Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE861
2006-05-31 06:39:00
SECRET
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

RESPONSE TO STATE 80071: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS

Tags:  PINR PBTS PGOV PNAT PREL YI SR 
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VZCZCXYZ0024
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBW #0861/01 1510639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 310639Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8689
INFO RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 3475
S E C R E T BELGRADE 000861 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2031
TAGS: PINR PBTS PGOV PNAT PREL YI SR
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO STATE 80071: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS
DECISION (C-RE6-00623)

REF: A. (1) BELGRADE 856


B. (2) BELGRADE 786

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


A. (U) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES
S E C R E T BELGRADE 000861

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2031
TAGS: PINR PBTS PGOV PNAT PREL YI SR
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO STATE 80071: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS
DECISION (C-RE6-00623)

REF: A. (1) BELGRADE 856


B. (2) BELGRADE 786

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


A. (U) POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES

1) (S) DO KOSTUNICA AND/OR TADIC THINK KOSOVO'S
INDEPENDENCE CAN BE PREVENTED?

(S) No. Kostunica thinks he can postpone the decision and in
the meantime lead the final result away from independence.
He continues to tell us emphatically that he will never
accept an independent Kosovo. Tadic thinks he can wait out
the result and survive politically, especially if the
democratic forces close ranks before a settlement. Both men
have certainly heard loud and clear the private messages from
USG and other members of the CG with regards to our belief
that independence will be the outcome. Both men will attempt
to either protect themselves from the expected backlash from
the Serbian electorate (or in the case of Kostunica, draw on
international law and regional neighbors to either forestall
independence or complicate its imposition). We also note
recent polls suggesting a backlash will not be so intense.
Kostunica continues to tell us about his private
conversations with leaders (Russia, Romania, Bulgaria,
perhaps Macedonia) and cites some western European leaders as
offering concern that the process is rushing too fast towards
independence. Kostunica might use this perceived discord
among the international community in the hope of delaying or
derailing the independence process. Tadic is not so
creative. We do not rule out Kostunica resigning, or calling
for a referendum, in the event of Kosovo independence.

(S) DO THEY BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE WILL BACK
SERBIA'S POSITION ON KOSOVO IF BELGRADE PUTS FORTH A GOOD
FAITH EFFORT DURING THE FINAL STATUS TALKS?

(S) This is a tactical decision not yet resolved. Kostunica
frequently refers to, and tries to exploit, perceived
divisions within the Contact Group. The GOS would bank on
getting Russia (and China) to back a compromise solution if

they manage to deadlock the proceedings (e.g. delayed UN
seat, no Kosovo army, possibly even partition).

(S) WOULD THEY BE PREPARED TO BUY OFF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE
SUPPORT, AND IF SO, WHAT PRICE ARE THEY WILLING TO PAY?

(S) The GOS would be prepared to offer solidarity with
Russian and Chinese positions on minorities (Georgia,
Moldova, Abkhazia, Tibet, Taiwan, etc.) But, in fact, Serbia
does not have the means to buy, such Russian or Chinese
support.

2) (S) WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE KOSOVO ISSUE COULD
FORGE BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN TADIC AND KOSTUNICA AS THEY
UNITE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE?

(S) Slim to none. They are wary of each other personally
while understanding that they benefit politically from being
close politically for now. Tadic is convinced that the next
government will be a DS-led DS/DSS coalition and he has said
that Kostunica can be won over by a promise to retain his
premiership, even if the DSS is the minority partner.
Kostunica is likely much more Machiavellian and more likely
to succeed in exploiting the DS for his own purposes.
Kostunica is most likely also hoping to build a &national
bloc8 of like-minded parties that would rival the DS.

(S) ARE THEY LINKED AT THE HIP ON KOSOVO?

(S) There are not significant differences on policy between
the two on Kosovo. However, Tadic will be more inclined to
be constructive after a settlement if the democratic forces
have succeeded in forging a strong coalition.

(S) WILL THEY BOTH SUFFER POLITICALLY IF KOSOVO IS GRANTED
INDEPENDENCE?

(S) They would both disassociate themselves from the result,
and go back to the electorate with the victimization rhetoric
that has been employed in the past. Tadic will focus on the
need for the GOS to be committed to its European future.
Kostunica is more likely to stress nationalist themes. Polls
do not necessarily indicate a major change in voting
preferences, but a sharp rise in democratic voter apathy
would benefit the SRS.

