KOSOVO: GETTING REAL WITH SERBIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000964

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: GETTING REAL WITH SERBIAN
OPINION MAKERS

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: COMs of Contact Group countries
and the UN told influential Serbian opinion
makers that the GOS must do more to prepare its
citizens for the likely outcome of Kosovo's final
status. The UN and Contact Group stand ready to
assist Serbia to get through the Kosovo
settlement and become a stable, strong, and
prosperous European state. List of Serbian
attendees in paragraph 11. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On June 14, at the French Residence, the
Ambassador and the Director of the UN Office in
Belgrade joined the French Ambassador over lunch
with influential Serbian opinion makers to convey
the message that (1) the Contact Group fully
supports the UNOSEK-led Kosovo final status
process, (2) the GOS -- and by implication other
opinion makers -- must do more right now to
prepare Serbs for the likely outcome of Kosovo's
final status and (3) the Contact Group and UN
stand ready to assist Serbia to get through the
Kosovo settlement and become a stable, strong,
and prosperous European state. The group of
prominent media, religious and policy leaders was
quite receptive to the frank nature of the
discussion and wished their government was
equally forthcoming about the realities of the
future status of Kosovo.

UN lays it out
--------------


3. (SBU) UN Office Director Harston reported that
UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari expects the status of
Kosovo to be resolved by the end of 2006, and
that in mid-July he will present a report to the
UNSC containing "no surprises." Harston said
"messages have been clear" concerning final
status and that, unfortunately, Ahtisaari could
cite almost no progress from recent UNOSEK-led
talks in Vienna. Both Ambassadors Polt and
Pernet voiced unequivocal support for the UNOSEK
process and Harston averred that UNOSEK was in
close contact and coordination with the Contact
Group.

GOS strategy is ineffective and unclear
--------------


4. (SBU) The consensus of the attendees was that
the GOS is not open enough regarding its
rationale and expectations from the talks, and
that the GOS negotiating team is not presenting
its case effectively. Ivan Vejvoda said the GOS
team had a "seminar" approach to the talks, as if
they are discussing an academic case study rather
than pragmatic solutions. Ambassador Pernet
noted how the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) had
been able to formulate and publish a platform
while the GOS had not. DANAS Editor Ramac said
the SOC had a history of being more willing to
engage, citing (some in) the SOC's willingness to
encourage dialogue and cooperation with UNMIK and
KFOR after 1999. Father Irinej said he was
heartened by the lack of "public outrage" to his
June 7 interview with Belgrade daily Glas
Javnosti. (Note: Irinej was the first SOC
official to imply publicly that there must be
preparations made for the possibility of an
independent Kosovo. End note.)

Serbian public is not engaged with negotiations
-------------- --


6. (SBU) Ambassador Polt stressed that when
Kosovo's final status is determined, the lack of
practical engagement by the GOS will likely lead
to a settlement package being presented which the
majority of the IC would find acceptable. It
would then again be up to Tadic, Kostunica and
other GOS officials to choose to frame the post-
settlement reaction in a productive manner or
not. Ambassador Pernet said one of the most
troubling aspects of how the GOS is handling
negotiations now is the "lack of public debate"
on the issue. POLITIKA editor Smajlovic agreed,
saying she was "ashamed" that frank discussions

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on Kosovo status are occurring at foreign
embassies in Belgrade, but not with the GOS.


7. (SBU) Smajlovic nevertheless expressed dismay
at the CG's implied "act of God" approach to the
negotiations outcome and said that it appears to
Serbs that the end of the process is already
known to the international community. She agreed
that the DS and DSS will suffer politically if
the lack of public debate would lead to confusion
and outrage if Kosovo independence is announced.
Ivanovic said cynically that perhaps "six years
of democracy" is not enough for people to know to
demand more transparency. Vejvoda said the GOS
itself does not understand that there is a "cost
for peace and stability" which is the abandonment
of extreme positions.

GOS has proven inflexible
--------------


8. (SBU) Harston expressed dismay that both
President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica were
presenting the same inflexible position on Kosovo
status as Milosevic did with eastern Slavonia,
and that on Kosovo, the public stance of the DS
and DSS is no different from that of the
Radicals. Harston also alleged that Kostunica and
Tadic are unwilling to meet with UN or other
international representatives one-on-one to avoid
being seen as "complicit" in a final outcome, and
that both men use the common DS-DSS approach as
cover to end any honest discussions of Kosovo
status. Kosovo Serb leader Ivanovic added that
the GOS negotiators cannot hope to achieve any
measure of success with "just saying no," and
that it "more important to get than to ask."
Unlike most negotiations, Ivanovic said, the GOS
sounds less willing to compromise publicly than
it is in private discussions. Ivanovic indicated
this was a sign of a "hands-off" and divested
approach by Tadic and Kostunica to the actual
negotiations, and that the (increasingly
desperate) negotiators are left in charge of the
process.

Possible outcomes
--------------


9. (U) Vejvoda sought to frame a possible Serbian
reaction to Kosovo independence in a historical
context. He said that when PM Djindjic made
efforts in January 2003 to address Kosovo status,
it was the international community that had said
his moves were premature. However, despite
public opinion being against compromise or
reduced sovereignty over Kosovo, Vejvoda said
that there was a "sense of relief" among the
public that the issue was finally being addressed
at all. He suggested that the recent referendum
in Montenegro shows that sometimes inflexible
rhetoric can be followed by practical, if
grudging, steps forward.


10. (SBU) Comment: The purpose of this lunch was
to impress upon influential policy makers a
similarly realistic message we tell Tadic and
Kostunica: the Contact Group and UNOSEK are
unified, and time is overdue to prepare for "the
day after" a settlement of Kosovo status. The
GOS is either unwilling or unable (or both) to
inform its citizens of the probable outcome for
Kosovo, but this should not deter other opinion
makers from working to help the Serbian people
better understand an unwelcome reality. The
international community, in turn, would do its
part to demonstrate its commitment to help Serbia
- whether we are joined by the GOS or not - to
help Kosovo Serbs on the ground and to move
forward and become a stable and prosperous
European state.




11. (U) Attendees:
US/France/UN:
- French Ambassador Hugues PERNET (host)

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- Ambassador Michael POLT
- Mr. Julian HARSTON, Director, UN Office in
Belgrade
- LTC Thierry NAVREZ, French Defense Attache
- Mr. Didier LARROQUE, PolOff, French Embassy
(notetaker)
- Mr. Demian SMITH, PolOff, US Embassy
(notetaker)

Serbs:
- Bishop-Elect Father Irinej DOBRIJEVIC, Serbian
Orthodox Church
- Mr. Ivan VEJVODA, Director, Balkan Trust for
Democracy
- Ms. Ljiljana SMAJLOVIC, Editor-in-Chief,
POLITIKA
- Mr. Mihajlo RAMAC, Editor-in-Chief, DANAS
- Ms. Duska ANASTASIJEVIC, Reporter, VREME
- Mr. Oliver IVANOVIC, Chair, Serb List for
Kosovo and Metohija

POLT