K+1: MOVING SERBIA BEYOND KOSOVO - IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001996

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR U/S BURNS
STATE ALSO FOR EUR - A/S FRIED AND DAS DICARLO
EUR/SCE PLEASE PASS STEVE GEE FOR SE WISNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PHUM PREL SR
SUBJECT: K+1: MOVING SERBIA BEYOND KOSOVO - IMMEDIATE
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

REF: BELGRADE 1719

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

--------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
--------------


1. (c) As part of our Mission-wide K+1 (Kosovo settlement
and aftermath) strategy, we have laid out in reftel our
recommendations on how to manage the endgame in the status
process here in Serbia. This message focuses on the next
step of K+1: expectations and consequence management. This
involves a combination of public and private messages, along
with operational preparedness that will help guide us through
the most difficult upcoming moment in Serbia. That moment,
in our view, is the time immediately before and after
Ahtisaari, the U.S., and key Europeans declare their support
for Kosovo independence and their intention to recognize.


2. (c) We are currently implementing phase one of our
four-phase K+1 approach: a pre-electoral effort to
get-out-the-vote (GOTV) and to engage and support democratic
forces in the run-up to the January 21 parliamentary
elections. Consequence management described in this message
constitutes K+1 phase two. This message will be followed by
phase three, our recommendations for rolling out the Serbian
benefits package once we judge, among other things, Serbia's
reaction to Kosovo settlement in the aftermath of the January
elections. A final message will focus on our post-Kosovo
engagement with a new democratic government that will seek to
address pending ICTY obligations, strengthen democratic
institutions, and propel Serbia decisively into the
Euro-Atlantic community. End summary and introduction.

-------------- --------------
BELGRADE ON KOSOVO: NO CHANGES FROM NOW TO ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------


3. (c) There will be no change in Belgrade's rhetoric (from
Kostunica or Tadic) from now until after the electoral votes
are counted. In fact, the clamor will get only stronger as
we move closer to the polling date. Given the intensity of
the domestic media campaign, public opinion is likely to be
affected in two ways: there will be a growing belief that
the government, with Russia's help, is making progress on
blocking the Ahtisaari process, and there will be ongoing
pressure for all the parties to stay faithful to the
nationalist line. Our GOTV campaign will at best be able to
encourage political abstentionists to consider voting for
their democratic party of choice and to push their future
government to take a more realistic attitude on Kosovo after
the election.

--------------
REACTION TO AHTISAARI AND NEXT STEPS
--------------


4. (c) Ahtisaari's early February presentation of his
proposal to the two parties will hardly affect the dynamic
here. If Ahtisaari engages only privately with the parties,
Belgrade will simply dismiss his plans and deny that we are
any closer to an independence outcome. Pristina will
acknowledge that they have received confirmation of an
independence outcome and confidently look to New York.
Russia will continue to suggest that the outcome is not
settled and that everything is on the table. We and the
Europeans will support Ahtisaari, but defer to his UN report
and recommendations.


5. (c) There is not likely to be a new government in Serbia
when Ahtisaari meets with representatives from Serbia. Even
if the democrats come out on top as we suspect, the
negotiations for the formation of a new government are likely
to be protracted (after 2003 elections, negotiations lasted
11 weeks). Kostunica might try to push for some form of a
national unity government and might even refuse to meet with
Ahtisaari - on the grounds that he has no governing mandate -
in an effort to put Tadic in a difficult spot. An invitation
to comment on the proposal will produce at best a reiteration
of previous harangues against Ahtisaari and his process.


6. (c) There will be little space or utility in Serbia's
politically-charged and well-controlled media environment to
respond publicly to any of the histrionics in the run-up to
UN action in New York. We plan to focus our public
statements here on full support for Ahtisaari and the process
and highlight the reasons for why constructive Serb
engagement in the end-game is in the best interest of Serbs
here and in Kosovo. In private, we will continue to remind
leaders of the personal responsibility they carry to prevent
provocations and violence. Unfortunately, Serb rhetoric on
the other side of the ABL will be even worse than in
Belgrade, which in turn will do little or nothing to help
tone it down.

--------------
GOING PUBLIC ON INDEPENDENCE
--------------


7. (c) The formal presentation of Ahtisaari's report and
recommendations on status and public announcement of our
support for Kosovo's independence will be a watershed. At
that point, neither Serbia nor the Russians nor certain
Europeans will be able to obfuscate about the outcome. On
our end, we plan to proceed on an immediate media blitz in an
effort to saturate the public with a detailed explanation of
our position, and to respond to the emotional and
inflammatory messages that will be forthcoming. We would
also include strong public assurances of our continued
engagement in Kosovo, our support for Serbia's integration
into the Euro-Atlantic community, our commitment to ensure
full respect for all the standards provisions, and our
commitment to ensuring that Serbs in Kosovo are the "most
protected" minority in the world. We would also point to
elements of the settlement that seek to ensure the
preservation of Serbia religious and cultural heritage in
Kosovo with specific benchmarks to demonstrate that
commitment. We continue, and will intensify, our work with
the SOC to support this. Statements by USOP on
implementation, responsible governance, and respect for
minority rights would help reinforce that message.


8. (c) Our discussion of the settlement would be grounded
in our central K+1 message: Serbia's Euro-Atlantic
integration and democratic future, on its need to continue
economic progress and modernization, further democratization,
and on our efforts to actively collaborate on those
priorities. Depending on the severity of the Belgrade
response, we then plan to shift the public debate wholly to
bread and butter issues of greatest importance to the Serbian
people. Our message would be relentlessly positive, focusing
on the future, on youth, and on various elements of our
benefits package.


