Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE395
2006-03-13 12:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

REACTIONS, PLANS AFTER MILOSEVIC'S DEATH

Tags:  PGOV PREL SR ICTY 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000395 

SIPDIS

VIENNA PLS PASS DAS DICARLO
JUSTICE FOR ALEXANDRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR ICTY
SUBJECT: REACTIONS, PLANS AFTER MILOSEVIC'S DEATH


Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000395

SIPDIS

VIENNA PLS PASS DAS DICARLO
JUSTICE FOR ALEXANDRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR ICTY
SUBJECT: REACTIONS, PLANS AFTER MILOSEVIC'S DEATH


Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

SUMMARY


1. (c) The Belgrade body politic is just in the initial
throes of reacting to Milosevic,s death. Current debate
swirls around his funeral arrangements and increasing
speculation that the former dictator was at best medically
neglected, at worst actively poisoned during his
incarceration in The Hague. Milosevic,s death, coming on
the heels of the Babic suicide and the unfettering of
Haradinaj,s ability to engage in public life are leading to
an increase ) even among some democrats ) in the belief
that ICTY is anti-Serb. The Radicals and Socialists will
undoubtedly do what they can to use this to bolster their
political standing and re-orient the government's ICTY
policies. End summary.

SATURDAY


2. (u) The initial cautious response by local networks to
news of Milosevic,s death on March 11 gave way later in the
day to more prominent coverage on Belgrade TV stations.
There were interviews and commentary by the Radical and
Socialist party ) mostly anti-Hague diatribes and unhelpful
commentary on the bias of the court and its alleged role in
the deaths of Milosevic and Milan Babic, who committed
suicide in his cell on March 5. Head of the DS caucus in
parliament Dusan Petrovic gave a helpful interview on RTS
rejecting any suggestions that there would be any change in
the government's policy towards The Hague or any reason to
reconsider its international legal obligations. CNN and other
international coverage was perhaps more pervasive throughout
the day, and included phone interviews with current and
former regional leaders, but consisted mostly of empty
speculation and commentary on the unreformed and unrepentant
parts of Serbian society and the tragic events of the
Milosevic era. The Ambassador's statement was quickly
picked up by local TV stations and aired prominently.

SUNDAY


3. (u) By Sunday, March 12, media attention had slackened
considerably on local stations, with most channels showing
regular programming for most or all of the day. So far,
there have been no large organized or spontaneous public

gatherings related to the news, though Socialist Party
headquarters announced over the weekend they would open a
condolence book and would encourage placement of flowers
outside the party's offices on Studentski Trg. Over the
weekend, a line of (mostly) pensioners numbering in the
hundreds formed at the party headquarters, and moderate
numbers also placed flowers or lit candles at the Studentski
Trg location and in other party offices throughout Serbia and
in The Hague.


4. (c) The Ambassador spoke with President Tadic, Deputy PM
Labus, and FONMIN Draskovic on the occasion of a
commemoration of the third anniversary of the Djindjic
assassination to prepare the path for discouraging any kind
of official funeral or commemorative event. Draskovic used
the opportunity to push again his long-held belief that ICTY
conditionality on PfP membership and the EU membership
process should cease, so that a Euro-Atlantic embrace could
be used to counter Radical and Socialist opposition to
Serbia's integration. Tadic, Draskovic, and Labus firmly
opposed any state funeral arrangements for Milosevic, while
Tadic added that he would oppose any &pardon8 for Milosevic
widow Mira Markovic in order for her to attend funeral events
in Serbia. (Note: Markovic faces arrest on an Interpol
warrant on charges of inciting abuse of public office if she
returns to Serbia. It is unclear if, under current
circumstances, GoS officials would be prepared to enforce
that warrant. The Milosevic family lawyer on Monday filed a
motion in Belgrade district court to have the warrant
rescinded and the charges dropped. End note.)

MONDAY


5. (u) By Monday, March 13, all major print media were also
carrying the news from the weekend, along with initial
reactions from various political parties, including
re-hashing of the SRS and SPS's predictable positions and
expressions of regret by PM Kostunica, who promised that the
government would ask for a full report from The Hague on the
circumstances of his death. He noted the political custom in
Serbia at difficult times for Serbs to put all political
differences aside. Tadic's office expressed condolences for
the family ) sources there have expressed their concern that
there was no way to react without benefiting the Radicals.
The most vitriolic response came from Draskovic, whose SPO
party was a target of Milosevic. Draskovic said any grief
over Milosevic,s death shown by Serbian citizens was
shameful in light of the pain Milosevic had inflicted on
Serbia. Also on Monday, the Supreme Defense Council of SaM
met (by telephone) and rejected proffering any military
honors on Milosevic if a funeral is held in Serbia.

