the U.S. had First Amendment concerns. Taking action
(i.e., shutting down websites) would be harder for the U.S.
to agree to, although when a site crossed a line and got
involved in terrorist activity, then the U.S. could take
action, Counselor Rosenzweig said.


5. (C) Kinderpass: Krause said Germany wants to resolve the
Kinderpass (Children's Passport) issue. Germany does not
want to fingerprint children under 14 because their
fingerprints change, Krause said. (NOTE: A German
Kinderpass, although it is machine-readable and contains a
digital photograph, does not contain an RFID chip. German
parents can and do, however, also obtain regular RFID
biometric passports for their children, and like all other
new German passports, a child's regular German passport does
contain the digital photo on the RFID chip. End Note).


6. (C) Registered Traveler Biometric Pilot Project: Krause
asked about the status of the U.S.-Dutch initiative and
pointed out Germany had its own pilot project in Frankfurt.
Counselor Rosenzweig explained the U.S.-Dutch project has not
yet started and he outlined several issues that had come up.
The Netherlands, for example, had sought a program for all
Schengen residents, but DHS would only agree to one for Dutch
citizens due to the need for thorough background checks.
Dutch citizens had to give consent for the background check
and DHS wanted to understand the depth of the background
check, the grounds for any denials of access to the program,
and the names and biographic data of anyone denied. Lastly,
there are administrative and logistical challenges to
implementing the program in U.S. airports. Counselor
Rosenzweig concluded by offering that experts meet to discuss
the program.


7. (C) Counterterrorism Center Personnel Exchange: Krause
noted U.S. officials already work closely with the German
GTAZ counterterrorism center, but German authorities are
prepared to invite a staff member from NCTC or other
appropriate U.S. CT center to visit and observe the work of
the German GTAZ for a week.

--------------
PASSENGER NAME RECORDS (PNR)
--------------


8. (C) Noting the U.S.-EU PNR discussions Sept 8 in Brussels,
Krause said the EU had to solve the PNR problem, that it made
no sense to have different solutions for the 25 member
states. Krause said a one year interim agreement was also
unsatisfactory; the German Bundestag would need to ratify it,
a process which would take a year. There needs to be a PNR
final agreement. Given the approaching deadline, Germany had
reluctantly agreed to try to find its own solution, Krause
said. Counselor Rosenzweig replied the UK airline bomb plot
has sensitized the U.S. Congress and DHS is interested in
going beyond the previous PNR agreement, as Secretary
Chertoff had outlined in his recent op-ed article. The UK
has decided to solve the problem with an "Air Navigation
Order" to authorize the provision of PNR data, but the draft
agreement from Brussels is problematic, Counselor Rosenzweig
said. Krause responded Congress' position is clear and the
U.S. is in a strong position, but the problem in the EU is
the transfer of data to other U.S. agencies. Krause noted he
had told Minister Schaeuble that the end result of the
European Court of Justice decision is that EU countries'
airlines would return to the status quo before the U.S.-EU
agreement, with airlines forced to provide the data of they

BERLIN 00002654 003 OF 003


wanted to fly to the U.S.


9. (C) MOI Official for Air and Sea Security Holger Sperlich
said PNR is "not such a big problem" because Lufthansa would
continue to provide PNR data to be able to continue its
flights, despite the risk of a lawsuit by data protection
authorities in the German state of North Rhine - Westphalia,
where Lufthansa is incorporated. Krause appeared angry to
hear German state, rather than federal, data protection
authorities might intervene. Counselor Rosenzweig asked
whether obtaining passenger consent might resolve the issue.
Sperlich replied MOI data protection officials said it would,
but North Rhine - Westphalia data protection officials had
said it would not. Krause said the state authorities should
leave the issue to the German federal government. He said
skeptical German data protection authorities did not realize
that EU travelers were better off with the agreement in
place, because it constrained U.S. use of the data. Sperlich
clarified that U.S. (and other, e.g., Asian) airlines flying
to the U.S. from Germany are not subject to the German
federal or state data protection rules that applied to
Lufthansa.

--------------
NEW GERMAN CT DATABASE
--------------


10. (C) Krause explained Interior Minister Schaeuble and the
interior ministers of the sixteen German federal states had
agreed September 4 on the framework for a combined
counterterrorism database after years of wrangling caused by
state/federal, law enforcement/security service, and
political party differences. The agreement is better than
MOI had previously expected due to the ministers' concerns
about the train bomb plot, Krause commented. The MOI's
research had shown that different German agencies had
different information about terrorist suspects -- even when
they thought they had shared their information. The MOI has
not yet drafted implementing legislation, Krause noted, but
the new database would have two tiers of access: virtually
all police and security personal would have access to check
names and obtain simple biographic data from all other
agencies. If they wanted additional information, they would
need to inquire with the office that held it. The database
would also include instructions, for example, on which people
to arrest, which to question, and which to simply report
having observed.

--------------
OTHER ISSUES
--------------


11. (C) Krause briefly touched on several issues he said
Minister Schaeuble would not discuss with Secretary Chertoff
in Washington. These issues included the Schengen
Information System, the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
Megaports, and Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative
(SECI). In the same vein, Krause said U.S. access to Europol
data hinged on Irish ratification of the third protocol; then
a basis for U.S.- data exchange could be resolved. Counselor
Rosenzweig observed there were Megaports enhancements on the
horizon, with first phase pilot projects in Hong Kong and
elsewhere.


12. (U) This message was cleared by Counselor Rosenzweig.
TIMKEN JR