9. (c) We do not plan to persuade on independence. Most
parties will refuse to accept such an outcome. We won't in
any way shy away from our position, but will after restating
it quickly intensify a positive, Serbia-focused message.
Such a message must be carried by the USG. Polls here
suggest that, despite opposition to Kosovo independence,
popular expectations already reflect such an outcome. Our
public diplomacy approach is based on our expectation of a
strong emotional reaction to the outcome that will quickly
give way to a mixture of proud and stubborn refusal and
tacit, black-humored acceptance.

--------------
THE AFTERMATH: BEST-CASE SCENARIO
--------------


10. (c) We expect a range of possible developments on the
ground following the announcement of independence. A best
case scenario would see little more than rhetoric in Belgrade
and from Kosovo Serbs, and a temporary closing down of the
official border crossings. Calls for secession and partition
of northern Kosovo would be encouraged by Radicals and
Socialists but perhaps only tacitly supported by a new DS-DSS
coalition government. Some Serbs in Kosovo would boldly
decide to cooperate with the new government and participate
in Kosovo's constitutional process. This might be encouraged
by some in Serbia, particularly if the Albanian minority in
southern Serbia participates in parliamentary elections here
and acknowledges being part of Serbia.



11. (c) Kostunica would still call for a national unity,
rejectionist, and separatist front, but Tadic, inspired by a
better-than-expected democratic victory for his DS would
refuse, asserting his authority over the military and
actively working to lower temperatures while symbolically
continuing to claim Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Military
authorities would be in close touch with us and KFOR.
Tensions would subside relatively quickly. Official Belgrade
would quietly send instructions to Serb political and
security elements in northern Kosovo not to instigate unrest,
using its control over the official payroll to ensure
compliance. In southern Serbia, ethnic Albanian leaders
would corral their more extremist elements and agree to
cooperate with the government to maintain stability.

--------------
THE AFTERMATH: WORST-CASE SCENARIO
--------------


12. (c) Unfortunately, a worst-case scenario would be quite
the opposite, with large flows of refugees, violence in the
enclaves, active Serbian support for Kosovar Serb separation,
and significant tensions along the Ibar river. The injury or
deaths of Serbs and Albanians would heighten passions and
spur radicals and nationalists to push for tough measures:
closing the border; symbolic sanctions against those states
supporting Kosovo's independence; rejection of any
participation in Partnership for Peace, cooperation with
NATO, or even EU ambitions. Kostunica, emerging empowered by
a strong showing in the elections, could push hard for some
form of national unity government. Tadic would do little to
resist and fail to use his limited authority to calm the
nationalist fervor. Significant flows of refugees into
northern Kosovo or southern Serbia would be encouraged by the
government, either adding to a volatile mix on the streets of
Mitrovica or raising tensions and destabilizing the situation
in Albanian areas of southern Serbia.


13. Contact between Serb military leaders and Embassy/KFOR
would be uneven and incomplete. There would be active
efforts in Belgrade to call on all patriotic Serbs not to
recognize an independence outcome, and threats and violence
against any Kosovo Serbs who tried to participate in the new
Pristina government. The government in Belgrade would
quietly, but actively, encourage nationalist mischief,
particularly north of the Ibar. Albanians in southern
Serbia, having boycotted the parliamentary elections, would
call for secession form Serbia. While the military would not
intervene in Kosovo, it would feel no such restraints on
moving into southern Serbia. Gendarmerie units would take
aggressive measures to put down any Albanian separatism in
the region.

--------------
EMBASSY CONTINGENCY PLANNING
--------------


14. (c) We have taken operational steps to prepare
ourselves for managing events as they unfold. We have set up
a dedicated space that will be used as a crisis management
center in the event of an escalation of tensions, refugee
flows, or even March 17-type violence. We have added extra
phone lines set up a duty roster to make sure there is
24-hour staffing if necessary, ensured VOIP and web-chat
capability as well as radio communications in real time if
cell phones or land lines go down.


15. (c) Our review of the events of March 17, 2004, when
violence erupted in Kosovo that spilled over into Serbia,
suggests that a persistent challenge during the early moments
was establishing real-time communications and sharing
information with our colleagues in USOP, KFOR, and EUCOM.
Cell phones went down, networks were overloaded, and we
lacked established contact procedures that were sure to be
available in times of emergency. Rumor control was a real
challenge.


16. (c) In the weeks ahead, we will be coordinating plans
with the desk, the ops center, USOP, and our military
contacts, as well as refreshing our Serbian contact points.
In the latter context, we are prepared to quickly get in


touch with all senior ministers (particularly defense and
interior); with appropriate military and police commanders
including the head of MININT's gendarmerie, which operates
special forces in southern Serbia; with appropriate KFOR and
EUCOM contacts; with our AID implementers in the field; with
refugee-related NGO's; with key contacts in the church and
with regional leaders in southern Serbia.


17. (c) Our RSO will head our physical planning efforts and
organize a table-top contingency management exercise in early
December, together with USOP. We would also recommend a
similar exercise, perhaps in mid-January, with the ops
center, EUR, EUCOM, KFOR, USOP, and Embassies Belgrade,
Sarajevo, Skopje, and Podgorica.
POLT