(AND THE DAYS AHEAD


6. (c) Speculation now has turned to where and under what
circumstances Milosevic will be buried. Tadic has said
publicly that a state funeral would be out of the question, a
position publicly shared by ruling coalition partners G-17
Plus and SPO. Kostunica,s DSS and the government have so
far been silent on the issue, while SPS and SRS seem to be
pressing hard for Milosevic to receive full head of state
honors. UK Ambassador Gowan raised the funeral issue with
Kostunica's Foreign Affairs Advisor Vladeta Jankovic and
received an icy response and a comment about interference in
internal affairs. Jankovic refused to pass along Gowan's
concerns absent a formal written demarche. Meanwhile,
Markovic is rumored to have argued alternately for Milosevic
to be buried in Moscow or in his hometown of Pozarevac.


7. (c) There is some confusion regarding who has final
authority to grant Head of State honors and interment in the
special section of the Belgrade Central Cemetery reserved for
historically important figures and former presidents. The
city council (run by DS Mayor Bogdanovic),which has a role
in the approval process, has already balked at approving
Milosevic,s burial in the special section, and absent a
specific request form the family for such treatment (we
understand none has been made yet) to force the question, it
would appear a Belgrade funeral with full honors is unlikely.
Furthermore, the Supreme Defense Council's decision would,
on the face of it, preclude the possibility of a state
funeral in any location in Serbia, as such an event would
include a color guard, caisson procession, fusillade, and/or
similar honors that the military now will not provide.
However, funeral plans are still in the wildly speculative
stages, so it may be a few days before this all plays out.


8. (c) We understand from reliable sources that the
Radicals and Socialists are already cooperating on plans for
public events and commemorations aimed at touching off
another round of anti-Hague fury. It is not clear how well
such demonstrations (or the funeral) might be attended -- the
SRS rally in support of Seselj several weeks ago was a dud --
but there is likely to be more support for any protest
against the ICTY following Milosevic,s death. Indeed,
despite the low opinion of Milosevic and his regime, recent
events in The Hague ) a more permissive attitude towards
Haradinaj,s public life, the Babic suicide (under what
locally are considered suspicious circumstances),the
interpretation of Chief Prosecutor del Ponte's recent
comments that the tribunal is sensitive to political
pressure, and the recent assertions by Milosevic himself that
he was given improper medication (which Monday reprints of
Dutch TV reports of the autopsy did nothing to dispel) --
have intensified a local perception of anti-Serb bias in the
tribunal. Even pro-Western Serb politicians, most
prominently former PM Zivkovic, have criticized the recent
series of unfortunate events in The Hague as a disgrace to
the tribunal.

IMPACT


9. (c) There is a good chance that this chain of recent
events, and their locally scandalous nature, will, in this
fertile ground for conspiracy theorists, lend support to
those looking to stall any more cooperation with the Hague
Tribunal. The government will face real pressure -- at the
very least on humanitarian and medical grounds -- to review
its ICTY policy and to reconsider domestic prosecution for
indictees who have not been turned over or are in pre-trial
release, to ease any kind of efforts on delivering Mladic
(not rumored to be in the best of health) or cooperating with
The Hague in general. There are several Serb indictees on
pre-trial release (e.g., Simatovic, Pavkovic and Stanisic,
the latter two with their own serious health problems) and we
expect they will use their influence and connections to
encourage this debate. The government may try and make the
case for de-linking EU accession from the Hague issue to
avoid any "political instability." At the very least, we
should expect SPS to use its position as "kingmaker" for this
minority coalition government to extract maximum political
gain from the situation ) to include a rehabilitation of
Mira Markovic and a hard push for full state honors for the
deceased dictator. We are engaging with the PM's office to
elicit their plans for the coming days and to encourage them
to stand with SPO, G-17 Plus, DS, and most average Serbs to
oppose a state funeral for Milosevic.

POLT