Radicals Test the Waters of Popular

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000612

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Radicals Test the Waters of Popular
Discontent



1. (U) Summary: The underwhelming public
responses to recent Serbian Radical Party (SRS)
demonstrations in Belgrade protesting the
government's policies on Kosovo and The Hague has
led some observers to suggest a growing weariness
with nationalist hyperbole among a frustrated
Serbian electorate. They also exposed some
divisions within the party and with its
nationalist allies. Despite increasingly
assertive rhetoric from the Radicals to put
pressure on the government to lessen its
cooperation with the international community, the
SRS is not in a position, nor does it desire, to
push for elections at least until it can try to
win nationalist points out of the end-game of
Kosovo status talks. Nevertheless, the SRS is
still easily the strongest party in Serbia, and
recent polls continue to indicate a mathematical
possibility of an SRS-SPS coalition in new
elections. End Summary.

Yelling at the Wind: Weak Showings in Belgrade
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2. (U) On February 24, the SRS organized a rally
in the center of Belgrade against the government's
Kosovo policies, efforts to arrest Mladic, and
failure to improve low living standards. It
invested significant resources and heavily
publicized the event. Nonetheless, the
demonstration failed to attract a large crowd,
leaving Republic Square, the site of several
200,000 plus demonstrations over the past ten
years, largely empty. Our sources confirm our own
in-house estimates of 2,500 - 3,000 people at
peak, with dropping temperatures making for an
even smaller showing in the follow-on march
through the city.


3. (U) In March, the Radicals made a play to
steal the Socialist Party's thunder over the
burial of SPS leader Milosevic. This
grandstanding culminated in a prominent role at
the March 19 funeral/commemoration, which some
analysts believe it funded and organized, that
harangued the US, key European countries, and The
Hague. The event was also underwhelming, drawing
only some 50,000 people (or less than two-thirds
of one percent of the population),most of them
pensioners, at peak - far less than the half-
million the organizers proclaimed. The event also
had little impact on life in Belgrade, despite
extensive coverage on CNN and BBC, with the most
common remark being a grumbling over the impact on
traffic patterns.

SRS Strategy: Build Support Now; Elections Later
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4. (SBU) SRS General Secretary Aleksander Vucic
told a key Embassy contact that the SRS plans to
raise the tenor and ferocity of their attacks on
the government this year, but will not attempt to
bring down the government until fall. The SRS
strategy is to act after the Montenegrin
referendum, after Mladic is turned over to The
Hague, and after Kosovo final status talks are
largely resolved. In the meantime, SRS hopes that
stronger rhetoric will slowly draw in more voters
over the next six months. The Radicals hope that
this plan would result in an SRS parliamentary
majority, as Vucic remains concerned about the
party's ability to enlist a coalition partner.


5. (SBU) The SRS stratagem also is partly
designed to draw nationalist voters away from the
SRS' competitors, namely the Socialists, erstwhile
supporters of Karic's PSS, and the ruling
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). UN Political
Officer Alex Mackenzie-Smith said that SRS acting-
President Tomislav Nikolic recently told UN
officers that the party is seeking to push
Kostunica into a corner on Kosovo. In other
words, the SRS would move beyond its current (and
widely criticized) call for Kosovo to be declared
an "occupied territory" if it becomes independent
(reftel) and adopt a more "politically correct"
position unacceptable to PM Kostunica, but that
would still appeal broadly to DSS members.

The Radical House: Divided, but Stable (for now)

BELGRADE 00000612 002 OF 002


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6. (U) Complicating these efforts are internal
divisions within the Radical Party itself. The
fight for control of the party between Nikolic and
Vucic, e.g., is longstanding. Mackenzie-Smith
noted that SRS President and Hague indictee
Vojislav Seselj has begun to favor Stevo
Todorovic, the SRS caucus head in the State Union
parliament, which represents another leadership
challenge to Vucic and Nikolic. Nonetheless,
party discipline remains solid so far, and SRS
leaders have managed to effectively cooperate at
least enough to present a coherent public front to
their support base.


7. (SBU) In addition, local analysts tell us Novi
Sad mayor Maja Gojkovic, the seemingly least
objectionable of SRS's senior officials, has
distanced herself from the party. She was notably
absent from the February rally and March
demonstration. She has reportedly told the party
that she will continue to distance herself from
the party as long as Seselj remains president and
that she is reluctant to play along with the
party's nationalist rhetoric. One respected
analyst said Seselj ordered Nikolic to expel her
from the party for disloyalty, but the SRS
leadership has resisted because such a move would
cause a serious public relations scandal and would
undermine SRS support in Serbia's third largest
city. Gojkovic's public position has been to deny
any gulf between her and the SRS leadership.


8. (SBU) Finally, questions are starting to arise
in Belgrade over Seselj's future in the party.
Although he remains president and influential,
Vucic has said that SRS leaders are often
frustrated by his interference and resent the
overbearing role Seselj's wife plays in delivering
orders to the party. Despite these rumors,
though, it is unlikely SRS's leadership is willing
to jettison their figurehead at this point.

Comment
--------------


9. (SBU) The Radicals are unlikely to push for
early elections before the announcement of
Kosovo's final status. The February rally and
March 11 demonstration were designed to warn the
government that it would pay a price "on the
streets" for cooperation with the international
community. Instead, they highlighted the
limitations of SRS's ability to mobilize
discontent or politically outmaneuver Kostunica,
proving that it will take more than xenophobic
slogans to win over a frustrated and increasingly
apathetic electorate. Until Kosovo reaches its
end-game and the SRS can roll out a strident "they
lost Kosovo" campaign against the government, the
party will try to increase its appeal to
nationalist-leaning voters from PSS, SPS, and DSS
- but not enough to endanger the current
government unless it can successfully convince
voters that Mladic, Montenegro, and Kosovo results
are all damaging to Serbia and its future.

POLT