Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE967
2006-06-19 12:21:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

Serbian Political Roundup - Crumbling Coalition?

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL PBTS PNAT SR MW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3375
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #0967/01 1701221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191221Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8826
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000967 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PBTS PNAT SR MW
SUBJECT: Serbian Political Roundup - Crumbling Coalition?

REF: A) Belgrade 860 B) Belgrade 862 C) 2005 Belgrade 467

BELGRADE 00000967 001.2 OF 002


Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000967

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PBTS PNAT SR MW
SUBJECT: Serbian Political Roundup - Crumbling Coalition?

REF: A) Belgrade 860 B) Belgrade 862 C) 2005 Belgrade 467

BELGRADE 00000967 001.2 OF 002


Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) In a June 1 press conference, Serbian Prime Minister
Kostunica officially responded to the final tally of the Montenegrin
referendum, and addressed several key issues facing his governent:
the formal dissolution of the State Union, he upcoming cabinet
reshuffle, and a new constittion. With the dissolution a reality
and constittional talks again underway, conventional wisdom i
Belgrade is that parliamentaryelections are likely in the fall.
End Summary.

PM Announces Changes
--------------


2. (U) Kostunica held a rare press conference June 1 to address the
results of the Montenegro referendum and announce pending changes to
his cabinet following the resignation of DPM Labus over the EU's
decision to suspend SAA talks because of non-cooperation with ICTY.
Kostunica's remarks highlighted the EU's recognition of the fairness
of the process, but stopped short of recognizing Montenegro's
independence. (Note: Serbia subsequently recognized Montenegro on
June 15. End note.) Most of the government's work, though, has
been in reaffirming Serbia's continuance of SaM's international
legal identity. President Tadic has sent a letter to the UN
claiming as much and reaffirming Serbia's inheritance of SaM's UN
seat and membership in key IO's, including the OSCE, based on the
provisions of the state union charter. Montenegro has similarly
referenced the charter in a letter to the UN asking for membership,
thus implicitly recognizing Serbia's successor claims.

Institutional Change
--------------


3. (U) In addition to these international legal formalities,
Kostunica is facing a major overhaul of the institutions of
government. Since the state union was the successor to the FRY, it
retained many traditional state-level functions of government,
including all competencies of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign
Affairs and control of the armed forces through the Supreme Defense
Council. Tadic and Kostunica have already sparred over the

president's control of the military. The president is the commander
and chief of the military under Serbia Republic law, but his
responsibilities beyond that are not defined. Some in DS have
expressed concern that the PM might seek to legislate a larger role
for himself or the Defense Minister in controlling the military.
Tadic, Stankovic, and now acting CHOD Ponos have all told Washington
visitors in recent weeks unequivocally that the President is the
CinC, but lines of authority are still legally murky.


4. (SBU) On June 8, the GoS issued a formal decree abolishing
state union agencies and institutions and transferring some
competencies to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Serbia. The
abolished institutions include SaM Parliament, President, Council of
Ministers, Supreme Defense Council and the SaM court. Of particular
note, the SaM Human and Minority Rights Ministry is now transferred
to the Republic of Serbia as an executive agency of the government
(vice a ministry). Serbian Justice Minister Stojkovic told local
press that of all the ministries of SaM, only defense and foreign
affairs ministries remain in operation. The National Council for
Cooperation to The Hague Tribunal, the Coordinating Body for
Southern Serbia, and the Coordinating Center for Kosovo and Metohija
will continue to work for the Serbian republic, with Ljajic
continuing at the helm of the first two bodies and Sanda
Raskovic-Ivic likely to remain at the head of the CCK. The decree
recommended a 45-day deadline (a political commitment, not a legal
requirement) for the Serbian parliament to adopt amendments to the
laws on ministries and government, which would allow for personnel
changes including the minister positions in Defense and MFA.

Cabinet Reshuffle In the Works
--------------


5. (SBU) There has been little debate over keeping Defense
Minister Stankovic, but speculation is rampant that FONMIN Draskovic
might be replaced once the amendments are made. SPS and Draskovic
have been bitter enemies for years, and SPS leadership has
threatened to withhold support from the government unless Draskovic
is removed. Kostunica's 45-day window means Draskovic may well be
safe until the end of July, when summer recess could prolong his
tenure even further. If/when Draskovic leaves, though, his 3 SPO
MP's likely would leave with him, which would further erode the
GoS's parliamentary majority.


