K1: MOVING SERBIA BEYOND KOSOVO - IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR U/S BURNS
STATE ALSO FOR EUR - A/S FRIED AND DAS DICARLO
EUR/SCE PLEASE PASS STEVE GEE FOR SE WISNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/16
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL PHUM SR
SUBJECT: K1: MOVING SERBIA BEYOND KOSOVO - IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT

REF: BELGRADE 1719

CLASSIFIED BY: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
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1. (c) As part of our Mission-wide K1 (Kosovo
settlement and aftermath) strategy, we have laid out in
reftel our recommendations on how to manage the endgame
in the status process here in Serbia. This message
focuses on the next step of K1: expectations and
consequence management. This involves a combination of
public and private messages, along with operational
preparedness that will help guide us through the most
difficult upcoming moment in Serbia. That moment, in our
view, is the time immediately before and after Ahtisaari,
the U.S., and key Europeans declare their support for
Kosovo independence and their intention to recognize.


2. (c) We are currently implementing phase one of our
four-phase K+1 approach: a pre-electoral effort to get-
out-the-vote (GOTV) and to engage and support democratic
forces in the run-up to the January 21 parliamentary
elections. Consequence management described in this
message constitutes K+1 phase two. This message will be
followed by phase three, our recommendations for rolling
out the Serbian benefits package once we judge, among
other things, Serbia's reaction to Kosovo settlement in
the aftermath of the January elections. A final message
will focus on our post-Kosovo engagement with a new
democratic government that will seek to address pending
ICTY obligations, strengthen democratic institutions, and
propel Serbia decisively into the Euro-Atlantic
community. End summary and introduction.

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BELGRADE ON KOSOVO: NO CHANGES FROM NOW TO ELECTIONS
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3. (c) There will be no change in Belgrade's rhetoric
(from Kostunica or Tadic) from now until after the
electoral votes are counted. In fact, the clamor will
get only stronger as we move closer to the polling date.
Given the intensity of the domestic media campaign,
public opinion is likely to be affected in two ways:
there will be a growing belief that the government, with
Russia's help, is making progress on blocking the
Ahtisaari process, and there will be ongoing pressure for
all the parties to stay faithful to the nationalist line.
Our GOTV campaign will at best be able to encourage
political abstentionists to consider voting for their
democratic party of choice and to push their future
government to take a more realistic attitude on Kosovo
after the election.

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REACTION TO AHTISAARI AND NEXT STEPS
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4. (c) Ahtisaari's early February presentation of his
proposal to the two parties will hardly affect the
dynamic here. If Ahtisaari engages only privately with
the parties, Belgrade will simply dismiss his plans and
deny that we are any closer to an independence outcome.
Pristina will acknowledge that they have received
confirmation of an independence outcome and confidently
look to New York. Russia will continue to suggest that
the outcome is not settled and that everything is on the
table. We and the Europeans will support Ahtisaari, but
defer to his UN report and recommendations.


5. (c) There is not likely to be a new government in
Serbia when Ahtisaari meets with representatives from
Serbia. Even if the democrats come out on top as we
suspect, the negotiations for the formation of a new
government are likely to be protracted (after 2003
elections, negotiations lasted 11 weeks). Kostunica
might try to push for some form of a national unity
government and might even refuse to meet with Ahtisaari -
on the grounds that he has no governing mandate - in an

effort to put Tadic in a difficult spot. An invitation
to comment on the proposal will produce at best a
reiteration of previous harangues against Ahtisaari and
his process.


6. (c) There will be little space or utility in
Serbia's politically-charged and well-controlled media
environment to respond publicly to any of the histrionics
in the run-up to UN action in New York. We plan to focus
our public statements here on full support for Ahtisaari
and the process and highlight the reasons for why
constructive Serb engagement in the end-game is in the
best interest of Serbs here and in Kosovo. In private,
we will continue to remind leaders of the personal
responsibility they carry to prevent provocations and
violence. Unfortunately, Serb rhetoric on the other side
of the ABL will be even worse than in Belgrade, which in
turn will do little or nothing to help tone it down.

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GOING PUBLIC ON INDEPENDENCE
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7. (c) The formal presentation of Ahtisaari's report
and recommendations on status and public announcement of
our support for Kosovo's independence will be a
watershed. At that point, neither Serbia nor the
Russians nor certain Europeans will be able to obfuscate
about the outcome. On our end, we plan to proceed on an
immediate media blitz in an effort to saturate the public
with a detailed explanation of our position, and to
respond to the emotional and inflammatory messages that
will be forthcoming. We would also include strong public
assurances of our continued engagement in Kosovo, our
support for Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community, our commitment to ensure full respect for all
the standards provisions, and our commitment to ensuring
that Serbs in Kosovo are the "most protected" minority in
the world. We would also point to elements of the
settlement that seek to ensure the preservation of Serbia
religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo with specific
benchmarks to demonstrate that commitment. We continue,
and will intensify, our work with the SOC to support
this. Statements by USOP on implementation, responsible
governance, and respect for minority rights would help
reinforce that message.


8. (c) Our discussion of the settlement would be
grounded in our central K+1 message: Serbia's Euro-
Atlantic integration and democratic future, on its need
to continue economic progress and modernization, further
democratization, and on our efforts to actively
collaborate on those priorities. Depending on the
severity of the Belgrade response, we then plan to shift
the public debate wholly to bread and butter issues of
greatest importance to the Serbian people. Our message
would be relentlessly positive, focusing on the future,
on youth, and on various elements of our benefits
package.


