KOSOVO: BELGRADE PRESENTS NEGOTIATING PLATFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000856

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR U/S BURNS, A/S FRIED, DAS DICARLO, SE WISNER AND SE
AHTISAARI FROM AMBASSADOR POLT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNMIK YI SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE PRESENTS NEGOTIATING PLATFORM

REF: BELGRADE 817

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) Summary and Recommendation: As expected, on May 30
senior negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan Samardzic
presented the GOS' "Platform on the Future Status of Kosovo
and Metohija" to COM/DCMs of the Contact Group missions in
Belgrade. The platform defines the GOS' position on status
of "more than autonomy, less than independence" for Kosovo.
The GOS proposal reflects no change in the Serbian position
since the delivery of the private messages. It is
essentially a plan for Kosovo autonomy within Serbia, with
Belgrade retaining control over foreign, customs and monetary
policy, etc. Kojen said that he would deliver the plan to SE
Ahtisaari on May 31.


2. (C) This document was as predictable as it is unrealistic.
As with the GOS' previous proposal for restructuring talks
(reftel),I again propose that we let Ahtisaari speak for us.
In fact, I see no real need for the Contact Group to respond
formally to this plan. That said, as the occasion arises,
Ahtisaari and members of the Contact Group can acknowledge
having received the Belgrade proposal, give them our honest
assessment of its chances of success, and note that Belgrade
will have an opportunity to propose its plan to the Kosovo
Albanians. End Summary and Recommendation.


3. (SBU) On May 30 senior negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan
Samardzic presented the GOS' "Platform on the Future Status
of Kosovo and Metohija" to COM/DCMs of the Contact Group
missions in Belgrade. Kojen and Samardzic called the
platform a "compromise" which they expect will be "attacked
from both extremes" for either giving too much or not enough.
This document, which the negotiators described as a
condensed version of the GOS position adopted in January 2006
has the support of both PM Kostunica and President Tadic.
The GOS is concurrently releasing the same document during a
press conference, also on May 30. In response to our
question as to if and how UNOSEK would receive this document,
Kojen responded that if UNOSEK had a local representative in
Belgrade, that person would also have been invited to receive
the proposal. Kojen said that he would deliver the document
to SE Ahtisaari on May 31 when he attends the talks on
Economic Issues in Vienna.


4. (SBU) The platform summarizes the GOS' position of "more
than autonomy, less than independence" for Kosovo. The GOS
maintains it represents more than autonomy because (1)
Kosovo's status would be guaranteed by the international
community (unlike other autonomous regions),(2) Kosovo would
be demilitarized (which the GOS considers a concession as it
involves Serbian as well as possible Albanian forces),and
(3) there would be no requirement for any Kosovo
representation in GOS or GOSaM bodies. According to the GOS,
the plan offers less than independence because the GOS would
retain sovereignty in a number of areas ("foreign policy,
control of borders, monetary policy, customs policy, special
customs inspections and control, final legal recourse in the
protection of human rights, and the protection of Serbian
religious and cultural heritage"). Asked about the 20 year
effect for the status proposal, Kojen confirmed that deferred
independence for Kosovo is not mentioned in the platform but
offered his personal assessment that in the future when "the
whole region is closer to EU integration and current
political tensions have eased", the agreement could be
amended to discuss such issues.


5. (U) Begin text of GOS Platform:
Platform on the Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija(endnote
1)
Introduction: The Serbian negotiating team is firmly
committed to the view that the future status of Kosovo and
Metohija must be the result of an agreement between the
legitimate representatives of Serbia and Montenegro (endnote
2) on the one hand, and those of the Kosovo Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government, on the other hand. The
representatives of the international community plays very
important role in the process; their mediation should
contribute toward finding a peaceful, comprehensive and
lasting solution.
A negotiated solution to the future status of Kosovo and

