Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE1752
2006-10-25 15:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SERBIA AND KOSOVO: WISNER VISIT TO BELGRADE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PBTS KPAO YI SR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001752 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR POLT FOR SPECIAL ENVOY FRANK WISNER, USOP
PLEASE PASS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KPAO YI SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA AND KOSOVO: WISNER VISIT TO BELGRADE
10/31/06


Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4b and d

The Lay of the Land
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001752

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR POLT FOR SPECIAL ENVOY FRANK WISNER, USOP
PLEASE PASS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KPAO YI SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA AND KOSOVO: WISNER VISIT TO BELGRADE
10/31/06


Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4b and d

The Lay of the Land
--------------


1. (C) Frank, Serbian politics have gone into high gear since
your last visit to Belgrade in late July, and every
politician is now in election mode. Although Prime Minister
Kostunica and President Tadic have both improved their poll
numbers by appearing to work together, it is the Prime
Minister who is driving the agenda in Belgrade. Kostunica
has skillfully corralled all the major democratic parties (as
well as the Radicals) to support a Constitution that promises
to force everyone onto his Kosovo platform through a
referendum process that leaves him a great degree of say
about when to have elections and how to choreograph them.


2. (C) Reformist hopes, as you know, lie with the President
and his DS party. But so far, Tadic is either unwilling or
unable to stand up to Kostunica on any significant issue. He
has still not succeeded in forcing Kostunica to agree to
concurrent Presidential and Parliamentary elections in
December, a combination that would boost his party's seats
and give him a stronger hand in forming the next government.
But just as significantly, he has wavered on confirming the
progressive and pro-western Acting Chief of the General
Staff, an appointment that is his alone to make. Tadic's
staff tell us that Kostunica controls levers that prevent him
from moving on this now -- levers that will be in Tadic's
hands after parliamentary elections.


3. (C) Not only did the Constitution save the government from
falling (coalition member G-17 has formally submitted
resignations),but Kostunica is increasingly playing the
Kosovo card in calling on Serbs to support it (despite the
fact that a reputable polling agency showed that the Kosovo
issue is the primary motivator for only 10 percent of those
who say they will vote for the Constitution.)


4. (C) Kostunica has still not made a final decision on when

to hold parliamentary elections, but DSS Party elders are now
claiming in public that it will not be later than January

2007. Much depends on the outcome of the Constitutional
referendum and the ability of the International Community to
stand firm on its timelines. At the end of the day,
Kostunica's options are somewhat limited: his governing
majority is in question and none of the major parties, all of
which supported the referendum, can afford to hold up a
Constitutional law that in November will officially confirm
the results of the referendum and set dates for follow-on
elections - sometime soon. Moreover the key Constitutional
law requires a two-thirds majority - i.e., it cannot be
passed without the support of the Radicals, who are in no
hurry for elections before a Kosovo settlement. If the
referendum fails -- not likely but possible -- all bets are
off on what comes next.


5. (C) Your visit to Belgrade is well-timed -- you can help
remove the GOS-cultivated ambiguity over UNOSEK's Kosovo
timetable. Kostunica claims he has received assurances of
support from Moscow and Beijing for Serbia's stance on
Kosovo, and the well reported rumblings from EU capitals --
most notably Rome -- are feeding a perception with voters
here that the Kosovo status decision may be delayed and
altered. The Prime Minister, buoyed by his success in
orchestrating domestic political forces, appears confident
that he can similarly steer the international community away
from an independent Kosovo by exploiting perceived divisions
within the EU and Contact Group. Some suspect that Kostunica
will agree to early parliamentary elections, but will stall
on presidentials in a bid to entice the international
community into further delaying a Kosovo settlement.


6. (C) In addition to reaffirming our commitment to the
Contact Group timeline, you should also remind leaders here
of their responsibility to avoid provocation and maintain
calm. Your discussion with political parties and civic
leaders can help stimulate a discussion on how to help foster
a less emotional and more constructive discussion of the
Kosovo issue and to concentrate Serbia's future. This will

BELGRADE 00001752 002 OF 003


also help me with the "K 1" program we have launched here
to deal with the run-up and aftermath of the Kosovo
settlement in Serbia. K 1 focuses -- as Dan did when he
visited in late September -- on tangible commitments to
working with Serbia's democrats on making the country a more
stable and prosperous member of a modern, democratic Europe.