3) (S) WOULD KOSTUNICA AND/OR TADIC WITHDRAW FROM FINAL
STATUS DELIBERATIONS BEFORE THE TALKS ARE FULLY COMPLETED?

(S) The current inclination for both men is to hope against

hope and try as much as possible to stay in the game to
achieve their objective of avoiding blame for losing Kosovo.
Advisors on both sides have been crystal clear that
notwithstanding reservations about negotiations they have no
interest or intention to walk away from the table. That
said, when presented with Kosovo independence, they are
likely to walk away.

4) (S) IF THEY DID WITHDRAW EARLY WHAT MIGHT THE IMPETUS FOR
SUCH A STRATEGY BE?

(S) The public announcement of the impending independence
decision. If elections are called early, they would
definitely stall the GOS, participation. They could
withdraw as the endgame approaches because of their desire to
preserve political capital with the electorate during
elections.

(S) WOULD BOTH BE WILLING TO RESIGN FROM THEIR CURRENT
POSITIONS? WOULD BOTH FAVOR EARLY ELECTIONS?

(S) While we do not rule it out, neither the PM or President
is likely to resign as they would use their positions to go
back to the voters (via elections or a referendum) and try to
get a clearer mandate for their plan to proceed. Tadic and
the DS want early elections more than Kostunica and the DSS.
Tadic, with a five year term lasting to 2009, is least likely
to resign.

(S) WOULD EITHER OF THEM BE INCLINED TO WITHDRAW FROM
POLITICAL LIFE ALTOGETHER?

(S) Not likely. There was some speculation that Kostunica
would retire and return to the University, but our contacts
for the most part dismiss these rumors. They say Kostunica
is far more enamored of the power of the office and he will
try to retain the position at all costs. Tadic has told us
that he might lie low and wait out a Radical government, but
clearly he sees his future in politics.

(S) WOULD EITHER BE PREPARED TO JOIN A COALITION WITH THE
SOCIALISTS OR THE RADICALS TO REMAIN IN POWER IF EARLY
ELECTIONS WERE HELD?

(S) Normally, neither would ever join in government with
extreme nationalists. However, if Kostunica were left with
no other options we could envision him constructing a
coalition with (reform elements of) the Radicals and
Socialists (as he has done since 2004). Kostunica has always
suggested his preference for a National Unity government as
the most appropriate vehicle for resolving supranational
questions like Kosovo. Tadic has always maintained that he
would never join with either Socialists or Radicals in
government.

5) (S) WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS THAT BELGRADE COULD SEEK TO
LOBBY OTHER GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED IN "FROZEN CONFLICT" AREAS
SUCH AS GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST INDEPENDENCE
FOR KOSOVO?

(S) This is very likely to happen in the UN.

(S) HOW DOES BELGRADE PLAN TO USE OTHER KEY UN MEMBER STATES
AND ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, TO
BLOCK KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE?

(S) This is not likely to be used as a tool to block
independence, rather to block UN membership. They understand
that once key states recognize Kosovo, their most productive
course of action is blocking or at least delaying UN
membership.

6) (S) UNDER WHAT SCENARIOS/CONDITIONS COULD BELGRADE AGREE
TO KOSOVAR INDEPENDENCE? WHAT SPECIFIC CONDITIONS,
GUARANTEES FOR KOSOVO SERBS, MUST BE PROVIDED TO WIN
BELGRADE'S BACKING?

(S) They won,t agree in the foreseeable future, but there
are conditions under which Belgrade might tolerate it (e.g.
not employ a policy of actively undermining an independent
Kosovo.) The minimum requirement would be guarantees for
local control for Serb communities in the areas that are
defined under the enhanced competencies proposal and
unhindered vertical links to Belgrade for Serbian communities
in Kosovo. Protection of Serbian Orthodox Church property
and security for Kosovo Serbs are also sine qua nons. Leon
Kojen (senior negotiator and advisor to Tadic) has made the
distinction between constitutional/legal guarantees and
administrative/political control. For Belgrade, both are
absolute requirements.

(S) WHAT WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE TIMEFRAME FOR KOSOVO'S

EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE FROM BELGRADE'S PERSPECTIVE?

