DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRAMER'S MEETING IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001025

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM CVIS EUN GM BO
SUBJECT: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRAMER'S MEETING IN
BERLIN ON BELARUSIAN SANCTIONS


Classified By: DAS DAVID KRAMER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) (Summary) During his visit to Berlin on April 11,
Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer met with Rolf Nikel,
Deputy Director General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy,
and Global Issues at the Chancellery, and Rolf Welberts,
Office Director for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the
Commonwealth of Independent States at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and other German officials. DAS Kramer described the
purpose of his trip was to engage key European capitols on
coordinating well calibrated sanctions to slowly increase the
pressure against the Belarusian regime. Nikel and Welberts
agreed unity was paramount and while financial sanctions
might not have a large monetary impact their symbolic value
was very important. All parties also agreed that Russia was
not being very helpful and was unlikely to change its
behavior. (End Summary)

Nikel, Chancellery


2. (C) DAS Kramer; accompanied by EUR/UMB's Alan Purcell
and OFAC's Jennifer Fowler, applauded German and EU efforts
on the recently announced visa ban list. He said the U.S. is
taking a two pronged approach to Belarus. The first prong is
to support civil society, NGO's, the democratic opposition
and the flow of information inside Belarus; and the second
prong includes punitive targeted sanctions against members of
the regime. Kramer stated that the initial U.S. visa ban
list would include about 50 names, but the list would remain
open and further names could be added at any time. He
believed the combination of the visa ban and sanctions would
have a psychological effect of isolating those on the list
and causing others in the regime to worry if they are next.
Treasury OFAC official Jennifer Fowler described the
structure of U.S. targeted sanctions programs, saying a
program for Belarus could be similar to the sanction regime
used against Zimbabwe by both the U.S. and EU. She added
that while it is difficult to determine the amount of regime
leaders' assets in the U.S. financial system, imposing
sanctions would cause disruptions for those on the list and
would also raise the risk and cost of doing business for the
targeted individuals.


3. (C) Nikel agreed that the proposed sanctions may not
have a large material effect on the Belarusian regime, but
would have a large symbolic effect. Nikel thought the
subject of sanctions would be reviewed at the EU's next
General Affairs and External Relations meeting on May 15, and
no action was likely before this meeting. Nikel said that
Alexander Milinkevich, main opposition candidate in the
recent presidential election, stated his opposition to
blanket economic sanctions on Belarus as these would harm the
people but he spoke favorably of the proposed targeted
sanctions. Nikel also passed along that while Milinkevich
has been positively received in Berlin, Alexander Kozulin,
another opposition presidential candidate, did not make a
very good impression during his visit.


4. (C) Kramer commented that Russia's strong support for
Lukashenko and blaming the opposition for the recent violence
in Minsk were disappointing. Nikel agreed that Russia has
not been very helpful on Belarus, but we needed to keep
working with them since Russia is probably the only country
that could have a major impact on the Belarusian regime. In
the run-up to the G8 summit, Nikel thought the Russians might
become more accommodating to the West on a number of issues
but Belarus was unlikely to be included on this list. Nikel
speculated that the Belarusian regime's antipathy towards the
West was a key reason for Russia's continued strong support.
Both Nikel and Kramer agreed that Ukrainian President
Yushchenko's planned meeting with Lukashenko for the
Chernobyl anniversary was not a good idea and both
governments had demarched the Ukrainians on this issue.

Welberts, Ministry of Foreign Affairs


5. (C) DAS Kramer opened by saying he wanted to touch base
with key European capitols on a coordinated approach to
Belarus and explain Washington's dual track approach of
engaging the civil society while implementing targeted
punitive measures against the regime. Kramer stated that it
was very important that the U.S. and EU stay united on
Belarus. Fowler explained that initially the sanctions could
be limited to a small number of individuals; however, the
program could include the authority to designate additional

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individuals or entities at a later date to improve the
effectiveness of the sanctions against targeted individuals.
Welberts stated that while he supported sanctions, they would
largely be symbolic since Belarus had few assets in Germany
or in the EU. Welberts relayed that the Belarusian
Ambassador to Germany seemed far more concerned with the
possible names on the visa ban list than with the financial
sanctions.


6. (C) Michael Kindsgrab, Counselor for EU External
Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained that
the EU sanctions process was not as flexible as the U.S.
procedure. The EU needed first to create a common position
among the 25 members and then the Commission needed to create
a regulation based on this position which must then be
approved by the Council. Kindsgrab thought that the
Commission could have the regulatory framework for sanctions
ready by May. The actual names on the list would be a
political decision by the Council; however, the current
common position only mentions individuals. The inclusion of
entities would require a new position and regulation
according to Kindsgrab. Further, humanitarian exceptions
would also require additional work since they were not
possible under the current framework.


7. (C) Welberts thought Russia's recent announcement that
it would stop subsidizing gas deliveries to Belarus was a
ploy to help bring about the state union between Russia and
Belarus. Welberts said that Milinkevich shared this
interpretation and appealed to the EU to state its opposition
to such a union unless the Belarusian people freely voted for
it. While Welberts thought Lukashenko remained in control,
the combined pressure from the West and Russia had clearly
surprised him. Regine Hess, Belarus desk officer at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that Lukashenko's control
is probably not complete because his administration does not
always strictly follow his orders and occasionally softens
the implementation of his orders.


8. (U) DAS Kramer cleared this message.
CLOUD