Serbia - No Participation in Status Talks

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000097

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KDEM SR PBTS PGOV PNAT
SUBJECT: Serbia - No Participation in Status Talks
if Kosovo Independence Presumed


Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) Key Serbian negotiators on Kosovo again
told Contact Group (CG) representatives that the
GOS would likely withdraw from status talks if
independence was "presumed" at the outset. The
GOS presented a non-paper detailing their
objections to CG draft position papers (text
below),which they assert are based on a
presumption of independence as the only potential
outcome of status talks. On decentralization, the
GOS strongly denied any Serb interest in Kosovo's
ethnic partition and emphasized that its new
proposal on decentralization was far more
"realistic" than the April 2004 Belgrade plan.
End Summary.

Kosovo Independence: A Non-Starter for GOS
--------------


2. (U) On January 20, Aleksander Samardzic,
Vladeta Jankovic, Dusan Batakovic, Leon Kojen,
leading members of the Serbian negotiating team on
Kosovo, met with Contact Group representatives.
Citing three recently circulated internal CG
papers, the GOS representatives strongly objected
to formulations in those papers that they believe
"presume independence" for Kosovo. They called
the tone of the papers "disturbing," said they
were a "non-starter" for Belgrade, and implied
they were a recipe for Serbian withdraw from final
status talks. President Tadic's adviser Kojen was
especially emphatic, warning that an emphasis on
independence at the beginning of the process "will
raise the issue of Serbia's participation in
talks." Instead, Kojen argued that the process
should tackle practical issues -- such as
decentralization and protection of holy sites --
in order to build good will before the "really
tough" issue of status was raised. Batakovic said
that the GOS viewed the Kai Eide's report as a
minimum starting point and that the CG papers
represent "steps backward" from that report.
(Comment: This is the second time key GOS
representatives have warned that an a priori
presumption of independence by the CG would lead
to a Belgrade boycott of status talks. The first
instance occurred in December, after the UK
Ambassador in Belgrade delivered an alleged CG
demarche ruling out the potential return of Kosovo
to Serbia. End Comment)

Serbs Claim More Realistic Approach to
Decentralization
-------------- --------------
---


3. (U) Samardzic said that Belgrade's thinking on
decentralization had become significantly more
"realistic" in the year and a half since the 2004
Belgrade Plan was presented. Having digested
international and K-Albanian feedback, he and
Kojen categorically assured us that Belgrade no
longer sought state-like institutions (parliament,
executive council) that would unite Serb-majority
municipalities. They also categorically denied
any Belgrade interest in the ethnic partition of
Kosovo. They called for "flexible" implementation
of decentralization;" i.e., the Serbs would have
no objection either to all municipalities in
Kosovo enjoying the same competencies or to
differentiated competencies for Serb-majority
municipalities (as is the case in Spain, Samardzic
claimed). All expressed concern about the recent
"platform" (septel) released by the Albanians of
southern Serbia and rejected any linkage between
that region and any aspect of the Kosovo status
process.


4. (U) Samardzic and Kojen expressed concern
that the draft agenda for the 1/25 Vienna meeting
was far too ambitious for a one-day session.


Text of Non-Paper
--------------

Some Comments on Three Contact Group Draft Non-
Papers (Decentralization; Serbian Religious
Heritage; International Presence)

General: The most significant feature of the
three draft non-papers is their pervasive
assumption that the question of Kosovo's future
status can only be resolved in one way by granting
Kosovo some form of independent statehood. The
assumption is sometimes quite explicit, as in the
decentralization non-paper, which starts by
mentioning "Kosovo's possible independence" (p.
1),but then quickly moves to talking about "Serb
communes [i.e., municipalities] on either side of
the future border and the "cooperation [that]
would mitigate the reality of the separation by a
border" (p. 2),the border in question clearly
being that between Serbia and the future
independent state of Kosovo. The point is driven
home by the next sentence which discusses the
possibility of the "free movement of persons
between the two countries, or the establishment
even of a 'mini-Schengen' between them" (p. 2).

