Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERLIN2577
2006-08-31 16:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO BERLIN

Tags:  PTER PGOV GM 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5050
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002577 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO BERLIN

REF: A. BERLIN 2303

B. BERLIN 2234

Classified By: DCM John Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002577

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO BERLIN

REF: A. BERLIN 2303

B. BERLIN 2234

Classified By: DCM John Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The July 31 train bombing plot, the UK
airplane bombing plot, and the Hizballah-Israel war have
brought about public debate in Germany that gives us new
opportunities for increased counterterrorism cooperation
which you should explore in your discussions here. After
9/11, Germany began cooperating very closely with the U.S.
and enacted numerous CT legal improvements. While good
cooperation has always characterized the U.S.-German
counterterrorism relationship, both sides want to do more.
The Merkel government plans to take more robust national
measures and would like to intensify cooperation with us. In
particular, we have sought greater information sharing to
prevent the entry into both our countries of individuals
connected with terrorism. Unfortunately, data privacy
concerns and public perceptions (skeptical of a terrorist
attack in Germany and misunderstanding the U.S.) have limited
Germany's ability to act. The current debate within Germany
creates an opening for our two governments to right the
balance. End Summary.

Current U.S.-German CT Cooperation Solid...
--------------


2. (C) Numerous USG entities, from FBI to the several DHS
agencies on the ground here, cooperate well with their German
counterparts in the war on terror. To date, however, while
informal exchanges work well, often as a function of
excellent personal relations between USG officials and their
German counterparts, formal agreements or data exchanges have
been few, largely due to German concerns over maintaining
data privacy and a strong focus on working within the EU.
There has also been a concern that pushing hard for formal
agreements could disrupt the information flows that take
place and help us in the fight against the terrorists.

... Although with Obstacles to Improvement
--------------


3. (S) Press allegations and exaggerations (e.g., charges of
secret detention centers, allegations over renditions,

SIPDIS
discussions over German assistance to the U.S. during the
Iraq war) have raised some objections to the cooperation both

sides want. A special Bundestag Committee is investigating
some of these allegations; German officials say they
sometimes spend half their day reviewing old files for
information to give the Committee. The committee's creation
also cast a shadow over some informal information sharing,
with some officials now fearing the press or the Bundestag
may later disclose it, thus rendering German officials
personally liable. Some German law enforcement offices that
formerly provided information quickly and informally now
require letters rogatory.


4. (C) Another concern is EU and German Data Privacy policy.
Proposed EU regulations might compel data privacy
authorities' case-by-case approval of law enforcement data
sharing. This possibility could significantly disrupt
information flow. At the same time, a German initiative --
the so-called Pruem agreements -- tightens law enforcement
cooperation with select EU partners, enabling, for example,
nearly instant electronic sharing of fingerprints and other
key data. Meanwhile, Germany opposed a U.S.-proposed
fingerprint-sharing initiative. While we have made the point
at the Director General and working level, few German
officials see it as illogical and unwise for Germany to take
these steps with its EU partners, while holding back
cooperation with the U.S.


5. (SBU) German counterterrorism experts, including German
leaders in the fight against terror whom you will meet,
remain conscious of the risks Germany faces. But another
obstacle to better CT cooperation is public perception.
Years of post-9/11 polls show the German public is not as
concerned about terrorism as its leaders -- or the citizens
of countries like the UK or the Netherlands. One recent poll
said only thirty-one percent of Germans fear a terrorist
attack, 68 percent do not (the September 2002 numbers were 20
and 76, respectively). Opposition political parties (chiefly
the Free Democrats - FDP - and the Greens) have maintained
their traditional stress on strengthening civil liberties and
opposing stronger counterterrorism legal initiatives.

German Counterterrorism Landscape
--------------


BERLIN 00002577 002 OF 003



6. (C) The 9/11 connection to Hamburg spurred German legal
changes that greatly improved their counterterrorism regime,
e.g., new laws banned membership in foreign -- not just
German -- terrorist organizations and simplified law
enforcement and security agencies' access to data. But the
inability to convict some suspects and the remaining
obstacles to more simplified cooperation mean that Germany
has more to do. The Christian Democrat - Social Democrat
German coalition government that took office November 2005
pledged to strengthen Germany's counterterrorism laws. The
first positive results are in and more progress is to come.

-- A draft law broadens and simplifies German security
agencies' access to airline, travel, vehicle, bank, and
telecom data and renews sunset provisions from post-9/11 laws
set to expire January 2007.

-- The Interior Ministry plans a combined terrorist database
for the German Joint Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ) to
improve information sharing (police/security service and
federal/state).

-- The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) will
get more powers to investigate terrorism.

-- A new law re-implements the EU Arrest Warrant (the
Constitutional Court had called for better extradition
protection for German nationals, which the new law includes).
German officials tell us they now plan to extradite to Spain
Mamoun Darkazanli, a Hamburg-based German-Syrian national and
suspected al-Qaida financier.

-- A new law will broaden the Interior Minister's ability to
ban organizations. A court had overturned the ban of a
PKK-linked publication; the Ministry is rewriting the law to
re-impose the ban.