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Metohija is in every respect preferable to any kind of
imposed solution. Only a negotiated solution creates the
preconditions and provides an opportunity for peaceful
coexistence between Serbs and Albanians (as well as the other
ethnic communities in the province),makes economic and
social recovery possible, and contributes to the historical
reconciliation necessary to establish a common European
perspective for all. A negotiated solution also has the
advantage of being situated between two unacceptable
extremes-the status Kosovo and Metohija had in the period
1989-1999, and independence, i.e., the creation of a new
Albanian state.
The Serbian negotiating team holds that a realistic proposal
for such a negotiated solution can be achieved through direct
negotiations, as suggested in the 18 May 2006 letter of the
President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia,
who are also the co-chairmen of the Serbian negotiating team,
to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Contact Group
countries, to Mr. Xavier Solana, the High Representative for
the CSDP of the European Union, and to Mr. Martti Ahtisaari,
the Special Envoy of the UNSG for the Future Status of
Kosovo.
The position of the Serbian negotiating team is that the
future status of Kosovo and Metohija must be defined as
substantial autonomy within Serbia and the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro. This document lays out the key
elements of such a solution.

The Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija in International Law
International guarantees of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Serbia and Montenegro. The future status of
Kosovo and Metohija, conceived as a broad autonomy with
international guarantees, must be fully compatible with
international law and the fundamental principles of the
international order. This implies that the future status of
Kosovo and Metohija must not infringe the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro as an
internationally recognized state, a member-state of the
United Nations, and a member of other international
organizations.
The future status of Kosovo and Metohija should fully conform
to the fundamental principles and norms of the international
community, as well as to the specific documents of the
international community that affirm the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro (endnote 3).
Any settlement of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija
that would go against the existing international law,
infringing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Serbia and Montenegro, could only represent an imposed
solution, and as such would have to be declared illegitimate,
illegal, and invalid by the relevant institutions of Serbia
and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.

General Agreement on the Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija:
The political talks on the future status should be concluded
by a general agreement which would be considered an
international legal document. This Agreement would spell out
all the essential features of the future status of Kosovo and
Metohija, including both general principles and concrete
provisions. The General Agreement would also specify the
constitutional guarantees that would provide for the security
of the Serbian and other non-Albanian communities (through
decentralization as well as other institutional and legal
guarantees). All parties to the Agreement would be bound to
respect strictly its provisions.
The General Agreement should be in effect for a period of 20
years, with the possibility of extending its duration.
Amendments to the Agreement could also be discussed at an
earlier date with the consent of all interested parties.
The implementation of the future status defined by the
General Agreement would be under international supervision.
The security sector would be administered by an international
force that would be given a new mandate.
(1) Participants, signatories and guarantors of the
Agreement. The parties to the Agreement are Serbia and
Montenegro, the PISG in the province, and the international
community, i.e., the United Nations, whose representatives
operate within a mandate granted by the Security Council. The
Agreement must be accepted in its entirety by all three
parties prior to its formal adoption. As subjects of
international law, the signatories to the Agreement are
Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand, and the United

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Nations, on the other. The signatories to the Agreement are
at the same time its guarantors.
(2) The obligations of the UN under the Agreement. In
addition to its role as a guarantor of the Agreement, the
United Nations would have specific duties and
responsibilities, primarily in the security sector. The UN
would maintain its military presence, and to some extent also
its police presence in the province. The military presence of
the UN presupposes the complete internal demilitarization of
Kosovo and Metohija. The UN police would have a general
supervisory role with respect to internal security.
(3) Other features of the General Agreement. After the
General Agreement is signed, the Security Council of the UN
would adopt a new Resolution on Kosovo and Metohija. This
Resolution would replace Resolution 1244 and confirm the
status affirmed in the Agreement. Annual reports to the UN
Security Council on status implementation would be
instituted, with the possibility of modifying the modalities
of the UN military and police presence (the number of
soldiers and policemen, their rules of engagement, etc.)

The Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija: Constitutional
Framework
General Solution. The General Agreement contains both general
principles and concrete provisions that need to be enshrined
in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the new
Constitution of Kosovo and Metohija. The new constitution of
the province would thus be based on the General Agreement,
reaffirming the obligations it contains, particularly those
concerning the rights of the Serbian and other non-Albanian
communities, including decentralization and other relevant
institutional guarantees.
Substantial Autonomy. The Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia would contain the following provisions defining the
substantial autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija:
(a) Division of Competencies
- The province would exercise all competencies except those
reserved for Serbia or the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro.
- The following competencies are reserved for either Serbia
or the State Union, depending on the constitutional division
of competencies between them: foreign policy, control of
borders, monetary policy, customs policy, special customs
inspections and control, final legal recourse in the
protection of human rights, and the protection of Serbian
religious and cultural heritage.
- Kosovo and Metohija would have full financial autonomy in
the sense that the province would conduct its own public
finances (taxation, public revenues and expenditures,
including investment). The province could accordingly receive
loans from international financial institutions and secure
foreign direct investment.
- Certain forms of cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo and
Metohija relating to the free movement of people, goods,
capital and services would be constitutionally specified.
Additional forms of cooperation would be established in
sectors such as banking, the harmonization of fiscal policy,
infrastructure, communications, etc. Such cooperation would
contribute substantially to economic development and the
process of European integration.
- Given the proposed division of competencies, the effective
functioning of either the central or the provincial
government does not require Kosovo and Metohija to be
politically represented in the representative bodies of
Serbia and the State Union (endnote 4).
- In the field of competencies reserved for Serbia or the
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the Kosovo and Metohija
authorities would have the right to give recommendations to
the relevant institutions of central government.

(b) Institutions of Kosovo and Metohija

- The constitutional powers of Kosovo and Metohija would be
exercised through legislative, executive and judicial
institutions.
The Kosovo and Metohija parliament would be directly elected.
A certain number of seats in the parliament would be reserved
for the representatives of Serbs and other non-Albanian
communities. When the parliament is considering matters that
are of vital interest to the Serb community, including
provincial legislation, no decision would be considered valid
unless a majority of Serb representatives votes in its

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favour.
- The Government of Kosovo and Metohija, democratically
elected in the provincial parliament, would exercise
executive power.
- The judicial power in the province would be exercised by
municipal courts, district courts, and the Supreme Court of
Kosovo and Metohija. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo and
Metohija would be entrusted with constitutional oversight.
The Constitutional Court of Serbia is the court of final
recourse in the domain of human rights. In the judicial cases
involving the rights of Serbs or other non-Albanians, the
composition of the judicial body should be ethnically
diverse; international judges should also continue to sit in
such cases for the foreseeable future.

(c) International Relations
Kosovo and Metohija would have the right to maintain
relations with states, provinces, regional and international
organizations, provided that this does not require the status
of a sovereign international subject. Such international
cooperation must not be against the national interests of
Serbia and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Any
international agreement resulting from such cooperation
cannot be signed unless the Government of Serbia or the
Council of Ministers of the State Union are properly
consulted.
- The province could have direct access to international
financial institutions, in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia that would make
this possible. This access would assume prompt and regular
reporting to the relevant central institutions in Serbia, and
it would involve a measure of control by the National Bank of
Serbia.

Endnotes:
(1) This is a condensed version of Parts II and III of the
Platform adopted by the Serbian negotiating team on 5 January

2006.
(2) All references to the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro should be understood as applying to the Republic
of Serbia after the formal dissolution of the state union
takes place (see article 60 of the Constitutional Charter).
(3) This refers in the first instance to the UN Charter and
the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (now the OSCE) of 1975. On the basis of
these and other binding documents, the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro (then the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) is reaffirmed by UN Security
Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999),UNSC Resolutions
1160, 1199, 1203 (all from 1998),and UNSC Resolution 1239
(1999). In addition to the principal sources of international
law, the borders and territorial integrity of the states that
emerged from the breakup of the Socialist Federative Republic
of Yugoslavia are further guaranteed by specific
international documents and agreements. These include the
Opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on
Yugoslavia (Opinion no. 3 of 11 January 1992) and the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Dayton-Paris Agreement).
(4) The more common solution, i.e., participation of the
province in the representative bodies of the central
government, presupposes the usual, much more limited
conception of autonomy, with fewer autonomous and exclusive
competencies reserved for the province, as opposed to the
conception of substantial, very broad autonomy, envisaged
here.
End text.
POLT