9. (c) We do not plan to persuade on independence.
Most parties will refuse to accept such an outcome. We
won't in any way shy away from our position, but will
after restating it quickly intensify a positive, Serbia-
focused message. Such a message must be carried by the
USG. Polls here suggest that, despite opposition to
Kosovo independence, popular expectations already reflect
such an outcome. Our public diplomacy approach is based
on our expectation of a strong emotional reaction to the
outcome that will quickly give way to a mixture of proud
and stubborn refusal and tacit, black-humored acceptance.

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THE AFTERMATH: BEST-CASE SCENARIO
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10. (c) We expect a range of possible developments on
the ground following the announcement of independence. A
best case scenario would see little more than rhetoric in
Belgrade and from Kosovo Serbs, and a temporary closing
down of the official border crossings. Calls for
secession and partition of northern Kosovo would be

encouraged by Radicals and Socialists but perhaps only
tacitly supported by a new DS-DSS coalition government.
Some Serbs in Kosovo would boldly decide to cooperate
with the new government and participate in Kosovo's
constitutional process. This might be encouraged by some
in Serbia, particularly if the Albanian minority in
southern Serbia participates in parliamentary elections
here and acknowledges being part of Serbia.


11. (c) Kostunica would still call for a national
unity, rejectionist, and separatist front, but
Tadic,
inspired by a better-than-expected democratic victory for
his DS would refuse, asserting his authority over the
military and actively working to lower temperatures while
symbolically continuing to claim Kosovo as a part of
Serbia. Military authorities would be in close touch
with us and KFOR. Tensions would subside relatively
quickly. Official Belgrade would quietly send
instructions to Serb political and security elements in
northern Kosovo not to instigate unrest, using its
control over the official payroll to ensure compliance.
In southern Serbia, ethnic Albanian leaders would corral
their more extremist elements and agree to cooperate with
the government to maintain stability.

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THE AFTERMATH: WORST-CASE SCENARIO
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12. (c) Unfortunately, a worst-case scenario would be
quite the opQsite, with large flows of refugees,
violence in the enclaves, active Serbian support for
Kosovar Serb separation, and significant tensions along
the Ibar river. The injury or deaths of Serbs and
Albanians would heighten passions and spur radicals and
nationalists to push for tough measures: closing the
border; symbolic sanctions against those states
supporting Kosovo's independence; rejection of any
participation in Partnership for Peace, cooperation with
NATO, or even EU ambitions. Kostunica, emerging
empowered by a strong showing in the elections, could
push hard for some form of national unity government.
Tadic would do little to resist and fail to use his
limited authority to calm the nationalist fervor.
Significant flows of refugees into northern Kosovo or
southern Serbia would be encouraged by the government,
either adding to a volatile mix on the streets of
Mitrovica or raising tensions and destabilizing the
situation in Albanian areas of southern Serbia.

13.(c) Contact between Serb military leaders and
Embassy/KFOR would be uneven and incomplete. There would
be active efforts in Belgrade to call on all patriotic
Serbs not to recognize an independence outcome, and
threats and violence against any Kosovo Serbs who tried
to participate in the new Pristina government. The
government in Belgrade would quietly, but actively,
encourage nationalist mischief, particularly north of the
Ibar. Albanians in southern Serbia, having boycotted the
parliamentary elections, would call for secession form
Serbia. While the military would not intervene in
Kosovo, it would feel no such restraints on moving into
southern Serbia. Gendarmerie units would take aggressive
measures to put down any Albanian separatism in the
region.

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EMBASSY CONTINGENCY PLANNING
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14. (c) We have taken operational steps to prepare
ourselves for managing events as they unfold. We have
set up a dedicated space that will be used as a crisis
management center in the event of an escalation of
tensions, refugee flows, or even March 17-type violence.
We have added extra phone lines set up a duty roster to
make sure there is 24-hour staffing if necessary, ensured
VOIP and web-chat capability as well as radio
communications in real time if cell phones or land lines
go down.


15. (c) Our review of the events of March 17, 2004,

when violence erupted in Kosovo that spilled over into
Serbia, suggests that a persistent challenge during the
early moments was establishing real-time communications
and sharing information with our colleagues in USOP,
KFOR, and EUCOM. Cell phones went down, networks were
overloaded, and we lacked established contact procedures
that were sure to be available in times of emergency.
Rumor control was a real challenge.


16. (c) In the weeks ahead, we will be coordinating
plans with the desk, the ops center, USOP, and our
military contacts, as well as refreshing our Serbian
contact points. In the latter context, we are prepared
to quickly get in
touch with all senior ministers
(particularly defense and interior); with appropriate
military and police commanders including the head of
MININT's gendarmerie, which operates special forces in
southern Serbia; with appropriate KFOR and EUCOM
contacts; with our AID implementers in the field; with
refugee-related NGO's; with key contacts in the church
and with regional leaders in southern Serbia.


17. (c) Our RSO will head our physical planning efforts and organize
a table-top contingency management exercise in early December, together
with USOP. We would also recommend a similar exercise, perhaps in mid-
January, with the ops center, EUR, EUCOM, KFOR, USOP, and Embassies
Belgrade, Sarajevo, Skopje, and Podgorica.