Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE207
2006-02-10 17:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

VIENNA DECENTRALIZATION TALKS: KEEPING THE SERBS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000207 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI
SUBJECT: VIENNA DECENTRALIZATION TALKS: KEEPING THE SERBS
ENGAGED

REF: BELGRADE 193

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, (Reasons 1.4 B&D)

Summary
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000207

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI
SUBJECT: VIENNA DECENTRALIZATION TALKS: KEEPING THE SERBS
ENGAGED

REF: BELGRADE 193

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, (Reasons 1.4 B&D)

Summary

1.(C) Discussions with Tadic advisor Leon Kojen, EU
Representative Lehne and sources in local UN headquarters
here suggest a disconnect between Belgrade and others on
what is to be achieved in the Vienna decentralization talks
on 2/20. Kojen and the PM's office have made it clear to
us that they are ready and eager to start talks and are
expecting a serious multi-round negotiation. If the Vienna
meeting does not signal clearly that Serb concerns on
decentralization will be addressed seriously, there is a
risk that Belgrade will walk away from the session
convinced that there is no future in further talks. End
Summary.

Kojen's Comments on "Tough Message" and Way Ahead

2.(C) President Tadic's chief Kosovo negotiator, Leon Kojen
told poloffs on February 9 that Belgrade would not
"overreact" to the tough messages delivered by U.S. Special
Envoy Wisner and UK Political Director Sawers (Reftel).
Tracking with how Kostunica responded to Wisner, Kojen
suggested Belgrade will just simply choose not to believe
what they heard. Kojen said he had been expecting Sawers
to be tougher then Wisner but was taken back at how
"roughly" and undiplomatically Sawers had presented his
points. Kojen noted several asides that led him to believe
that the Serb position would not be well received in
Vienna: "Tony Blair did not go to war over Kosovo to see
Serbia get it back"; "These won't be negotiations on
status, but rather the status of the Serb minority in
Kosovo"; and, "Kosovo Serbs think they can live their
separate lives, but we will insist that fully integrate
into a multi-ethnic Kosovo." Kojen thought it completely
unrealistic, given the current hostility between Serbs and
Albanians in Kosovo, to think that, in the near term,
Kosovo Serbs would be willing to live integrated with
Albanians. He said he also found it incomprehensible how
"Belgrade could be denied the right to sit at the table and
discuss the fate of part of our country."


Concerns about Vienna

3.(C) Kojen said Belgrade was ready and eager to start

talks, calling them "long overdue,". He noted that he had
met with Rohan in Vienna in late January, and was
incredulous about some of the details on how the talks were
being set up. He said that Rohan had initially suggested
one session, beginning with statements from the two sides,
followed by an overly ambitious agenda covering a full
range of issues from decentralization to protection of
cultural heritage and socially owned enterprises. Kojen
pushed for an initial session in which they would discuss
"general principles" for the talks, followed by separate
sessions in which they could hash out the various issues.
Rohan insisted on keeping to the original schedule ) night
of the 19th and all day on the 20th, but agreed to turn a
ceremonial dinner on the evening of February 19 into a
working session on the general principles, followed by
separate sessions on decentralization, and non-
decentralization issues (religious sites, and public
utilities/socially owned enterprises) on the 20th. Kojen
said that everything was still being discussed; he would
continue to push for an overall lighter agenda and a longer
session when he meets with Rohan in Belgrade on Tuesday
February 14.

4.(C) Kojen also said he was concerned after a discussion
with Stefan Lehne that Ahtisaari planned to hold "seven
chapters" of simultaneous talks, "occurring in parallel,
not sequentially." (Lehne was in Belgrade on Feb. 8-9 on
one of his periodic swings through.) Kojen thought it
would make more sense to build momentum on the key topic of
decentralization, the results of which would likely inform
the debate on other topics. Kojen expressed frustration
that Belgrade has not had a chance to see the new Albanian
decentralization plan, which both Rohan and Lehne told him
"was a positive step forward". Kojen thought that it would
be more productive to see it before the Vienna meeting so
that Belgrade could prepare a proper response.

5.(C) Kojen also expressed his dismay to Lehne about some
of Sawers remarks ) not about status but about
decentralization ) when he saw him on February 8. Kojen
believed his insistence on an opening session on general
principles was reasonable in order to ensure substantive
talks. If the Albanians simply state that they will not
negotiate on anything until they have independence, he
said, we will not make progress on anything ) Pristina will
just always refer back to the general principles. Kojen
said he asked Lehne whether the idea was to channel
decentralization into some sort of multi-ethnic utopia that
will never work. "In that case," he said, "it would be
meaningless for us to participate."

6.(C) Comment: Despite the tough messages it has received
over the last week, Belgrade is still committed to going to
Vienna. They are going convinced that they will be able to
engage in a real way about substantive issues related to
minority rights. Kojen was not predicting a train crash,
but he did express repeated puzzlement that Rohan seemed to
be setting up the talks as if they were a one-off instead
of the start of a process.

7.(C) We need to ensure that Vienna reflects the seven non-
final status points in the eight part tough message that
Wisner delivered to Belgrade last week. An encouraging
first round in Vienna is the necessary condition to keep
the Serbs, especially Kostunica, at the table. There is
already talk around town about a parliamentary session on
final status that will no doubt be designed to give
Kostunica a clear mandate to reject any independence
option. We will be working with the PM's office and our
parliamentary sources over the coming days to advise
against any such parliamentary session, at least until
after the first round of Vienna. We will also speak with
Rohan about his talks with the Serbs when he is here next
week. Department may also wish to consider a Wisner-
Ahtisaari call to urge taking the Serbs seriously in
Vienna. END COMMENT.
POLT