(C) BELIZE: PM MUSA ON GUATEMALA-VENEZUELA UNSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELIZE 000562

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN - JASON MACK, BEN ZIFF
WHA/PPC - MICHAEL PUCCETTI
G/TIP - LINDA BROWN
USOAS - TIM DUNN, TIM WRAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PBTS SMIG UNSC KWMN OAS BH GU
VZ, XL, XK, XM
SUBJECT: (C) BELIZE: PM MUSA ON GUATEMALA-VENEZUELA UNSC
BIDS; KEEN TO MAKE PROGRESS ON TIP RANKING

REF: A. BELIZE 243


B. BELIZE 459

C. STATE 85511

D. BELIZE 561

Classified By: Ambassador Dieter for reason 1.4(b) (d)

SUMMARY


1. (C) Belize appreciates U.S. assurances that its
recent TIP Tier 3 ranking is not linked to its
unwillingness to support Guatemala's candidacy for a
seat on the UNSC, and will make a concerted effort to
implement the 60-day mini-plan, according to Prime
Minister (PM) Said Musa. Guatemala should show good
faith in resolving its longstanding border dispute with
Belize by moving forward with resettlement of the
inhabitants of Santa Rosa; this would allow more CARICOM
members to support its bid for a seat on the UNSC.
End Summary.

Dispelling Allegations of Linkage
--------------


2. (C) Amb. Dieter met privately with Prime Minister
(PM) Said Musa and Foreign Minister Eamon Courtenay the
morning of June 21 to emphasize the following points:

(A) The U.S. was concerned by recent media reports
indicating that the Government of Belize (GoB) believed
that its recent ranking by the USG on Tier 3 with respect
to trafficking-in-persons (TIP) (Reftel C) "was not a
coincidence" but had been in part a result of the GoB's
opposition to Guatemala, and support for Venezuela, to
become a member of the UNSC (Reftels A, B).

(B) In fact, within the Department, G/TIP was a largely
autonomous, one-issue office which evaluates countries'
TIP performances irrespective of any other issues or
policies. There was no connection or linkage between
Belize's Tier 3 ranking and the GoB's position on
Guatemala's or Venezuela's candidacy for a UNSC seat.

(C) We realized that the GoB was aware of the negative
implications for Belize if it were to remain on Tier 3
and become subject to sanctions, particularly with
respect to freezing IMET and FMF. This was an outcome
we all hoped to avoid.

(D) The focus now should be on implementation of the
60-day mini-plan, with the objective of having Belize
removed from Tier 3. The Embassy would assist and
support in any way it could, but the GoB would need
to take the initiative to move the effort forward.
The U.S. recognized that the GoB's resources were
stretched thin. However we hoped that, in
implementing the mini-plan, the GoB would move ahead
and give timely responses.

(E) The U.S. hoped that, through implementation of the
mini-plan, the GoB and USG could "put things back on
an even keel". But in any case, that the Tier 3
ranking had come during the run-up to the UNSC
membership vote had been purely coincidental: there
was no linkage between the two.

Belize Committed to Progress on TIP
--------------


3. (C) PM Musa then made the following points:

(A) He welcomed the opportunity to meet, and
appreciated the assurance that Belize's Tier 3 ranking
had been unrelated to the GoB's position with respect
to the Guatemala-Venezuela competition for a UNSC seat.

(B) His Government took the Tier 3 ranking very seriously:
it had been the subject of a "full-blown" discussion in
the most recent cabinet meeting. His Government intended
to pursue counter-TIP efforts "every way possible." The
GoB accepted that there was a TIP problem, and would do
"whatever we can" to remedy matters.

(C) As a first step, cabinet had agreed to designate
the Chief Executive Officer in the Ministry of Human
Development, Ms. Anita Zetina, to head the TIP Task
Force; Community Development Officer Bertha Fuentes
would assist her. The Immigration Department also would
play an important role. With USG assistance, the GoB
would "work our way through this"; Belize wanted to be
removed from Tier 3.

GoB Opposes Guatemala Because of Lack of Progress in Border
Dispute
-------------- --------------



4. (C) PM Musa then said that he had been misquoted in
recent media reports: he never had said that Belize actively
supported Venezuela's bid for a seat on the UNSC; he merely
had said there was no way that the GoB could support
Guatemala.
It would be "helpful with CARICOM" if Guatemala "showed good
faith" in making progress toward resolution of the border
dispute. In particular, progress was needed in relocation of
the inhabitants of the Santa Rosa community. He appreciated
the USG's financial contribution toward relocation, and hoped
the U.S. would use its influence to move Guatemala forward.


5. (C) Amb. Dieter then noted that he had met on June 20
with the Director of the Office of the General Secretariat
in the Adjacency Zone, Miguel Trinidad, who had been
visiting Belize City. Trinidad had said that the OAS was
having difficulty in identifying land in Guatemala to
resettle the Santa Rosa inhabitants. One possible site had
proven infeasible because of land title disputes. The OAS
currently was considering three or four other parcels;
however, the owners had inflated their asking prices.
Amb. Dieter then observed to PM Musa that Belize and
Guatemala both appeared to have confidence in Trinidad's
objectivity and impartiality, and that he hoped the U.S.
would be in a good position to lend support to its friends
in seeking a resolution of the longstanding border dispute.
The U.S. had been concerned by reports that the GoB had
lobbied against Guatemala's candidacy for the UNSC;
Venezuela's candidacy was not in the interest of Latin
America, other Western Hemisphere nations or the UN.


6. (C) PM Musa then reiterated that the GoB was "not
lobbying in support of Venezuela", but rather had "made
its position clear" that it could not support Guatemala
without progress on the border issue and movement on
Santa Rosa.


7. (C) Amb. Dieter then noted that the U.S. was not alone
in opposing Venezuela's candidacy for the UNSC; most of
the Europeans and many Asian countries shared our views.
Interestingly, PM Musa then acknowledged that, viewed
objectively, Guatemala's chances of winning probably were
good. Courtenay said that Guatemalan Foreign Minister Briz
seemed to have the mistaken impression that Belize actively
had lobbied CARICOM to support Venezuela; this had not been
the case. To his knowledge, none of the Caribbean countries
had told Guatemala definitively which way they would vote:
"we need to see good faith progress on the border issue" for
Guatemala to "win support from the Caribbean."


8. (C) Amb. Dieter noted that Venezuela also had a
longstanding border dispute with Guyana, another member of
CARICOM. But the broader question was which country's
membership on the UNSC would better serve the interests of
Latin America and the nations of the Western Hemisphere. In
light of the Venezuelan Government's recent provocative
behavior and international profile, including its
mistreatment of U.S. diplomatic personnel, the answer seemed
clear.
DIETER