Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE404
2006-03-14 14:16:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

NATURAL GAS CRISIS IN SERBIA HIGHLIGHTS PROBLEMS

Tags:  ENRG ECON EFIN PGOV EIND SR MW 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000404 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

USDOC FOR 4232/ITA/MAC/EUR/OEERIS/SSAVICH
BRUSSELS PASS TO STABILITY PACT - MIKE MOZUR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG ECON EFIN PGOV EIND SR MW
SUBJECT: NATURAL GAS CRISIS IN SERBIA HIGHLIGHTS PROBLEMS

Summary
-------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000404

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

USDOC FOR 4232/ITA/MAC/EUR/OEERIS/SSAVICH
BRUSSELS PASS TO STABILITY PACT - MIKE MOZUR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG ECON EFIN PGOV EIND SR MW
SUBJECT: NATURAL GAS CRISIS IN SERBIA HIGHLIGHTS PROBLEMS

Summary
--------------

1. (U) The recent gas shortage in Serbia highlights both
deficiencies in its infrastructure and the perils of relying
solely on Russian gas delivered through the Ukrainian pipeline.
Both domestic and foreign companies that rely on natural gas
supplies were negatively affected, and continued reliability
problems could deter foreign investors who are major gas
consumers. The Government of Serbia (GoS) plans to address the
gas system's immediate needs with two infrastructure projects: a
gas storage facility in Banatski Dvor and a new Nis-Dimitrovgrad
gas pipeline. These will provide a supply from which to offset
temporary shortages and alternative access to gas through
Bulgaria. Carrying out such projects while both Gazprom and
Hungary's MOL are seeking to strengthen their position in
Serbia's energy industry will provide an interesting challenge
for the Kostunica government. END SUMMARY

Gas Shortage's Adverse Impact
--------------

2. (U) On January 19, Russian company Gazprom announced that, due
to extremely low temperatures in Russia, it would reduce by 25
percent the amount of gas delivered to a number of countries,
including Serbia. However, temporary reductions lasted more than
two weeks due to the Russia-Ukraine gas conflict and another cold
wave at the beginning of February. The shortage left Srbijagas,
Serbia's monopoly natural gas distributor, able to supply only
priority customers - health institutions, schools and the food
industry - while industrial facilities were forced to turn to
other energy sources, such as coal, mazut, and electricity.


3. (U) However, most companies and city heating plants were not
prepared. The price of mazut (a heavy oil left from the refining
of higher value products) jumped from 14 to 20 dinars (approx. 27
cents) per kilogram, and it was cheaper to import electricity
than to produce it from mazut. The electricity network was
overloaded, although EPS, the state-owned power company, was able

to avoid restrictions on consumers. A general lack of mazut
coupled with the delay necessary to prepare boilers for mazut
usage caused some cities like Nis and Zrenjanin to face two days
of freezing weather without central heat. Meanwhile, both
domestic and foreign companies suffered losses because of reduced
gas deliveries.


4. (SBU) For instance, from January 19 to 28, US Steel Serbia's
operations were severely disrupted by reduced deliveries from
Srbijagas to its plants in Smederevo and Sabac. Six production
units failed to meet January output targets due to the cold
weather and gas reduction. Steelmaking, in general, is energy
intensive, and US Steel consumes up to 40,000 cubic meters per
hour. During this period, US Steel was receiving between 22,000
and 27,000 cubic meters per hour. This business interruption
adversely impacted U.S. Steel's product shipments and financial
results, causing millions in losses in January and February.


5. (SBU) However, despite pledges from Srbijagas that it would do
everything possible to avoid more cuts to U.S. Steel, the company
was notified on February 28 that it would face restrictions
again. On March 1, the flow to U.S. Steel's Smederovo plant was
cut from a range of 26,000-30,000 cubic meters to 18,000, and the
reduction continued on March 2. Although the initial
justification was colder weather, government officials revealed
that Srbjiagas was giving preference (under GOS orders) to a
state-owned fertilizer plant that consumes 10 percent of Serbia's
gas on a daily basis. This plant normally is not permitted to
operate during the winter, due to its impact on gas supplies. The
plant also has not been able to pay for its gas on a current
basis in the past. (The GOS is in the process of selling this
plant, Azotera Panchevo, with a decision from the tender
committee expected this week.)