Your meetings, Your messages
--------------


7. (C/Rel Serbia) I recommend the following messages:

With the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister:
-------------- --------------

-- Reaffirm USG resolve to keep to Contact Group schedule,
irrespective of the domestic political timetable.

-- Reiterate unequivocal support for Ahtisaari and his
UNOSEK team under CG guidance.

-- Inform on plans (as much as you can) to make status
outcome clear in our decisions and public statements by the
end of the year.

-- Reinforce the commitment by the Contact Group to hold
Serbian and Kosovar leaders responsible for any
destabilization by Serbs or Albanians in Kosovo.

-- Reassure on our commitment to ensure decentralization
outcome provides the appropriate guarantees on rights for
Serbs, including especially on cultural and religious issues.

-- Inform on themes from meetings in Pristina as appropriate.

-- Urge realistic engagement with us now and after elections
on helping Serbia move ahead.


With Serbian Orthodox Church leaders:
--------------

-- Thank them for continuing engagement with the Kosovo
status process.

-- Inform on meetings with Teodosije as appropriate.

-- Reassure that UNOSEK has taken church's concerns into
account during this process, and that the rights of the
Church in Kosovo will be protected.

-- Urge them to call for Serbs ("your flock") to stay in
Kosovo and for Serbians in Serbia to engage positively with
the international community whatever the Kosovo outcome.


For Your Meeting with Political Party Leaders
-------------- --------------

We have stopped trying to shift leaders' public stance on
Kosovo, a futile exercise. In the months ahead we will
remain focused on the future of US-Serbia relations,
implementing the Secretary's intention to speed Serbia into
Europe. For these meetings, I recommend a realistic but
future-oriented message that can speak to both our resolve on
Kosovo and collaboration for the future. The following would
be appropriate:

-- We will support the democratic parties against the
radicals and socialists.

-- We will not exclude any democratic party from this
process. We will also increase our support for smaller
parties that are actively supporting a more realistic and
constructive discussion of Kosovo. We will be careful that
our efforts supporting GOTV and civic society initiatives,
and our public messages open the discussion about responsible
alternatives.

-- We respect the challenges faced by your leaders at this

BELGRADE 00001752 003 OF 003


difficult moment in this difficult year and do not expect you
or your leaders to reverse their public Kosovo policy.
However, on a practical level you need to adapt to the
situation -- if Kosovo Serb rights are assured and they
remain in Kosovo, this means Serbia has not "lost."

-- Some have suggested that the Constitution is in part a
political move used to prevent implementation of a positive
vision -- to commit Serbia to a rejectionist position well
into the future.

-- We will continue to remind all our democratic friends
that there is a way to deal responsibly with disagreements
without trapping Serbia in a dead-end and isolationist policy.

-- Your Constitution could be used to do either. We hope
the right decisions are taken. But ultimately managing this
crisis will be a test for Serbia's leadership. You will be
shaping the future environment to either complicate or
facilitate the task of building a more modern, prosperous and
European Serbia.

For your B-92 Interview
--------------


-- We respect the challenges faced by Serbia in this
difficult year.

-- There will be a Kosovo settlement soon and both Belgrade
and Pristina will have to adapt and work positively with the
outcome.

-- Some on both sides of the ABL may be tempted to prevent
implementation of a positive vision whatever the settlement.
We are resolved to assist those who want to work for a
positive future for Serbia, including Kosovo and the whole
region.

-- We will continue to remind all our democratic friends
that there is a way to deal responsibly with disagreements.

-- We hope the right decisions are taken. But ultimately
shaping their own future will be a task for the Serbian
people.

-- Clearly, there is a choice. You can either complicate or
facilitate the task of building a more modern, prosperous and
European Serbia.


A Final Word
--------------


8. (C) The bottom line: We need to inject certainty on the
Kosovo outcome directly into the calculations of Serbian
politicians and opinion-makers while continuing to encourage
reform elements to manage the end game constructively. A
referendum and looming elections simply do not change that
reality. As you well know, we are not talking about asking
for their support on final status, but rather to step up to
the plate and show some strong leadership that will preserve
Serbia's future.

Cheers, Mike
POLT