TOUGH MESSAGE ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND BELGRADE

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y --CLASSIFIED BY LINE ADDED

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/16
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SR
SUBJECT: TOUGH MESSAGE ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND BELGRADE
NEGOTIATING ENGAGEMENT

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CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF IAN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) (D)


1. (c) Summary: In meetings with U.S. Special Envoy Frank
Wisner in Belgrade on April 17, PM Kostunica, President Tadic,
and FM Draskovic reiterated strong GoS opposition to an
independence outcome in Kosovo status talks, but sought to
reassure that Belgrade was not seeking a "permanent carve-out"
for Serbs there. Wisner was unambiguous in his private
discussions about U.S. certainty that Kosovo would be independent
as a result of talks and offered to help with necessary
protections for Serbs and other minorities. The U.S. could not
cooperate, however, with a political project that sought to
undermine Kosovo's stability.


2. (c) Wisner also met with senior leaders of the Serbian
Orthodox Church on its ongoing efforts to contribute to the talks
and with representatives of the Contact Group to brief on his
meetings (septel). Press play of the visit focused on timeline
(outcome of talks by the end of the year) and on GoS intention to
table the details of its "more than autonomy, less than
independence" proposal in the near future. End summary.


3. (c) During his April 16-18 visit to Belgrade, Special Kosovo
Envoy Frank Wisner met separately with PM Kostunica, President
Tadic, and FM Draskovic. Tadic and Kostunica were both
accompanied by senior negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan
Samardzic. Chief of Staff Nikitovic also attended the Kostunica
meeting; executive assistant Vuk Jeremic accompanied President
Tadic. Wisner had a working lunch with Kojen and Samardzic which
included Tadic advisor Dusan Batakovic and Kostunica advisor
Aleksander Simic. Discussions with Serbian Orthodox Church
representatives included Metropolitan Amfilohije, Bishops
Gregorije and Jovan, and SOC International Affairs advisor Father
Irinej Dobrivojevic. Wisner met with "Kosovo pool reporters"
from several leading Belgrade dailies in a short press event.
Wisner's meeting with local Contact Group representatives on
April 19 is reported septel. Ambassador Polt accompanied Wisner
to all meetings.


4. (c) Wisner reviewed the details of his latest discussions in
Europe for GoS principals. He noted encouraging signs from
Brussels that the EU was preparing for its role in supporting
implementation of the final settlement. The U.S. and EU were
working closely together. From talks with Ahtisaari and his
discussions in Pristina he also saw signs that the new leadership
in Pristina was moving in the right direction and was prepared to
engage in a substantive and credible way on protections for
Kosovo's minority communities. Wisner noted that while in Kosovo
he had met with Serbs, Turks, Bosniacs, and other minorities and
all had been unreserved in their expressed desire to stay and
prosper in Kosovo and in their frustration that Belgrade
continued to block progress. The negotiations, noted Wisner, had
appeared to hit a roadblock and it was difficult not to conclude
that Belgrade was responsible. Recent developments, including
the "one salary" edict and other unhelpful CCK requirements, as
well as credible reports of MUP intimidation, were suggesting
that Belgrade was determined to be unhelpful. Wisner
acknowledged the need for strong guaranteed protections for Serbs
and other minorities, but the U.S. would not cooperate in any
effort to permanently tie Kosovo Serbs to Belgrade or to prevent
the development of a stable Kosovo government.