6. (SBU)Following complaints by U.S. Steel, Ambassador Polt
called Deputy Prime Minister Labus both on February 28 and on
March 1, and he followed up with a call to Economy Minister
Bubalo on March 2. Labus initially blamed the reductions on cold
weather, then complained that U.S. Steel was not being
forthcoming with information about its expected useage. Bubalo
agreed that Srbijagas had been a problem this winter, but he said
that Belgrade's municipal heating plant, not Azotera, was the
reason for the more recent shortage. He pointed to the need to
finish the underground storage by next winter to avoid such
problems. The Ambassador emphasized to both Ministers that such
unpredictability seriously damaged not only the bottom line of a
major U.S. investor, but also the reputation of Serbia among
other current and future foreign investors.

Unreliable and Insufficient Gas Supplies
--------------


7. (U) Serbia's gas pipeline system suffers from its unenviable
geographic position as the last customer at the end of a single
pipeline, with the gas supply coming from Russia via Ukraine and
Hungary. Serbia takes possession of its Russian gas at the
Serbia-Hungarian border at Horgos, but pays for it at the
Ukrainian-Hungarian border in Beregovo. Transit fees through
Hungary are paid to Hungary's MOL.


8. (U) The agreed deliveries of Russian gas for 2006 are 10
million cubic meters per day, a level that is sufficient
(allegedly) at projected temperatures of -15 degrees Celsius.
But at lower temperatures, an additional 1.5 to 2 million cubic
meters per day are necessary. For these additional supplies,
Srbijagas must issue a tender, in which the price is much higher
than the contract price. In addition, the transit pipeline has a
physical limit of 10 million cubic meters per day. During the
recent energy crisis, Serbia was receiving only 8.6 million cubic
meters per day from Russia, allegedly due to unauthorized use of
gas in Ukraine. Although Gazprom sought to maintain a steady
supply or even increase gas deliveries to its European consumers,
Ukraine was "stealing" some 70 million cubic meters per day,
according to Gazprom executive Alexandar Medvedev, who cited this
figure during his meetings in Belgrade on January 27.


9. (U) Hungarian MOL delivered to Serbia all of the gas Gazprom
allocated to Serbia, although MOL received reduced supplies, as
well. (NOTE: MOL managers told econ chief they were able to
manage the shortage there without major disruptions.) Srbijagas
is paying USD 220-230 per 1,000 cubic meters for the Russian gas,
and the world price is around USD 270 per 1,000 cubic meters. In
the contract with Gazprom, the gas price is not based on volume;
rather, a methodology fixes the gas price at three-month
intervals, depending on both the dollar and world oil prices.
Srbijagas pays transit fees of approximately USD 25 per 1,000
cubic meters, about 10 percent of the gas price, to MOL.


10. (U) Serbia's annual consumption is around 2.7 billion cubic
meters, which pales in comparison to consumption in the region,
with Croatian consumption at 4.5 billion and Hungarian at 10
billion. Consumption is expected to increase by some 10 percent
in 2006, while, at the same time, according to the 2006 Serbian
Energy Balance, domestic production of natural gas in 2006 will
be lower by some 14 percent, at 253.4 million cubic meters.
Imports are expected to reach 2.568 billion cubic meters.
Consumption is rising due to increasing gasification, and US
Steel's reopening of a second blast furnace in Smederevo in 2005.
Summer gas consumption is only 2.5 million cubic meters per day,
while during the winter it exceeds 11 million cubic meters per
day, more than 4 times higher.

