Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE67
2006-01-17 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SAM PRESIDENT MAROVIC

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS SR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000067 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS SR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SAM PRESIDENT MAROVIC

REF: BELGRADE 54

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000067

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS SR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SAM PRESIDENT MAROVIC

REF: BELGRADE 54

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (c) Summary: The Ambassador met January 17 with SaM
President Marovic at the latter,s request primarily to
discuss modalities of the Montenegro referendum. Marovic
highlighted his desire to find a compromise approach that
would mollify both pro-independence and opposition leaders,
ensuring that the rules of the game did not pre-determine an
outcome in favor of either side. The Ambassador pledged to
support Marovic,s efforts to bring both sides to agreement,
but cautioned against unfounded optimism in this regard. End
Summary.


2. (c) Marovic said he spoke with EU Special Envoy Lajcak
during his most recent visit to Belgrade (reftel),noting he
hoped to help Lajcak find common ground between Djukanovic's
people and the opposition. Marovic said he is keeping
communication lines open with opposition leaders like
BULATOVIC because he recognizes that while pro-state union
forces do not represent a majority, they are a significant
minority that could cause substantial mischief if they feel
the outcome of the referendum was pre-determined to their
detriment. A referendum along those lines, he said, would
force the opposition to boycott, call into question the
international legitimacy of the referendum, and significantly
raise tensions between the two camps throughout the republic.


3. (c) At the same time, Marovic said the current EU
position (which he said Lajcak explained as 50 percent
turnout and 60 percent voting yes) would be completely
unacceptable to Djukanovic and force him to call a referendum
under the existing law. Thus the key to a successful
referendum, said Marovic, is to establish rules that both
sides felt gave them a chance to win and would keep the
opposition from boycotting.


4. (c) Marovic said he proposed a plan to Lajcak consisting
of several parts that would mollify Djukanovic and BULATOVIC,
as well as mollify Serbian leaders. Marovic said the
referendum should propose two questions instead of one (as
outlined by Lajcak reftel) to eliminate abstentions as de
facto &no8 votes, that turnout should be agreed at 50

percent, and that the percentage of "yes" votes needed to
win should be a number at least 50 percent of the turnout in
the most recent Montenegrin elections ) a formulation that
would amount to 42 percent of registered voters voting yes.
He said there should also be a minimum "spread" between
votes for independence (question one) and votes to preserve
the state union (question two). He said a minimum difference
of 10 percent support for these two questions would give the
outcome greater legitimacy.


5. (c) Marovic told the Ambassador that, in addition to
these compromises, he told Lajcak he would encourage
Djukanovic and BULATOVIC to sign a "secret agreement" prior
to the vote pledging to form a government of national
reconciliation in the next elections whatever the outcome, to
ensure stability in Montenegro following the referendum.
Finally, he said he would also propose to Serbian PM
Kostunica, as part of an independence scenario, to accede to
Djukanovic,s earlier appeal for a "union of independent
states" as a further measure to encourage stability in
Montenegro after independence.


6. (c) Barring a compromise solution of this sort, said
Marovic, the only other outcome that might preserve stability
would be for the USG and EU to present a joint proposal for
what would constitute an internationally acceptable
referendum process. Adding the weight of the USG to the
process, with the continued engagement of the EU on the
issue, said Marovic, would discourage the opposition from
boycotting while giving Djukanovic a clear way forward to
international legitimacy for the referendum.


7. (c) The Ambassador welcomed Marovic's clear and
creative thinking on this thorny issue, agreeing that it is
critically important to establish rules of the game that do
not pre-judge the outcome of the vote and encourage one side
or the other to take unilateral action. The Ambassador
pledged continued USG support for a fair referendum held
according to prevailing European standards, and said we will
engage with al the concerned parties to encourage them to
find compromise solutions. He cautioned Marovic, though,
that selling many of his proposals would be an uphill battle
) Djukanovic will not likely warm to the idea of a "Grand
Coalition" when he has the upper hand, BULATOVIC would be
hard-pressed to give up the boycott option as his most potent
negotiating tool, and Kostunica is already fairly dead-set
against any sort of post-referendum union with an independent
Montenegro.


8. (c) Comment: Marovic's proposals, while some are too
ambitious, do strike at the heart of the conditions for a
successful referendum: both sides must believe they have a
decent chance of winning in order to engage in the run-up and
to eschew instability in the aftermath. We should play an
active role in encouraging our EU counterparts to work
closely with Marovic and others to find compromise formulae
that will bring all sides into the voting booth ) before
Kosovo status negotiations heat up. Barring agreement by the
two sides, we should support the Europeans in setting down an
acceptable compromise for us.
POLT