KOSTUNICA: REGION CONCERNED W/ INDEPENDENCE - PLEASE RECONSIDER


5. (c) Kostunica acknowledged difficulties in decentralization
talks but defended the Serb position as constructive, consistent
with Contact Group giding principles and solel seeking to
protect the basic vital interests of erbs in Kosovo. If there
were difficulties on dcentralization now, this suggested many
more complications on status and argued for a reconsideration of
any "predetermined" outcomes. Kostunica noted his conversations
with nearby states - Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia - had
suggested support for Belgrade's position of "substantial
autonomy along European standards." Recent conversations with
French PM Chirac during a recent visit to Paris had identified a
similar sympathy in the CG for respecting Serbia's territorial
integrity and general principles of decentralization. (Note: The
French Ambassador in Belgrade, who had attended the Kostunica-
Chirac meeting, told Ambassadors Polt and Wisner that Chirac had
been very clear in pointing out that Kosovo independence was
inevitable.) Kostunica rejected suggestions that Belgrade was
blocking participation in the PISG, noting that Serbs did
participate at the municipal level and were committed to
participating at all levels once they were assured of basic
guarantees for their safety and rights.


6. (c) Kostunica said that no Serb would accept an independence
outcome and he encouraged the U.S. and the Contact Group to
reconsider its fixation on that goal. The only objective for
Belgrade was securing the human rights of Serbs, which had been
trampled on during the last six years. Kostunica told Wisner
that he would be presenting the details of the GoS position on
autonomy shortly - suggesting it would be an innovative proposal
somewhere between the strong centralization of France and the

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more decentralized structure of Belgium. He asked Wisner to
consider it carefully in all its details and allow for a re-think
of independence. Kostunica said he was convinced that
independence would be bad for the region. If the international
community insisted, Serbs would not accept it and there would be
"very negative consequences." Kojen reviewed some details of the
Serb negotiating position at Vienna and insisted that Belgrade
was seeking a "viable outcome, not a permanent carve-out."

TADIC: CONCERNS ABOUT STABILITY


7. (c) Tadic also expressed his view that independence was
the wrong outcome, arguing that it would likely destabilize not
only Kosovo but Serbia as well. Tadic said he had a deep
understanding and appreciation for the U.S. position on Kosovo's
independence, but he said his focus would continue to be on ways
of minimizing instability in Serbia. On participation of Serbs
in Kosovo's institutions, Tadic reviewed in detail his decision
in 2004 to call for Serb participation in elections. Little had
been achieved: Serbs in Kosovo had overwhelmingly rejected the
idea with less than one percent voting, and his numbers had
dropped 5 percent in Serbia. Tadic said that notwithstanding
anecdotal information suggesting a groundswell for Serbs to
engage in the PISG, the reality on the ground was much more
complicated. Any push on participation would encourage greater
division among Serbs in Kosovo, encourage new divisions among
parties in Serbia, and be worse for stability in both places. It
was unrealistic, suggested Tadic, to demand that he focus on one
issue to the exclusion of all others. Every decision he took on
Kosovo had to take account of a series of interlocking
considerations. It was "dangerous" to focus solely on
independence for Kosovo without considering larger implications.


8. (c) Tadic said he was actively considering the elements of a
workable exit strategy. He confessed to "not knowing whether
partition was a good idea," but he viewed it as an intellectual
argument that ignored the 60 percent of Serbs south of the Ibar
river. Ultimately, said Tadic, the solution lay not in a
"technical talks approach" in Vienna that suggested discrete
solutions to interconnected problems but rather a more
comprehensive approach that included Serbia's discussion of the
details of implementation. Kojen noted that his comments on a
"viable outcome not a permanent carve-out" were meant to assure
that Belgrade had no intention of undermining Kosovo or tying
Serbs there to its apron strings forever. But transitional
arrangements in Belgrade's view were not a question of 2-3 years
and were more likely to give way to progress for both Kosovo and
Serbia on EU integration. Tadic said that he continued to see
common interests for Serbia and the U.S. in resolving regional
problems including Kosovo.