Infrastructure Projects to Increase Reliability
-------------- --

11. (U) A gas storage facility in Banatski Dvor and a Nis-
Dimitrovgrad gas pipeline are two important investments seen as
necessary for reliable gas supplies to consumers as well as for
future development of Serbia's gas network. The Banatski Dvor
facility requires around USD 65 million for phase one, and a
total of USD 160 million for the entire project.


12. (U) The 167-kilometer gas pipeline, at a cost of around USD
65 million, will provide Serbia with an alternative route through
Bulgaria, connected to the Russian gas system. This route also
could provide a direct connection with the Nabucco project, a
3,300 kilometer pipeline sponsored by Austria's OMV, Turkey's
BOTAS and others, that will bring Caspian and Middle Eastern gas
into Western Europe via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.
Completion is projected for 2011. In addition, construction of
the Nis-Dimitrovgrad pipeline would improve Serbia's prospects as
a transit route for gas to some areas in Romania and Pristina.


13. (U) The Banatski Dvor gas storage facility will buffer summer-
winter gaps in consumption and distribution, eliminate penalties
to MOL because of this seasonal imbalance, and lower gas prices.
Full capacity is projected at 850 million cubic meters and should
be reached by 2011. However, since key equipment has already
been imported from the U.S., the technical part of the first
phase could be finished by late summer 2006. The biggest cost
will be pumping in the fixed amount of gas - the so called
"pillow gas" - that would 1) prevent underground water from
entering the facility and 2) allow pumping of around 250 million
cubic meters of gas next winter. Required investment for this
technical part of the first phase is USD 15 million, and USD 50
million for the gas supplies. Once funding is secured, the
storage facility could be finished by October-November 2006.

Russians and Hungarians Jockeying for Position
-------------- -

14. (U) The Ukrainian gas controversy, Serbia's heavy dependence
on Russian gas, and Hungary's position as a crucial transit
corridor, all create the perfect scenario to permit Gazprom and
MOL to put pressure on the Serbian Government for prime positions
in the forthcoming multi-million dollar investment projects.


15. (SBU) Serbia has a 20-year agreement with Hungary's MOL for
gas transit from Russia which dates back to 1998. MOL CEO Zsolt
Hernadi visited Serbia on January 25, just two days before the
Gazprom visit. Knowing that Serbia plans to build an alternative
gas route to Bulgaria, MOL's sought to strengthen its position in
Serbia through a new agreement. Hernadi explained that MOL is
very interested in building underground gas storage together with
Srbijagas because Serbia's planned investments could affect gas
prices and transport routes. A connection to the Bulgarian
system would end MOL's monopoly on gas transit to Serbia. MOL
would like a new agreement with Srbijagas, although the current
one will not expire until 2018. After difficult negotiations, MOL
and Srbijagas agreed only on an annex to the current agreement
that will eliminate penalties for non-delivered gas from Russia.
However, working groups will be formed to prepare for negotiation
of a new agreement by the end of April 2006, which the Government
of Serbia (GoS) wants to have in force starting January 2007.


16. (SBU) Negotiations with Gazprom's Alexandar Medvedev were
held in Belgrade on January 27. The Russians placed the blame for
the gas shortage on Ukraine's diversion of gas but pledged to try
to maintain deliveries according to the contract in the future.
Exploiting the political weakness of the current government and
Srbijagas's current debt of USD 80 million toward Gazprom, the
Russians lobbied for a privileged position in the forthcoming
tenders for concessions to build the gas storage facility and
pipeline.