Particular formulations such as those just quoted
might not matter so much if the underlying
conception of decentralization were genuinely
neutral on the issue of status. But this is
unfortunately not the case: decentralization is
primarily seen as a way of reconciling the Kosovo
Serb community to an independent Kosovo and even
as a prelude to creating an "institutional link"
between Belgrade and Pristina.1

In the same way, the non-paper on Serbian
religious heritage poses the whole issue from the
perspective of an independent Kosovo. For example,
it explicitly mentions and rejects
extraterritoriality for some of the Serbian
Orthodox churches and monasteries on the ground
that this "would not be in keeping with the idea
of a multiethnic Kosovo in which all the
communities would have their place". There might
instead be "special rights" protecting "Serbian
religious heritage", but only "within the
framework of a single State" (p. 2). The single
state mentioned here could only be a future
independent Kosovo, as extraterritoriality would
be unnecessary if it were recognized that the
churches and monasteries in question are situated,
as in fact they are, on Serbian (and Serbian-
Montenegrin) territory.

The non-paper on international presence is
somewhat less explicit than the other two, but it
is still noticeable that the question discussed in
most detail, the powers of a possible
International Community Representative in Kosovo,
is posed by comparing the future Kosovo with two
independent, internationally recognized states,
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, that have had
such a representative for a number of years. Thus,
the same implication seems to be there: the future
status of Kosovo will be some form of
independence.



1. It is only if decentralization is seen as
taking place within an independent Kosovo that it
makes sense to tie it, as the draft non-paper
does, with Albanian demands regarding the
municipalities of Presevo and Bujanovac in central
Serbia. If the assumption is not made, there is no
reason to make the connection: for the Albanians
in Presevo and Bujanovac already exercise all the
rights that are now denied to the Kosovo Serbs and
that decentralization is supposed to restore to
them.


From the point of view of Belgrade, the assumption
in the draft non-papers that the future status of
Kosovo will be some form of independence rather
than some kind of broad autonomy within Serbia is
not only unwelcome, but poses a procedural
dilemma. The rationale generally offered for
starting the status process with specific issues
such as decentralization, Serbian religious
heritage, etc. is that, unlike the question of
status itself, these are the issues where it is
easier to find at least some common ground and
thus a solution that could be acceptable to both
Belgrade and Pristina. So, it is often argued, the
question of status should be postponed until some
of these important but more specific issues have
been resolved in a mutually acceptable manner,
paving the way for the discussion of the more
difficult status issues. This in fact seems to be
the view of both the Special Envoy and the Contact
Group countries.

If this rationale is accepted, as it is accepted
by Belgrade at least with respect to the
decentralization process, it makes little sense to
approach specific issues by making very definite
assumptions about status. For this will block the
talks at the very start, by inevitably raising
status issues that would then tend to monopolize
all attention and effectively prevent fruitful
discussion of matters where there might be some
common ground. Thus, the dilemma for Belgrade, but
also for Pristina, the Special Envoy and the
Contact Group, is whether to start with specific
issues, looking for some common ground, or to
address the question of status directly.

Belgrade is prepared for either alternative, but
if the first one (specific issues) is chosen by
the Special Envoy, the Contact Group non-papers on
specific matters can only play a useful role if
all assumptions about the future status of Kosovo
are carefully avoided.
Unless this is done, talks on matters such as
decentralization or the Serbian religious heritage
will fail at the very start, and this is an
outcome that everyone involved has good reason to
avoid.

Further comments given below on the two draft non-
papers illustrate Belgrade's approach on the first
of the two alternatives mentioned above - where
discussion of specific issues is taken as far as
it can fruitfully go without involving the
question of status.