6. (SBU) Meanwhile, the Radicals have intensified their rhetoric
against the government. Most recently, the SRS has protested the
well-publicized efforts of G-17 Plus to bar the party from politics
on the grounds that its MP's are inciting racism and promoting hate
speech in the parliament. The SRS has also protested what it calls
the "dirty deal" the government has completed with the 45-day delay,

BELGRADE 00000967 002.2 OF 002


and has walked out of its seats in all parliamentary committees.
Due to the Byzantine make-up of the committees, some are chaired by,
or are staffed in the majority by, the opposition SRS - notably the
legislative, administrative, and finance committees. With their
walk-out from these critical functional committees, any real work by
the parliament is effectively hamstrung.


7. (SBU) In addition to these former state union-level
appointments, the PM faces a struggle to appoint the G-17 candidate
to replace Labus, Agriculture Minister Ivana Dulic-Markovic.
Dulis-Markovic is also under attack from SPS, which initially vowed
it would never let her be appointed but later clarified that it
simply wanted her out of the AGMIN job (Dinkic's threat to bring
down the government if she was not appointed seems to have
effectively called their bluff). Our contacts have told us
privately that SPS will support Dulic-Markovic as DPM, but are so
far holding firm against Draskovic.

The Constitution (Again)
--------------


8. (SBU) Kostunica has revived his call for a new Serbian
constitution, a need made more pressing by Montenegro's departure.
He tasked Speaker of Parliament Markovic to begin consultations on
reaching consensus between two drafts that have languished in
parliament for about 20 months (ref c). Initial rumors indicated
the PM might use the constitutional discussions to try to create an
indirectly-elected president, thereby effectively removing Tadic
from office in advance of fall elections. Tadic, however, has
refused to discuss the constitution with Markovic and is calling for
the GOS to follow the legal requirements to alter the constitution,
which are essentially impossible to meet. (Note: Tadic's current
term runs through 2009, but he would have to step down if he wanted
to compete for the PM job - though contacts in his office have
hinted he's happy in his current position. End note.)

Since then, though, there are a number of indicators that DS, DSS,
and perhaps G-17 (in the person of "bridge builder" Dinkic) are
working on a compromise that would allow a constitutional text to be
agreed and elections called with democratic parties aligned together
- either loosely or in coalition. Contacts tell us Tadic and
Kostuinica met privately on June 3, presumably to discuss these
issues. Media were not informed of the meeting.

Elections Timetable
--------------


9. (SBU) The institutional challenges in the dissolution of the
state union, along with a series of political setbacks for the GoS
(most notably the EU's suspension of SAA talks over the government's
failure to produce Mladic) and the looming deadline for Kosovo
status talks have thrown into stark relief the fragility of the
Kostunica government. The referendum, in particular, seems to have
finally set into motion machinery that makes early elections all but
inevitable.


10. (SBU) There are several possible triggers for new elections.
If parliament, which would have to be called into extraordinary
session, cannot garner sufficient support for the legislative
changes necessary to formalize the devolution of state union
competencies to the Republic of Serbia (which the SRS walkout makes
more likely),Speaker Markovic would probably have to dissolve the
parliament and call new elections. Even if these things are worked
out, G-17 leader Dinkic has already put the GoS on notice that it
will withdraw support in September if SAA talks have not restarted.
Finally, if a deal is reached on a constitution in the next month or
two, the government could call a constitutional assembly to vote in
the new document, which would force new elections at all levels of
government (parliament, local elections, and the presidency -
depending on how that office is treated in the new constitution).
This last option will require creative interpretation of the current
(Milosevic) constitution, which makes constitutional change a
daunting prospect.


11. (SBU) If elections are announced by the beginning of September
- allowing for some bureaucratic inertia and the ubiquitous European
August holiday - we would expect an election date sometime in late
October or early November (the date must be not less than 45, but
not more than 90, days after the election is called). We will
report septel on the interplay between election calculus and Kosovo
status talks.

POLT