LUNCH WITH NEGOTIATING TEAM


9. (c) Chief negotiators Kojen and Samardzic took strong
exception to suggestions that Belgrade was obstructing the
decentralization talks, and they strongly denied that Belgrade
sought a permanent carve-out or a fully autonomous entity in
Kosovo. Instead, their goal was simply to ensure "essential
living conditions and fundamental freedoms" for the K-Serbs,
regardless of the status outcome, they claimed. Both negotiators
emphasized that the law of Kosovo, not Serbia, would obviously
prevail throughout Kosovo. Regarding the details of the
decentralization negotiations, Samardzic divided the Serb
position into two baskets -- "identity" issues and security
issues. He said that the Serbs sought a substantial measure of
autonomy (including vertical links) for Serb-majority
municipalities in six "identity" areas (education, health,
culture, religion, etc.) and merely "enhanced competencies" in
two security areas (police and judiciary). They stressed that
Belgrade was prepared to offer provide full transparency, but not
a veto, to Pristina regarding any vertical interactions with K-
Serb municipalities. (Kojen averred that Pristina insisted on
controlling inflows of money in order to prevent K-Serb
municipalities from enjoying better-funded health and educational
facilities.) In the security area, they underscored that police
and judicial organs in K-Serb municipalities would be part of
Kosovo-wide institutions, although they argued for a strong
municipal role in selecting judges and police chiefs. Referring
to a "troubling dinner" with Ahtissaari and some cynical comments
by Rohan, Kojen closed by noting that the Belgrade team suspected
that UNOSEK was not committed to the negotiations and was merely
going through the motions.


DRASKOVIC


10. (c) There was nothing new in the Draskovic meeting. The
FonMin simply reiterated his standard plea for a "European
solution" to Kosovo status that would leave the Albanian majority
in control in Kosovo, but the international borders of Serbia,
including Kosovo, unchanged. Draskovic also pushed hard against
a Kosovo UN seat, arguing that giving Kosovo such membership was

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like awarding a student a university degree and then asking him
to begin to study for that degree. Ambassador Wisner challenged
the logic of withholding the UN seat for Kosovo, asking Draskovic
whether doing so would lead to Belgrade's acquiescence to
independence. Predictably, Draskovic was not prepared to strike
such a deal.

SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH


11. (c) Both sides reviewed the Church?s concerns and its role
in the ongoing status talks. Amfilohije raised concerns about
destruction and vandalism at one of the SOC cemeteries and showed
a photograph of trash dumped at the site. Wisner promised to
check to see what could be done (material faxed to USOP). Father
Irinej asked for support for a project to return 1,000 Serbs to
Prizren in connection with the reconstruction of Church buildings
there. He also asked that Wisner raise with Ahtisaari the
possibility of SOC representatives being allowed to attend Vienna
talks dealing with Church interests, but not attached to the
Belgrade negotiating team. Wisner promised to follow-up on both
issues.

COMMENT


12. (c) Ambassador Wisner's visit was both timely and
effective. His clear private reaffirmation of U.S. support for
Kosovo independence finally laid to rest any lingering doubts or
hopes among Belgrade's leadership. Wisner's tough "no permanent
carve-outs" message and sharp rebuke of recent CCK actions also
put down a clear marker that the U.S. would not tolerate
obstruction or delay of the negotiations process.


13. (c) The Serbian reaction was predictable, both in asserting
their genuine desire for negotiations progress, as well as in
their complete rejection of an independence outcome. Our
reaction and that of the Ahtisaari team should be to simply push
forward with the negotiations, not based on Belgrade or Pristina
bluster, but on what we consider to be a reasonable deal
protecting Serbians' future in an independent Kosovo.


14. (c) In the end, independence -- as well as some of the
envisioned minority rights -- will likely have to be imposed.
Give that Belgrade is hoping on some Contact Group disunity on
this imposition, the manner of taking this action matters. Some
of our contact group partners have called for "soft imposition,"
meaning a face saving way of delivering Belgrade the bitter pill.
If that is the price for getting the Russians and maybe some
others in the CG on board, it is worth paying. In addition to
offering Belgrade a small fig leaf, it could help accelerate
Belgrade's tolerance of an independent Kosovo and a lessen
domestic political consequences. Despite Draskovic's response to
Wisner, a delayed UN seat may be possibly be a useful device in
that regard and we should consider it.

POLT