Decentralization: In line with the position the
Serbian delegation presented in Vienna in
September 2005 and with the Eide report, Belgrade
insists on the following four crucial points,
mentioned here without further elaboration: (a)
new, wider competences for the Serb majority
municipalities; (b) the setting up of new Serb-
majority municipalities in a number of areas
(Northern Mitrovica, Central Kosovo, Kosovo
Pomoravlje region, and Metohija); ( c) the
establishment of "horizontal links" between such
Serb-majority municipalities; (d) direct
institutional links of these Serb-majority
municipalities with Belgrade.2

Decentralization in this sense is clearly a matter
of meaningful self government at the local level,
and has the twin purpose of restoring normal
living conditions for the Serb community in Kosovo
and thus also making possible the return of a
significant number of lDP's from central Serbia.
It does not exhaust, however, the legitimate
political demands of the Serb community. There is
the obvious need for the Kosovo Serbs to have some
institutional guarantees at the level of central
government, particularly in the Kosovo parliament.
A good proposal here would be that, where matters
of vital interest to the Serb community are
concerned, no decision can be taken in the Kosovo
parliament without the majority of the Serb
representatives voting in its favor. And there is
also the issue of the overall constitutional
position of the Serb community in Kosovo, which is
an aspect of the general status issue, i.e. of the
constitutional relationship to be negotiated
between Serbia and its province of Kosovo. Both
these issues, however, can be addressed
independently of decentralization, and after some
commonly agreed solution has been found for that
issue.

A very surprising feature of the decentralization
non-paper is the attempt to link decentralization
with "cross-border inter-communal cooperation" and
"cross-border relations" generally. This is a new
departure, and one that has little support in the
realities of the situation in Kosovo. For example,
these ideas are completely foreign to the very
balanced and widely accepted recommendations on
decentralization contained in the Eide report.
Given that the cooperation envisaged in the draft
non-paper would clearly be between communes (i.e.,
municipalities) belonging to two different
independent states, any attempt to link
decentralization in Kosovo with such "cross-border
cooperation" is completely unacceptable to
Belgrade.

Serbian religious heritage: Even apart from the
fact that the draft paper assumes an independent
Kosovo, the solutions proposed here for the
protection of the Serbian religious heritage are
grievously inadequate. The non-paper explicitly
concentrates on the protection of "buildings and
material goods", while the Serbian Orthodox Church
and the Serbian political leadership insist on the
protection of living religious communities, which
certainly includes but goes beyond the protection
of buildings and material goods. Given that more
than 150 Orthodox churches and monasteries have
been completely or partly destroyed after 1999, it
is necessary to protect the most important
Orthodox churches and monasteries in Albanian-
majority areas (Pecka patrijarsija, Visoki Decani,
Bogorodica Ljeviska, Sveti Arhandeli, Devic) both
by creating "safe zones" around them,3 as
advocated in the Eide report, and also by linking
them institutionally with the Serb majority
municipalities in Kosovo. In other words, these
churches and monasteries with their "safe zones"
should belong territorially to the "Serbian
entity" in Kosovo, together with all the Serb-
majority municipalities in the province (though it
should be added, to avoid misunderstanding, that
the Serbian entity as envisaged here would not be
a compact, continuous territory).

The draft non-paper envisages the formation of a
"High Authority" or "supervisory council" that
would have extensive powers in arbitrating
disputes involving the Serbian Orthodox Church in
Kosovo, "could serve as a facilitator for
international donors", and could even "be
responsible for the management and maintenance of
the buildings" (i.e., of the most important
churches and monasteries). It is important to
stress that such a proposal is fundamentally
unacceptable to the Serbian Orthodox Church and
would in fact constitute a very serious
infringement of basic religious freedoms. The only
reasonable view, given the brutal persecution of
the Orthodox faith in Kosovo after 1999, is that
the Serbian Orthodox Church in the province should
in any case retain its present administrative ties
with the Ministry of Religious Affairs in
Belgrade.

16 January 2006

3 Such "safe zones" should comprise both the
estates now owned by those churches and
monasteries, and the estates they lost due to
nationalization after 1945 and should now
rightfully recover through denationalization.

MOORE