SERBIA-KOSOVO: LACK OF PREPARATION FOR POTENTIAL

UNCLAS BELGRADE 000366

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR PRM/ECA, VIENNA FOR HOVENIER

E.O. 12958: DECL. 00/00/12
TAGS: PGOV PREF SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA-KOSOVO: LACK OF PREPARATION FOR POTENTIAL
IDP/REFUGEE FLOWS


1. (SBU) Commissioner for Refugees of the Republic of
Serbia Dragisa Dabetic told our REFCOORD March 2 that he
was not prepared to receive an outflow of ethnic Serbs and
other minorities from Kosovo. He said, however, that if
Kosovo became independent, there would be a large outflow.
Formulating contingency plans at this moment was
politically impossible. When the time came to react, the
Serbian government would react, though he could not predict
at this time how.


2. (SBU) UNHCR officials in Belgrade have reminded Embassy
officials on numerous occasions that their 2006 budget (10
million USD) will be only 80 percent funded. At a dinner
March 1, visiting UNHCR Deputy Director for Europe Udo Janz
said that there would have to be heavy cuts in UNHCR
spending in Belgrade during the last two quarters of the
year. Nor did he see any immediate source of contingency
funds, should massive new demands emanate from a Kosovo
settlement.


3. (SBU) UNHCR has reportedly drawn up a contingency plan,
but prefers to close-hold it for fear of precipitating a
self-fulfilling prophecy. UNHCR has revised upward from a
previous draft its estimates of how many people would leave
Kosovo if independence is granted. According to its
estimates, any outcome would result in internal movements
within Kosovo, i.e. Serbs from southern Kosovo to north of
the Ibar. Should there be violence, the outflow may be as
much as a third of the remaining Serb and minority
population in Kosovo, as many as 70,000 people, and not
only to North Mitrovica, but into Serbia proper as well.
Serbian Refugee Coordinator Dabetic, however, claimed that
there are some 216,000 non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo,
including 124,000 Serbs, all of whom who would leave.


4. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, our REFCOORD has had the
opportunity to speak to a number of IDPs who have returned
to Kosovo or who intend to return. (All are actual or
potential U.S. refugee assistance beneficiaries.) All of
them distrust the media and politicians, whether in
Pristina or in Belgrade. They have little idea of what is
happening in the final status process and how it may
actually affect them. Most Serbs we talked to simply hope
that a Serbian flag will fly over whatever part of Kosovo
they find themselves in and that their security will
somehow be assured.


5. (SBU) COMMENT: A Serbian government in denial, ordinary
Kosovo Serbs in the dark, and the main international
refugee agency underfinanced, together do not bode well for
post-status contingency preparation. How assurances about
final status arrangements, especially on security, are
communicated to Serbs on the ground in Kosovo will be as
important as the details of the final status itself. The
ability of radical politicians and others to exploit the
situation for their own ends will impact the size and speed
of any outflow. The ability and willingness of the Serbian
government to protect and project Serb living conditions in
Kosovo will determine the dimension of the refugee/IDP
challenges we will face.

POLT