(S) There is no acceptable timeframe for Kosovo,s eventual
independence. Belgrade would prefer the question of
Kosovo,s independence to be subsumed under the EU
integration process that would allow them the freedom to
ignore the question, at least for many more years.


B. (U) STABILITY AND SECURITY ISSUES

(S) (Note: Our assessments of stability issues in particular
assume a continued moderate, democratic government. A SRS
government would force a significant recalibration of our
views. End note.)

1) (S) WOULD KOSTUNICA/TADIC SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE
OR OTHERWISE DEFEND SERB INTERESTS IN OTHER AREAS, MOST
NOTABLY MONTENEGRO, BOSNIA (REPUBLIKA SRSPKA),CROATIA, AND
SOUTHERN SERBIA, AS RETALIATION FOR GRANTING KOSOVO
INDEPENDENCE?

(S) Nothing here suggests that the GOS has any kind of plan
or intention to use minority issues in neighboring states as
a way of promoting their position on Kosovo. More likely the
difficulty will be north of the Ibar River where Belgrade is
likely to do very little to keep nationalist elements there
in check. The Radicals would be far more irredentist in
power.

2) (S) DOES BELGRADE HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DESTABILIZE THESE
AND OTHER REGIONS? IF SO, WHAT ARE SOME OF THE TACTICS AND
WHO ARE SOME OF THE PLAYERS THEY WILL SEEK TO USE TO
IMPLEMENT THEIR AGENDA?

(S) Belgrade will preserve the relatively good relations it
has with states in the region. Again, it is not likely they
would deploy any kind of grand destabilization plan. The
leadership in north Mitrovica and among the Serb communities
in the area north of the Ibar is already quite radical and
has the capacity to create a lot of practical problems for an
independent Kosovo. Belgrade will be careful no to do
anything overtly in this effort but could plausibly deny
having enough influence to keep things in order.

3) (S) HOW DETERMINED WOULD BELGRADE BE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
OF NORTHERN KOSOVO IF KOSOVO WERE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE? WOULD
BELGRADE ALLOW NORTHERN KOSOVO SERBS TO PURSUE THEIR OWN
AGENDA? WOULD BELGRADE BACK CALLS FOR SECESSION?

(S) Much would depend on the nature of the settlement and
arrangements for northern Kosovo. A special regime (e.g.
like UNTAES or Brcko) firmly backed by the international
community would make it difficult for Serbia to actively
cause problems. There is sufficient local leadership in
northern Kosovo for Belgrade to remain informed without
controlling the situation on the ground. Belgrade would
probably not go so far as to incorporate northern Kosovo into
Serbia but they might make special consultative arrangements
given the historically close ties. An attempt by the Kosovar
army to impose rule north of the Ibar presents a potential
flashpoint for violence.

(S) WOULD BELGRADE BE WILLING TO OFFER FINANCIAL, LOGISTICAL,
AND/OR RESOURCE SUPPORT TO SUSTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NORTHERN
KOSOVO?

(S) Belgrade would likely maintain its current support for
Serbian communities in northern Kosovo, as well as to other
Serb majority municipalities.

(S) IS THERE A SCENARIO UNDER WHICH BELGRADE WOULD SIMPLY
RETREAT FROM NORTHERN KOSOVO, THUS WITHDRAWING ITS
SIGNIFICANT POLICE, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY APPARATUS?

(S) We do not see this as a likely scenario. Again, an
interim regime under international community supervision for
northern Kosovo could make it more difficult for Serbia to
retain this apparatus.


C. (U) BELGRADE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY

1) (S) WHAT WOULD BELGRADE'S REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
OUTLOOK BE SHOULD KOSOVO GAIN INDEPENDENCE UNDER A GOVERNMENT
HEADED BY DSS? RADICALS? SOCIALISTS? DS? HOW WOULD ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES BE IMPACTED? WOULD
BELGRADE BE LESS INCLINED TO PURSUE EURO-ATLANTIC
INTEGRATION, NAMELY EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP?

