DISAPPOINTING DEL PONTE VISIT TO BELGRADE (ICTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001644

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STATE FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/RPM
STATE ALSO FOR S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: DISAPPOINTING DEL PONTE VISIT TO BELGRADE (ICTY
ACTION PLAN UPDATE NO. 6, SEPT 25 - OCT 3)

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Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.5 (b,d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) As foreshadowed by ICTY Action Plan Coordinator
Ljajic late last week, the Serbian government presented lots
of promises but reported little substantive progress in
October 2-3 meetings with visiting ICTY Chief Prosecutor
Carla Del Ponte. At the end of her visit, CDP told us that
her assessment of the GOS' implementation of its Mladic
Action Plan is "absolutely negative."

Ljajic's Weekly Report: No Good News
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2. (C) In his weekly meeting with polcouns on September 29,
Ljajic had nothing new to report. He appeared unhappy about
the arrival of Del Ponte and seemed resigned to an unpleasant
visit. He noted her critical remarks after her meeting with
EU Enlargement Commissioner Rehn, but was adamant that the
government was doing everything possible to locate Mladic and
the other remaining PIFWCs. He said that Del Ponte would
receive a detailed report of the intelligence and activities
related to the Mladic search, but it would add nothing new
from prosecutor Vukcevic's most recent report. On the
postponement of the trial of Mladic supporters announced
earlier in the week, Ljajic stated that while the judge had
handled it less than optimally, there was no real surprise in
the defendants' efforts to accuse the government of
complicity. He did not expect that to alter the likely
guilty verdict.


3. (C) When asked about how recent political events -- the
resignation of G17 Plus and the passing of the new
constitution by Parliament -- might impact GOS efforts on
Mladic, Ljajic said, "that is the exact question I posed to
the Prime Minister this morning." He commented that the
package that had been approved in connection with the
constitution (parliamentary vote, referendum, follow-on
elections) was a "total farce; unbelievable even by Serbian
standards." While Ljajic opined that the election-related
activities were a sham, i.e., a backroom deal among the major
parties that would make the referendum and elections only
about Kosovo, Ljajic insisted that the PM's, his and the
Action Team's efforts on Mladic were serious, transparent,
and without reservation.

Del Ponte Disgusted With Serbian Efforts
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4. (C) Del Ponte's arrival several days later confirmed
Ljajic's bleak prognosis. In her outbrief to local
embassies following two days of meetings with Serbian
Government officials, Del Ponte said that she was
"dissatisfied" with the implementation of the Action Plan for
three main reasons. First, she considered the outflow of
information among the key players to be poor. Second, she was
disappointed with the lack of coordination among the Serbian
State Intelligence Service (BIA) and the Serbian Military
Intelligence Service (VBA). Third, she said that the GOS
lacked a focused and coherent strategy and was merely
"fishing around" in Mladic's support network. On this point,
she cited inconsistencies in the GOS reports on Action Plan
implementation and claimed that the GOS had absolutely no
promising leads. She opined that if there was no significant
change in these areas, the GOS would "never catch Mladic."
Del Ponte announced she was assigning an analyst in Belgrade
to liaise with the Action Plan players to provide her daily
briefings and updates.


5. (SBU) Del Ponte criticized Serbian Prosecutor for War
Crimes Vukcevic's efforts, claiming he was "coordinating" and
not "directing" and that the results were erratic and
inconsistent. She noted that BIA Chief Bulatovic and VBA Head
Kovac made numerous claims in her meetings of which Vukcevic
was not aware. She ended by alleging that her office has 2-3
pieces of "concrete evidence" proving that the GOS is not
cooperating with the ICTY, citing lack of political will to
seriously go after Mladic.


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Del Ponte Asks For US Advice
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6. (C) At a dinner with the Ambassador, Del Ponte asked how
she should approach her meeting with Prime Minister
Kostunica. She described her five-hour meeting with Vukcevic
earlier that day as "five hours of trash." The Ambassador
encouraged Del Ponte to press Kostunica to kick off an
intensive media campaign with an "Oval Office-type" speech to
the public calling for Mladic's arrest and extradition. Del
Ponte wondered whether she should push Kostunica to fire
Bulatovic and Kovac since they had produced no results. The
Ambassador doubted that Kostunica would take any such action,
but agreed it would not hurt to make such a suggestion as a
technical move to suggest the seriousness of our approach.
Del Ponte finally admitted to the Ambassador that she was
wrong in March when she defiantly insisted that Kostunica
would turn over Mladic by April, but said she still had "a
gut feeling" that something positive would happen with
regard to Mladic by the end of the year.

Kostunica's Empty Promises
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7. (SBU) According to Del Ponte, Prime Minister Kostunica
told her that he was willing to give Vukcevic all the
authority he needed to head the search for Mladic, including
support for legislation that would give the prosecutor the
ability to target support networks. COMMENT: Since
Parliament is likely to be in recess until after the
constitutional referendum, Kostunica's assurances will have
little practical effect in the near term. END COMMENT.
Although Kostunica also assured Del Ponte that there were no
political obstacles to apprehending Mladic, she remains
extremely skeptical. She claimed that the Action Team
confirmed to her that the GOS missed an opportunity to arrest
Mladic in February, instead opting to communicate with an
intermediary in an attempt to entice him to voluntarily
surrender.


8. (C) Del Ponte told local Embassies that she had pressed
Prime Minister Kostunica to make an Oval Office-type address
as well as to lead a more aggressive public campaign, which
could create a more conducive climate for Mladic's arrest.
Kostunica, who Del Ponte described as "calm" and "quiet"
claimed that he would seriously consider these options and
was "ready to do more," but his watered down and uninspired
public statement after their meeting indicates that he
probably has no intention of taking more aggressive action.


9. (C) CDP bemoaned the fact that "she alone" is looking
for Karadzic. NATO's departure from Bosnia and EUFOR's lack
of a clear PIFWC mandate made the picture even bleaker, she
said. CDP said that the OTP believed that Karadzic was
frequently on the move between the RS, Montenegro, and
Serbia, but that OTP's "current information" is that Karadzic
is not/not in Serbia. CDP's team also reported that the GOS
believes that PIFWC Goran Hadzic is not in Serbia.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) Del Ponte's visit did not bring any new revelations
on the Action Plan or the search for Mladic. Ljajic seems
increasingly dejected in our weekly meetings; while Vukcevic
in our private discussions seems to be getting nervous that
he will be everyone's fall guy for any dramatic failure.
Clearly frustrated, Del Ponte indicated she would probably
present a highly negative assessment to the EU Troika later
this month. Kostunica continues to promise full cooperation,
but refuses to take any significant action on this issue, and
with the constitutional referendum, elections, and Kosovo, it
is likely to become increasingly difficult to get the GOS to
focus more intently on this issue.
POLT