17. (SBU) Citing two intergovernmental agreements between Russia
and Serbia from the 1990's, Gazprom asserts that it has exclusive
rights to build gas infrastructure in Serbia. These agreements
established a joint venture company, Jugorosgas, in 1996 to
manage the distribution of Russian gas and investment in gas
infrastructure. The ownership structure of Jugorosgas was 50:50
between Gazprom and various Serbian companies (NIS, Sartid (now
U.S. Steel Serbia),Progres-Beograd, Progresgas Trading, and
Beobanka (does not exist anymore)). It was agreed that NIS would
in time become the majority owner of Jugorosgas via preferential
purchasing rights. However, when NIS was reorganized in October
2005, Srbijagas was left with only 25 percent in Jugorosgas while
Gazprom bought 25 percent in Progresgas Trading to become the
majority owner of Jugorosgas.

Public Tenders for Infrastructure Projects
--------------

18. (SBU) Econ officers met with General Director of Srbijagas
Milos Tomic and Zorana Mihajlovic Milanovic, advisor to the
Deputy Prime Minister for energy issues, at company headquarters
in Novi Sad on February 6. Tomic confirmed that Gazprom is the
majority owner of Jugorosgas, but denied that it has an exclusive
right to build such gas infrastructure in Serbia. Milanovic
explained that Srbijagas does not have sufficient funds to
complete the necessary investment projects and said the GoS will
issue public tenders for a strategic partner for these two
investments. A public tender for the Nis-Dimitrovgrad gas
pipeline concession should be expected sometime in autumn. The
gas storage facility in Banatski Dvor will become a subsidiary of
Srbijagas, and a strategic partner to finalize this facility will
be sought through public tender no later than May or June 2006.
In both cases, if Gazprom wins the public tenders, it will manage
its operations through Jugorosgas.


19. (SBU) Tomic explained that borrowing for these projects was
not feasible, because of Srbijagas's USD 80 million debt toward
Gazprom. The current gas price of 16 dinars per cubic meter does
not even cover production costs. Srbijagas's proposed price of
19 dinars per cubic meter would cover only production costs but
leave nothing for investment. Srbijagas submitted the price
increase to the Ministry of Energy and Mining, but, in effect,
this requires approval not only of the Ministry of Energy, but
also by the Ministries of Finance and Trade and Tourism. Finance
Minister Dinkic generally has held up energy price increases to
restrain inflation. It is possible that the GOS will act on this
request after the winter.

Poor Management and Insider Deals
--------------

20. (SBU) Econoffs met with Assistant Minister for Public
Enterprises Milutin Prodanovic (protect) at the Ministry of
Energy on February 3, who laid partial blame for the energy
crisis on new management at Srbijagas, as well as on unnecessary
GOS intervention. Prodanovic said that similar gas problems with
Russia occurred last year, but without complaints from the
largest consumers in Serbia. According to Prodanovic, the new
management, including General Director Tomic, an agronomist by
profession, is inexperienced in gas and energy issues. After NIS
was restructured into three independent companies (NIS,
Transnafta and Srbijagas),leadership appointments to Srbijagas
were awarded to the G17 Plus party, of which Tomic is a member.
(Comment: Leadership positions as spoils for political parties
are common in Serbia, often resulting in inexperienced or
incompetent individuals filling key jobs in state-owned
companies.) Prodanovic also blamed Deputy Prime Minister Labus,
leader of G17 Plus, for intervening in gas issues when it is not
his responsibility. He also said that Zorana Milanovic
Mihajlovic, Labus's energy adviser, lacks expertise.

Comment
--------------

21. (SBU) The good news in Serbia's continuing gas squeeze is
that it could be easily fixed by relatively simple, inexpensive
projects already on the drawing board. How skillfully the GOS
maneuvers around its regional suitors and completes the work on-
time and on-budget will provide a good test of its commitment to
transparency and an improved investment climate. However, its
handling of these issues so far, particularly with respect to
U.S. Steel, has not been encouraging. We are concerned that the
necessary projects are being structured as separate tenders with
strategic partners - rather than simply borrowing the money, with
a sovereign guarantee, if necessary - as a way to create
opportunity for political payoffs. Given the high stakes for
U.S. companies, and for Serbia, we will keep a close eye on these
projects. END COMMENT.

POLT