(S) Our feeling is that no government in Serbia (SRS or
otherwise) would be foolish enough to engage in overt
military or paramilitary action with regards to Kosovo. More

likely, we envision a range of positions from benign
tolerance for an independent Kosovo to outright rejection a
la China-Taiwan. The SRS has already indicated it would
declare Kosovo &occupied territory8 and it would not
recognize an independent Kosovo. What would be different
would be the position of Belgrade with regards to EU
integration and ultimate membership in EU and NATO. More
enlightened minds in the DS and DSS could imagine a Serbia
that does not accept an independent Kosovo but could still be
a part of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way Cyprus
has done without resolving the situation in the north. On
the democratic side of the house (DS or DSS) Belgrade will
seek to maintain the strongest possible ties with its
neighbors and try and balance its unhappiness with an
independent Kosovo with its greater state interests. The
Radicals or Socialists will not be as balanced.

(S) WOULD SERBIA LIKELY BECOME MORE ISOLATIONIST IN ITS
THINKING? WOULD BELGRADE HAVE A STRONG BACKLASH AGAINST THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS WAS THE CASE DURING THE NATO
BOMBINGS IN 1999?

(S) There will not be a strong backlash a la 1999. Although
many in the pro-Western bloc are already (privately) resigned
to an independent Kosovo, it will still stall Euro-Atlantic
integration and deepen frustration levels in the general
public. The radicals will pounce to exploit the issue and
could succeed for time to enhance xenophobia, isolationism,
apathy or all of those as a result of many Serbs continuing
to lose confidence that democracy and integration with Europe
can deliver a better life for them. To date, the DS or DSS
have shown themselves incapable of mounting an effective
counter-offensive to solidify public opinion on a
pro-integration stance.

2) (S) WHAT WOULD BELGRADE'S STRATEGY BE TOWARDS KOSOVO IF
KOSOVO WAS NOT AWARDED INDEPENDENCE BECAUSE OF A RUSSIAN OR
CHINESE VETO?

(S) The thinking here is that independence will only be
avoided if Belgrade can &convince8 the Contact Group.
Belgrade may believe that China or Russia can block UN
membership but they are not counting on those states to block
independence. However, if this does come to pass we assume
Belgrade would assure the international community of its
intent to adhere to its commitments of autonomy and
protection of minority rights.

(S) HOW WOULD IT SEEK TO MANAGE KOSOVO UNDER A SYSTEM WHEREBY
KOSOVO HAS ALMOST UNLIMITED AUTONOMY? WHAT WOULD BE AN
ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT FOR BELGRADE?

(S) Belgrade presented their official platform on May 30,
which was as predictable as it was unrealistic (reftel 1).
Any success in getting to their enlarged autonomy outcome
would probably be implemented in a rather pro forma way.
That said, Belgrade could be expected to deepen its support
for Serbian minority communities in Kosovo. It would be
acceptable to Belgrade if Kosovo had an international
identity without national sovereignty (e.g. representation in
IFIs and other technical multilateral international
organizations). As they have said, Kosovo would have
complete internal independence but would be tied however
loosely to Serbia. The Serbs are assuming a need for
continued IC presence but they envision a post-UNMIK
international presence along the lines of a Bosnian HighRep
heading an EU mission.


D. (U) REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

1) (S) IS BELGRADE PREPARING FOR A POSSIBLE INFLUX OF KOSOVO
SERBS SHOULD KOSOVO BE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE?

(S) No. They are not preparing but we believe they are
expecting it. USAID is initiating a new program that will
include such preparations as one component of a broader
project.

(S) HOW DOES BELGRADE PLAN TO STEM THE TIDE OF POSSIBLE LARGE
REFUGEE FLOWS INTO SERBIA?

(S) If Kosovo is independent, there is strong evidence that
Belgrade will not seek to stem the tide of refugee flows.
Likely they believe Serbs north of the Ibar will stay put and
seek partition while Serbs south of the Ibar will move into
Serbia proper. If history serves, the GOS may declare
&defeat8 and call Serbs in Kosovo to come home.

(S) IS THERE A PLAN TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE ACCOMMODATIONS OR
WOULD BELGRADE ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REFUGEE CAMPS ON
ITS TERRITORY?


(S) The GOS has thus far been unwilling to talk about any
contingency plans including refugee camps other than to warn
of an exodus of Serbs from Kosovo and implicate the
international community as partially responsible. The GOS is
correct in its assessment that the Radicals would exploit
this exodus for political gain, but it is uses the refugee
issue in the same way ) only as a dramatic threat and stops
short of disclosing real contingency plans, if there are any.