-- The government also plans an Aviation and Maritime
Security bill to address terrorist threats from the sky and
the seas.


7. (C) Some of the changes above address U.S. priorities.
Other changes we seek are in our suggested talking points
(below in para 11). Additional USG priorities include longer
prison sentences, lower burdens of proof for convictions and
asset freezes, tighter laws against leaking classified
information, and less onerous data privacy rules. A DoJ
priority has been the creation of a way for classified
material to be used and protected in court. In July the U.S.
Senate ratified the U.S.-German Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty. The Bundestag is to ratify it in October. This
agreement -- and the U.S.-EU Agreements on Mutual Legal
Assistance and Extradition -- will improve bilateral legal
cooperation. We understand the U.S.-EU agreement is to go to
the Senate for ratification soon.


8. (SBU) The Madrid and London train bombings raised the
concerns of the threat of "home-grown" terrorists. Germany
has one of the largest Muslim population in Europe -- 3.2
million, 2.4 million of whom are Turkish. For various
reasons, groups with foreign ancestry are overrepresented in
the unemployed and incarcerated. Interior Minister Wolfgang
Schaeuble is organizing Germany's first high-level "summit"
with German Muslim leaders on September 27, which will likely
include some groups known to have extremist views, such as
Milli Gurus. This initiative follows Chancellor Merkel's
July Integration Summit, which focused on steps Germany could
take to improve the conditions foreigners face in Germany.
These efforts come as some German Muslim leaders say they
have more interaction with the U.S. Embassy, via its Muslim
outreach, than with German officials. In our suggested
points (below in para 11),we ask you to address this issue
as well.

Recent Events Prompt Discussion of CT Policies
-------------- -


9. (S) The July 31 discovery of unexploded suitcase bombs in
German trains and the subsequent arrests in Germany and
Lebanon have triggered new public debate about terrorist
threats and what to do about them. Senior official, media,
and think tank contacts have told us this creates an opening
for the Merkel government and the U.S. to shift the political
balance in favor of more robust measures and cooperation.
German and U.S. agencies are cooperating closely and while
the investigation is ongoing, there are legitimate concerns
that the plot was not as amateurish as some initially
suspected. German officials offered a 50,000 Euro reward for
information leading to an arrest and one Bundestag member
called for fingerprinting visa applicants. Minister

BERLIN 00002577 003 OF 003


Schaeuble said "never has the threat been so close" and seeks
merged CT databases, more bomb-sniffing dogs, more video
surveillance in public places like train stations, and more
monitoring of the Internet, including of Middle Eastern
content. Chancellor Merkel supported the call for more video
surveillance. Schaeuble also called for the Muslim community
to report extremists in their midst but stressed Muslims are
not under general suspicion. Some German Muslims criticized
his stance but 16 Muslim organizations issued a statement
condemning the plot.


10. (C) Hizballah's battle with Israel prompted additional
German discussion: A pro-Hizballah demonstration in Berlin
led city authorities to restrict pro-Hizballah propaganda
(ref B). German media reported more than 6,000 people,
possibly including members of Hizballah, fled Lebanon to
Germany. These allegations, and the fact that some of those
arrested in the train bombing plot recently traveled to
Germany from Lebanon, underscore what we have been saying to
German officials about the need for information sharing
(Homeland Security Directive Six - HSPD-6). Neither side
should tolerate the possibility of attacks that could be
prevented if we share what we know about people who might
carry them out. The recent UK airplane bomb plot led
Minister Schaeuble to call for EU-wide restrictions on hand
luggage and prompted a group of EU interior ministers,
including Schaeuble, to call for improved EU CT efforts after
a meeting in London. Lastly, in August Germany arrested two
PKK leaders, but the other CT stories predominated German
discussion other than in the pro-PKK Kurdish media, where the
arrests were condemned.

Points to Make
--------------

11. (SBU) Your visit is on opportunity to sound the German
out on the possibility of moving now to formal exchanges in
specific areas. We propose you make the following points.

-- Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation is very strong,
although there are limits and obstacles. Effective law
enforcement cooperation requires formal and informal
information sharing. We applaud tighter German cooperation
with its EU partners, which shows German commitment to our
shared counterterrorism and law enforcement objectives.

-- But for Germany to take these steps while at the same time
complicating U.S.-German cooperation with data privacy and
other concerns makes no sense. The vast flows of U.S.-German
trade, investment, and traveling public argue for at least as
much U.S.-German cooperation.

-- A valuable 9/11 lesson is the need to share information
across bureaucratic lines. The U.S. and Germany have learned
this lesson because the U.S. has its NCTC, and Germany its
GTAZ, where data is exchanged like never before.

-- Similarly, we should systematically share information
internationally. We could thwart terrorist acts in Germany
by preventing the entry into Germany of those the U.S.
believes to be terrorists, and vice versa. We are prepared
to be as flexible as possible in how we implement such a
program.

-- We agree with Germany's efforts to increase integration of
its Muslim population, the vast majority of which oppose
terrorism. We hope Germany will expand dialogue with the
Muslim community, with a goals of mutual understanding and
finding a middle ground between Muslim concerns and German
conventions and practices.
KOENIG