(S) International agencies and international NGOs, led by
UNHCR, have prepared contingency plans in case of a
population outflow. They expect population flows within
Kosovo (to enclaves) and out of Kosovo following the
determination of its status, but are hoping that they will be
gradual enough not to require a massive relief effort, which
would be difficult to fund. UNHCR has kept a fairly tight
hold on its contingency plans for fear of politicizing the
situation. (The Serbian government is aware of these plans
but has not participated in them.) Much will depend on the
kinds of security assurances given the minority communities,
both by the international community (including Serbia) and
the PISG, and the extent to which shadowy elements on both
sides can steer the outcome to their own political or
personal ends.

(S) ARE THEIR KEY FACILITIES/INDUSTRIES IN NORTHERN KOSOVO
THAT BELGRADE WOULD NOT WANT TO LOSE CONTROL OF? IF SO, WHAT
ARE THEY? WHERE ARE THEY LOCATED?

(S) Northern Kosovo includes both a substantial portion of
the rich coal reserves located in Kosovo, as well as all or
part of the Trepca lead mines. It is remotely possible they
would seek to block development or exploitation of these
resources pending resolution of what the Serbs see as key
issues. Serbia also has worked to retain the ability to
provide both power and telecommunications services to
Serb-populated areas of Kosovo. Telekom Srbije, in
particular, is quite active in Kosovo.


E. (U) MINORITY RIGHTS AND KOSOVO SERB ISSUES

1) (S) HOW WOULD A FUTURE BELGRADE GOVERNMENT SEEK TO
PROTECT ETHNIC SERB INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE BALKANS IF
KOSOVO AND MONTENEGRO BECOME INDEPENDENT?

(S) We believe Belgrade,s response to an independent Kosovo
will be confined to Kosovo. As with the other questions
related to larger plans for destabilization, we do not see
any indication that this is in the cards. Nevertheless,
Tadic himself believes that an independent Kosovo will
naturally destabilize the situation in Macedonia and in
Bosnia.


F. (U) BELGRADE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX
CHURCH (SPC)

1) (S) WHAT COORDINATION IS OCCURRING BETWEEN BELGRADE AND
THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH TO PROTECT KOSOVO SERBIAN
INSTITUTIONS IN KOSOVO?

(S) The position of the church is complicated by internal
infighting. There is a moderate wing (Fr. Irinej Dobrijevic,
Bishops Teodosije and Grigorije) which has attempted to
develop an apolitical position that would respond to the
SPC,s specific interests in Kosovo (property and religious
mission). There are harder-line elements which believe that
the SPC is a quasi-political institution as well as a
religious authority. We would caution, however, against
simplistic right/left distinctions among the bishops. This
is a confusing and Byzantine organization with a great number
of cross-cutting interests.

(S) Certainly there are those in the SPC who maintain a close
dialogue with senior GOS officials (e.g. Amfilohije is the
uncle of Kostunica,s wife and Bishop Irinej of Backa is
known to be an active participant in internal government
discussions on nationalist issues).

(S) In general, we have reported moderate elements of the SPC
complaining to us of pressure from the PM directly on the SPC
leadership to work in lockstep with the GOS throughout the
status negotiations. The PM views SPC deviation from GOS
policy as a potential &Trojan horse8 for Kosovo
independence and overall weakness in Serbia,s case (reftel
2).

2) (S) HOW ARE VARIOUS SERBIAN POLITICAL PARTIES ATTEMPTING
TO INFLUENCE THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, AND VICE VERSA, TO
HELP BUILD A CASE FOR OR AGAINST A KOSOVO SETTLEMENT?

(S) The PM is seized with maintaining an SPC that is in line
with his nationalist philosophy and will intervene as

necessary to keep the SPC leadership predisposed to
supporting him. The SPC leadership wants to keep the PM and
the DSS in power ) they see the Radicals as extremely
unhelpful to them and although SPC leaders have made
overtures to the DS, they have found Tadic to be less
receptive than the PM to their current hardline stance.
Meanwhile, the DS is working closely with moderate elements
in the SPC to try and reinforce efforts to forge a
constructive SPC position. There are also reports that
Tadic,s people are working closely with certain bishops and
financiers to try and influence who will be the next
Patriarch.
POLT